Cash maintenance of officers in the tsarist army. Russian army through the eyes of an eyewitness

“... So, we are assured that the tsarist soldier ate meat every day, in peacetime, 307-453 g each, strictly military 716 g each, and this was the weight of purely boiled beef, from which all bones and fat were carefully removed , and the Russian Army had a unique immunity to theft and extreme circumstances. ”

Personally, I was forced to investigate the issue by the controversy in LJ, during which I learned amazing things from young historians, ”writes Aleksey Sergeev historian30h   in my material, which I recommend for review:

“In general, there was trouble with meat in the Red Army, 175g according to the front-line norms of 1934, 150g according to the front-line norms of 1941, versus 716g. in wartime and 307 in peacetime in the Imperial Army ".
“The daily rate of meat consumption in the tsarist army (and this is only beef without bones!) For the lower rank (ordinary, non-commissioned officers) was 1 pound. This is 409.5 grams of beef pulp. The combat company of that time consisted of 240 lower ranks and 4 officers. Thus, about 100 kg of meat was required per day. ... From a bull calf weighing 200 kg received 100 kg of meat on the bones. Pure flesh was 10% less (minus the actual bones, hardness, liver). As a result, we can say that the front company needed at least one goby per day. ”.
« Only beef was used in the Russian army, while, for example, pork and lamb were still used in the German army. It is rather difficult to explain, but it was likely that this was so because a large number of “Gentiles” served in the Russian army. “So, what was supposed to include, according to the pre-war standards of allowance, rations of ordinary infantry units of the Russian Imperial Army? First of all, a pound (453 g) of boiled beef».
« The food reached the soldier in the prescribed amount, and was not stolen in huge dining rooms. Also, meat portions still implied meat, and not fat with bones, as in the Soviet army. Not a single officer of the Russian Army would ever allow himself to come to the soldier’s canteen, which was ubiquitous in the Soviet army and, naturally, didn’t add anything to the soldier’s cauldron».

So, we are assured that the tsarist soldier ate meat every day, in peacetime, at 307-453 g, strictly military at 716 g each, and this was the weight of purely boiled beef, from which all bones and fat were carefully removed, and the Russian Army She had a unique immunity to theft and emergency.

I didn’t have to go to the library or archive on purpose; it turned out that even an incomplete collection of pre-revolutionary sources available on the Internet in the public domain is quite enough for reliable conclusions, which I present to your court. You will find links at the end of the article, I will give the most important quotes in the form of scans, if it turns out to be few, I will add scans in the comments to the article, ask.

1.Two fundamental reservations:   a) We are talking primarily about norms and rules, and not about their implementation in life. b) We are talking about an ordinary salary for lower ranks, although there were higher rates and lower rates.

2.Meat or money?
The meat norm was issued to the tsarist soldier as part of the welding allowance. Orders of the military department determined the size of the meat dacha in cashcorresponding to the established local purchase price of the specified amount of meat. In this regard, I came across the opinion, they say, "money was still not meat." I protest categorically. The royal soldier received his established standard of meat in kind, and the monetary form of welding allowance served only as a means of interaction between military commissariat and military units, because in peacetime, military units often purchased the necessary meat on their own. For example, on the eve of the First World War, in connection with the rise in price of meat, the Military Council allowed the military units to initiate requests to increase the established welding salaries (1), however, this concerned only money - the natural size of the meat dacha remained the same. In connection with this, below, for simplicity, I will call the meat norm immediately in weight terms.

3. What was this meat norm?   At the beginning of the XX century. combatant and non-combatant lower ranks of regular troops (hereinafter referred to as “tsarist soldiers”), according to the usual salary, were to receive a daily norm of half a pound meat (205 grams) in peacetime and a pound (410 grams) in wartime. If in wartime various objective circumstances could interfere with obtaining norms and interfered, then for peacetime we can quite confidently say that the tsarist soldier received it stably.

Then, politics intervened in the issue of soldiers' nutrition. For some reason, I have not met this obvious consideration anywhere, although the historian must systematically consider any historical problems. On December 5, 1905, revolutionaries (primarily the Bolsheviks) in Moscow adopted a decree on the start of a general political strike on December 7 with its transfer to an armed uprising. And on December 6, Nicholas II “the highest commanded to deign (pr.v.v. 1905 No. 769): a) increase the indicated supply of meat by ¼ pound per day per person, i.e. to determine such a ¾ pound per day per person, ”and so as not to get up twice, he introduced tea allowance (2). The connection between these two decisions is obvious, so the Bolsheviks were able to achieve an increase in the standard of living of fellow citizens long before they came to power. From that time until the outbreak of World War I, the meat norm of peacetime was ¾ pound (307 grams), and wartime - 1 pound (410 grams).

I publish a scan from the 1914 reference book (3), which clearly shows that the union “or” between 1 pound of fresh (rather than boiled) meat and 72 spools (307 g) of canned meat means the possibility of replacement, and not the rate of addition (why some historians got 716 g).

4. On comparing the norm itself.
The 9th volume of the Military Encyclopedia (1911-1915) compares the Russian norm with the norms of the European armies: “All days. cottages of meat and fat: in the Russian army (¾ fn. meat) - 307 grams., in French - 300 in German small cottage - 180 grams. meat and 26 - lard; large cottage - 250 grams. meat and 40 - lard, in Austrian - 190 grams. meat and 10 grams. lard ”(4). However, as we shall see, comparing meat dachas in different armies in isolation from the content of the rest of the allowance is meaningless.For example, in the German army a slightly smaller volume of animal proteins was compensated by giving 230-300 grams of legumes. In the Red Army, the Red Army soldier received animal protein and meat and fish really every day, and the tsar’s soldier, either one or the other, depending on fasting or fasting days, but didn’t receive at all on strict fasting.

As you can see, the propaganda of the Russian army in the First World War was forced to respond to a comparison of the allowances of the Russian and German soldiers.

5. What kind of meat are we talking about in the standards of allowance of the Russian army?
Firstly, exclusively about the weight of fresh unprepared meat (see scan above). If, for example, the norm was given out as a finished dish, namely canned meat, then instead of 1 pound of fresh meat, 72 spools (307 g. Or. Pound) of canned food (net weight) were put. Moreover, about half of this weight is broth and fat. Needless to say, it was as if only the flesh of the meat was taken into account, I don’t even understand how such an opinion divorced from life could appear. Often, especially in wartime, meat was waiting in line in the form of herds of livestock, which was eventually consumed whole, except without skin, horns and hooves.

I did not find photos of herds of cattle that were moving to the front line, but perhaps this goby on the left is waiting in line.

The instructions of the military department of 1913 indicated that livestock from 8 to 9 pounds weighing (131-147 kg) should be contracted for deliveries to the army (5). Those. fatness of livestock was limited from above for cost savings. For the same purpose   The Military Council ordered contracts for the supply of meat of the 2nd grade   where possible (6). Moreover, making a march to military units, cattle destined for slaughter lost even more fatness, often eating only pasture (it was indicated to have a live cattle reserve for 10 days). By the way, according to the “Instructions for service at the army stages” of 1901, “livestock feeding is included in the cost of meat” (7).

It is curious that when in early 1916 the army succeeded in introducing a “surplus appraisal” of compulsory meat supplies at solid (below market) prices under the threat of requisition, the norms of fatness were increased. Now oxen and cows were accepted (bulls were not accepted) at least 1.5 years old, with a live weight of at least 15 pounds of sufficient fatness. For areas where it was difficult to find the required number of oxen and cows weighing more than 10-12 pounds (164-197 kg), such weight was allowed, provided that it was well-fed. This norm will tell a clever person a lot about the size of outbred peasant cattle in the empire (8).

6.Only in the soon days!
In any army in the world, food standards must be replaced if there are reasons for this. The Russian army was no exception. First of all, you should know that in peacetime, the meat norm was just meat only on short days, and in lean days it was given out by fish or mushrooms. In the year of fasting days, it was slightly less than half (about 45%), on average it can be roughly said that the tsarist sold meat 16-17 days a month, and the rest was content with fish and mushrooms. Therefore, if we make a comparison with the same Red Army second. floor. 1930s., Then the meat cottage of the imperial days of the tsarist soldier should be scattered throughout the year, and then only get the average real daily rate. For peacetime, I obtained a meat cottage in 169 from a tsarist soldier versus 175 from a Red Army soldier. Almost the same. I would not be surprised if the Bolsheviks calculated the Red Army norm by scattering the Tsar’s norm without fasting days. On fasting days, the tsar’s soldier replaced meat with fish or mushrooms, depending on the severity of the fast. According to the conditions of that time, most often snacks, dried river fish trifles, ¾ pound per pound of meat were received under the fish. In fairness, it should be said that the 1916 company management manual states: “in the form of saving the health of the lower ranks, as well as in special local conditions, the heads of divisions are also allowed to prepare fast food for people” (9) . I doubt that in peacetime such an idea would occur to officers in a normal situation, but in the war years, I believe that they could use this right periodically.

The meat contentment of tsarist soldiers during the days of fasting.

7. Rationing of meat substitution.
In addition to lean days, under certain circumstances there were options for other meat replacements. Although they tried to use beef, it was possible to replace it with lamb, pork, game, fish, sausages, lard, cottage cheese, cheese, milk. I publish a scan from the reference book of 1899 (10) on options for replacing meat in wartime.

In 1912, the use of buffalo meat in the Caucasus District was prohibited, i.e. they bought themselves quite well before the ban (8). By the way, both lard and pork were supposed to be less than the norm of beef - I am writing specifically for those who reproach the Soviet Army today for the wide supply of pork to soldiers. Indeed, pork has more calories. Instead of a pound of beef, ¾ pound of pork or lard was given (11).

This is fat pork for us - we move a little, we already consume a lot of fat. And in the past, pork was considered more valuable meat than beef. The transfer of the army to pork in the USSR is the desire to improve nutrition. So, if we compare the meat ration of Soviet soldiers in the late USSR and tsar’s soldiers, then the pre-revolutionary norm should be further reduced by a quarter according to the tsar’s replacement standards. It is wrong to say that the tsarist soldier ate boiled beef without bones, and the Soviet soldier ate fat and bones. It’s funny, but rightly so: the tsarist soldier was given less fat and more bony beef meat (in beef, the percentage of bones was greater than the pig), and the Soviet soldier was given fatter and less bony pork meat.

8. Did theft affect soldiers rations?
I don’t want to deliberately delve into the methods of meat procurement by military units, as well as control. I assure you that the imperial military department has surrounded this process with a sufficient number of reports and instructions to make theft and fraud as difficult as possible. However, at all times thieves find loopholes, in this the Russian army was hardly different from another army in the world. I suppose that the theft in the tsarist army was due to kickbacks on contracts, but the soldier still got his meat norm. The treasury rather than the soldier suffered.

9. Real military meat cottages.
I do not see much point in comparing in detail the meat allowance of the tsarist soldier and the Red Army during the First World War and the Great Patriotic War — wars of such tension create force majeure circumstances. I will give a brief general information. Both governments did what they could. There were pre-war intentions of the tsarist government to give out a pound of fresh meat, and the Soviet norm of 07/04/1935 - 175 g of meat and 75 g of fish. Reality turned out to be more complicated. The Soviet Union in the first weeks of the war lost a significant part of the territory with millions of herds of cattle. The Russian Empire, with smaller mobilization, on the contrary, got the meat trophies. But then, the Soviet Union on the meat issue hedged lendlis, and the Russian Empire was faced with insufficient development of its own railway network, neither the number of wagons nor the carrying capacity of which allowed to bring livestock in the quantities needed for the front.

As a result, norm No. 1 of 09/12/1941 for the Red Army soldiers (and command personnel) of the combat units of the army began to contain 150 grams of meat and 100 grams of fish (total 250 grams), norm No. 2 on the rear of the army — 120 grams. meat and 80 fish (200 g total), norm No. 3 for the remaining parts - 75 g meat and 120 g fish (195 g total). As you can see, the loss of tens of millions of cattle in the Red Army was partially offset by fish. During the First World War, with an initial central norm of 1 pound of meat until 1916, it was allowed for the commanders of the fronts to change it on their own initiative. “Thus, by personal order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front on August 25, 1914, the daily rate of meat per person in connection with the abundance of meat resources in the front line was increased by 1 pound (up to 820 g)” (12). This front abandoned this norm a few months later, and then “in connection with the depletion of food supplies in the front line and the deterioration of the conditions for the supply of food from the internal regions of the country, a decrease in food supply standards begins in March 1915. From March 25, 1915, the daily supply of meat was reduced from 1 1/2 pounds to 1 pound (410 g). ” “Until January 1916, the demand of the fronts ... in meat and fat was expressed in 15.3 million pounds, and only 8.2 million pounds were sent” (13), in other words, the existing norms were a little more than half full. Since January 1916, the single norm was already 2/3 pounds of meat (273 g) for the front and ½ pound (205 g) for the rear. Of course, there was no additional norm for fish; if necessary, it replaced meat. “Due to the reduction in food supplies, especially meat, the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters since February 1916 introduced mandatory fasting days, first in the rear area (up to four days a week) and then in the military area (up to three days a week)” (14 ) “During the war, due to the lack of meat, it was legalized to replace it with fish or herring in the following proportions: on the South-Western Front, 42 spools of fish (179 g.) Or one can of canned fish were issued for one pound of meat, on the North-Western Front a pound of meat was replaced by an equal weight of fresh and salted or 42 spools of dried fish ”(15). As we see, it makes no sense to exaggerate the successes of the autocracy in military meat supply, however, I would not blame them, no one was preparing for such a war.

10. Food culture.
In conclusion, I would also like to touch on the issue of food culture, directly related to the meat dacha, which is not generally recognized by the majority of those who touched on this topic. I do not want to throw a stone in the food business of the tsarist troops, for that time the norms themselves were quite advanced. They say that the tsarist army was the first to use field camping kitchen, which cooked food on the go.

With all this, the tsarist soldier received hot food twice a day before the war in the barracks, at lunch and in the evening (tea and bread were given in the morning), and the Red Army soldier also had a hot breakfast (on campaigns, there was already every way in the war, this Clearly, it’s silly to compare here). The tsarist soldier fasted during Lent strictly, and the Red Army man ate both fish and meat every day. The Red Army soldier was laid three times as many vegetables (according to the peace rate of 750 against 256 grams of a tsar’s soldier), the Red Army ate half white bread, and the tsar’s soldier was normalized with rye (not the one we buy, but only from rye flour). In 1909-1911 Gromakovsky conducted a study of the effect of uniform lean food on the weight of soldiers. For all three years, the lean food given to the soldiers was more high-calorie than the fast-food (3759-4200 cal versus 3473-3814). However, for 2.5-3 months of frequent consumption of fast food, 82-89% of soldiers increased their weight, and during Lent, 45-78% of soldiers reduced their weight (16). Understand not only quantity is important, but also a set of products!

We can say that the tsarist soldier ate more rarely, more abundantly, more coarse food, less diverse, by the standards, alas, a lower food culture than the Red Army. The Red Army ate more often hot food, their food allowance was more diverse and more consistent with proper nutrition. Modern man will easily accept the table of the Red Army man - he is close and understandable to him. The table of the tsarist soldier on a kilogram of pure rye bread, rice porridge, beef and potatoes with sour cabbage, with an abundance of posts - it will be difficult for us. Let me give you examples of the soldier’s kitchen (17), which some legends say about how tasty the king’s soldier’s cabbage soup and porridge were, not that ...

The recipe for soup is unusual for us. Only cabbage, often sour, meat, onions, flour, salt and spices and ... cereals for filling. Neither carrots nor potatoes - the standards for vegetables are very low. But if the potato soup, then there are no other vegetables, however, the soup is very thick by the standards. Or here is a scan of the recipe for "meat soup" (18).

I see what this soup is for? In order for the soldier to crumble his black bread there, a prison was obtained. In certain conditions it will go away with a bang, but this is the most primitive cuisine. The Red Army would have thrown at least vegetables and potatoes — his norm allowed it. By the way, let's still lay out a scan of how they shared the meat cottage. Everything is right there, just to be known (19).

Summarize. The subject of the meat contentment of the tsarist soldier today turned out to be roughly mythologized and misunderstood. Noting the desire of the tsarist military department to make the soldier’s food more satisfying, better, to protect the soldier’s table from various abuses, we must admit that after the revolution the improvement of the soldier’s table continued, there was no rollback. Even the meat dacha itself, on an annualized basis, remained at the same “tsarist” level, but diversity was added to the food by adding fresh vegetables, canceling fasting, introducing daily fish catering, and the share of easily digestible food (white bread, fish, vegetables, pasta) increased hot breakfast added. Under Nicholas II, the Russian army received a field kitchen, tea allowance, a good meat norm. Under the Bolsheviks, the Red Army received white bread, a hot breakfast, and a more rational food system. I propose not to oppose these two periods of our history on the “meat issue”.

References:
1. Supplement for 1912 to the directory of K.Patin, a complete and detailed alphabetical index of orders for the military department, circulars, instructions and reviews of the General Staff and so on. Main Directorates and orders, orders and circulars in all military districts. - S.-Pb., 1913. S.305-306. Supplement for 1913 to the directory of K.Patin, a complete and detailed alphabetical index of orders for the military department, circulars, orders and relations of the General Staff and so on. Main Directorates and orders, orders and circulars in all military districts. - S.-Pb., 1914. S. 215-216.
2. The economy in the company, squadron and hundreds (Pocket Military Library). - Kiev, 1916.S.60.
3.Lositsky N.M. A complete guide for the captain army (company and squadron, with their assistants, regimental: treasury, quartermaster and weapons) in the infantry, cavalry, engineering and auxiliary troops. A manual for company (squadron) commanders, chiefs of command and ranks of the regimental headquarters for managing departments of the military economy. Issue 8th, rev. And add. By April 1, 1914 - Kiev, 1914. P.259.
4. The military encyclopedia. - St. Petersburg: t. In I.V. Sytin, 1911−1915. - T. 9. S.146-158.
5. Supplement for 1913 ... S.215.
6. Supplement for 1912 ... P.307.
7. Instruction for service at the stages of the army. - Kiev, 1901. P.61.
8. The most important provisions for the organization of livestock supplies for the food of armies through the zemstvos or organs replacing them of February 27, 1916 / Calendar of the farmer for 1917 p. 189.
9. A farm in a company ... S.25.
10.Pestic. Layout of food, fodder and welding on the basis of cottages established by the highest approved "Regulation on the food of troops in wartime." - Vilna, 1899. P. 4.
11. The economy in the company ... S. 26.
12.Shigalin G.I. War economy in the first world war. - M.: Military Publishing, 1956. P.205.
13. There, p. 211.
14. There, p.205-206.
15. There, p.207-208.
16. Hygienic issues of the organization of military nutrition and water supply. - Leningrad, 1938. P.27.
17. The economy in the company ... S.59.
18. Lositsky N.M. The complete guide ... P.265.
19. The economy in the company ... S.25.

I would be grateful for an indication of inaccuracies and errors. - Alexey Sergeev aka historian30h.

Original taken from

"What are we fighting for?" - the question, in fact, during the war is by no means rhetorical, but the most pressing one. The idea is, of course, an important thing, but you won’t be fed up with it alone under the bullets and shells - everyone wants to have at least some money for personal expenses, everyone wants to be sure that in case of injury and, especially death, their families will not remain abandoned, and after the victory, the merits will be marked not only by medals. Meanwhile, when talking about the First World War, historians usually bypass such everyday details, focusing on the number of armies, guns and machine guns, numbers of losses, and pay attention to finances only in connection with issues of the global military economy. What kind of money lay 100 years ago in the pockets of officer service jackets and soldier's tunics is in the material of the Russian Planet.

Wealthy generals and modest guides

At the beginning of the war, the "salary" of officers of the Russian army was determined by order of the Ministry of War No. 141 of June 15, 1899. At one time, this order significantly increased the income of the military. In accordance with it, the full general received 775 rubles a month, the lieutenant general - 500, the colonel - 325, the captain (company commander) - 145 rubles. The lowest paid officer in peacetime was the second lieutenant (an analogue in cavalry - a cornet, among the Cossacks - a corral; the first officer rank in the army, conditionally equivalent to the current rank of lieutenant - RP), who received 55 rubles a month.

This "salary by rank" consisted of three components - the actual salary, the so-called table money and additional salary. “Table money” was reckoned to officers from the captain (company commander), inclusive and higher, their size depended on the position held. The sums of table money impressive at that time were received by generals and commanders of regiments - from 475 to 225 rubles a month. The maximum amount of “canteen money” was received by the generals and senior officers, who held positions in the departments of military districts, corps and division commissaries. Full generals, in addition to other payments, received another 125 rubles a month of “representation money” for, as the name implies, various representation expenses.

The captain (company commander) received 30 rubles of “table money” per month. For comparison, a lunch in an average restaurant in 1914 cost about 2 rubles per person, a kilogram of fresh meat cost about 50 kopecks, a kilogram of sugar - 30 kopecks, a liter of milk - 15 kopecks, and the average salary of an industrial worker without a high qualification was a little over 22 rubles per month.

It was traditionally believed that "table money" relied to the commander so that he could regularly collect subordinate officers in his house for general dinners. At the beginning of the 20th century, this medieval tradition was still respected, although it was no longer regularly and not universally. The junior officers (platoon commanders) were not supposed to pay money - there were no officers in their subordination, and the soldiers were actually and legally considered a different social layer, because the rank of second lieutenant already gave personal nobility, completely cutting off its carrier from the lower mass of soldiers.

Equally traditionally, from the 18th century in the Russian army there was a big gap in salaries between the high command staff and the middle and junior officers. While generals and colonels received very substantial money, even by the standards of the richest countries in Europe, then officers of lower ranks were rightly considered low-paid.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the salary of an army lieutenant (a nobleman who graduated from a military school) was only 2-3 times higher than the average salary of an unskilled worker. Therefore, in 1909, to increase the income of middle and junior officers (“headquarters officers” and “chief officers” in the army terminology of that time), the so-called “supplementary salary” was introduced. From now on, the lieutenant received another 15 rubles per month for salary, the captain - 40 rubles per month, and the lieutenant colonel - 55 rubles per month for “additional salary”.

For service in remote areas (for example, in the Caucasus, Turkestan, Omsk, Irkutsk, and Amur military districts), generals and officers had the right to receive an increased, as they said, “enhanced” salary. Special privileges were retained in the guard - officers of the guards units were paid one rank higher by one rank of rank. Thus, for example, the guard lieutenant colonel in rubles received as an army colonel, that is, not 200, but 325 rubles a month.

In addition to all types of salaries, there were additional payments. Those officers who did not live in state-owned apartments received “apartment money”. Their size depended on the rank of officer and place of residence. All settlements of the Russian Empire, depending on prices and living conditions, were divided into 8 categories. In the “first class locality” (capital, large cities and provinces with a high price level), the captain, with a monthly salary of 145 rubles, received 45 rubles 33 kopecks per month of “apartment money” (including 1.5 rubles per month “ to the stable ”), in the cheaper terrain of the 8th category, the captain’s“ apartment money ”amounted to 13 rubles 58 kopecks per month (including 50 kopecks per month for renting a stable).

A full general in the 1st category locality received 195 rubles of “apartment money” every month. For comparison, renting a room in an apartment building in the working district of the provincial city in 1913 averaged 5.5 rubles per month, and a five-room apartment on Liteiny Prospekt in the center of St. Petersburg per month required about 75 rubles of rent.

In addition to “apartment”, generals and colonels regularly received “feed money” - to feed their horses (an average of 10-15 rubles per horse per month), and “travel allowance” during relocations and various business trips. “Travel allowance” included “running money” and daily allowances. The "runners" were calculated according to the old, almost medieval scheme - the lieutenant general, for example, was paid for the passage of a whole caravan of 12 horses, the colonel was supposed to receive less - only 5 horses.

Naturally, in most cases, generals on business trips moved by train, and the difference in rubles between the cost of one train ticket and the run of many horses was put in their pocket. For example, General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, who served as Minister of War of the Russian Empire from 1909 to 1915, shamelessly used this calculation method. As the top leader of the military department, he constantly went on business trips to the military districts of the whole country. Of course, the minister traveled by train, but the “traveling” and “running” money paid him on the basis of trips on two dozen horses at a speed of 24 miles a day. With the help of such a simple bureaucratic scheme, the Minister of War “legally” put tens of thousands of additional rubles into his pocket every year.

Rubles “lifting” and “flying”

In addition to all types of salaries and additional payments, there were also lump-sum payments for some groups of officers. For example, all students in the six military academies that existed in the Russian Empire by 1914 each year received 100 rubles "for books and teaching supplies."

For the junkers who graduated from military schools, when they were promoted to officers, they were supposed to pay a one-time allowance “for acquiring” (that is, the purchase of a full set of officer uniforms) in the amount of 300 rubles, as well as additional money for the purchase of a horse and saddle. Subsequently, officers of the Russian Imperial Army were required to acquire uniforms at their own expense. In 1914, a uniform cost about 45 rubles, a cap - 7, boots - 10, a sword belt - 2-3 rubles, the same shoulder straps.

Therefore, since the declaration of war, all the generals and officers of the Russian army in July-August 1914 were paid the so-called military lifting money. They were intended for the purchase of camping clothes and equipment. Their size was set depending on the rank: generals - 250 rubles, headquarters officers from captain to colonel - 150 rubles. At the beginning of World War I, lieutenants, lieutenants, and staff captains were each entitled to 100 rubles of "military-raising money." At the same time, “military-lifting” officers in the field army were paid in double size, in army and front headquarters in one and a half sizes and in the usual size to officers who remained in the rear.

Since the declaration of war, the entire officer corps of the Russian Imperial Army received an increased ("reinforced") salary. So, if in peacetime the lieutenant colonel received monthly 90 rubles of the basic salary (not including the additional salary, “table money” and other surcharges), then the reinforced basic salary of wartime was already 124 rubles a month.

But, in addition to these payments, payments of “table money” and “additional salary” were also “strengthened”, and “portioned money” was added to them - payments that were supposed to compensate officers for “special conditions and high cost of camping life”. As a result, with all the additional payments, the lieutenant colonel during the First World War received about 360 rubles a month, not counting “apartment money” and “feed money” for keeping at least a couple of horses.

By order of the Minister of War, each officer post was assigned a rank according to which the amount of "field portioned money" was established. The maximum received the corps commander (full general) - 20 rubles "portion" per day, at least 2 rubles 50 kopecks - received the platoon commander.

Since the start of the war, the top command of the Russian Imperial Army, in addition to the salary of the rank and the mass of additional payments, began to receive considerable "additional money". For example, the front commander additionally received 2 thousand rubles a month. As a result, such a commander, with the rank of full general, received at least 5 thousand rubles a month. For comparison, in the fall of 1914, 250 unskilled workers in the city or 500 workers in the village could be hired for a month for this amount.

The First World War became the first war of technology. Therefore, for the first time, technical specialists began to receive big money on it. For example, aviators received, as they said then, vagrant money - 200 rubles a month for officers and 75 rubles for “lower ranks”. “Zaletnye” were awarded monthly to those pilots who spent at least 6 hours in the air. In the same way, additional maintenance for crew members of balloons was calculated. True, the military bureaucracy, in order to save money, introduced a provision according to which “stray” money could not be paid out for more than 6 months a year - as if pilots didn’t fly in wartime year-round.

Money for captivity and wounds, military pensions

In case of injury and retirement from the front, officers retained an “enhanced” salary at the rank and all additional payments, including “table money”. But instead of “field portioned” money, wounded officers received “daily allowance” - 75 kopecks per day for treatment in a hospital and 1 ruble per day for treatment in their own apartment.

In addition, all officers injured or ill at the front were given benefits upon discharge from the medical institution. The amount of such allowance was determined depending on various circumstances and marital status: for generals and colonels - from 200 to 300 rubles, from lieutenant colonels to captains - from 150 to 250 rubles, for all younger officers - from 100 to 200 rubles.

Injured officers who had lost part of their property at the front could claim compensation for these losses in the amount of the amount of “military lifting money” that they were entitled to (from 100 to 250 rubles). In addition, the "military-lifting" were paid to the officer whenever he returned from the hospital to the army.

If an officer was captured, then his family was paid half of his salary and "table money." “Housing money”, if the officer and his family did not occupy the state-owned apartment, were paid to the prisoner’s family in full. It was assumed that upon returning from captivity, the officer was to receive the entire remaining half of the payments for the entire time of his stay in captivity. Such payments were lost only to those who in captivity went over to the side of the enemy.

If the officer went missing, then until his fate was clarified, the family was paid a “temporary monetary allowance” in the amount of one third of the salary and “table money” of the missing person.

Families of officers killed in the war and officers who retired due to injury or life expectancy received a pension. Its payment was regulated by the "Charter on pensions and lump-sum benefits to the ranks of the military department and their families, adopted on June 23, 1912".

By age, a pension was due to officers who had a “length of service” of at least 25 years. In this case, they were paid a pension in the amount of 50% of the last salary, which was calculated taking into account all payments - the basic and “enhanced” salaries, “canteens” and other additional money (except for “lodging”, lump sum benefits and wartime supplements).

For each year served over 25 years, the size of the pension increased by 3%. For 35 years of service, the maximum pension was 80% of the total amount of the last salary. The preferential calculation of the length of service for obtaining the right to retirement was provided. Such benefits, for example, were given by service in a warring army - a month of service at the front was considered two. The maximum benefit was assumed to have been fought as part of garrisons surrounded and besieged by the enemy fortresses - in this case, the month of military service was considered a year when calculating the length of service. The time spent in captivity did not give any benefits, but was taken into account in the length of service.

In some cases, the king appointed pensions in an increased amount. Thus, he was granted pensions to the Minister of War, members of the Military Council of the Russian Empire, commanders of military districts and commanders of corps.

In special cases, the king appointed personal pensions. For example, in 1916, Nicholas II granted a personal pension to Vera Nikolaevna Panaeva, the widow of the colonel, the mother of three sons, officers who died at the very beginning of the First World War and were posthumously awarded the Order of St. George. The brothers who fell in battle served together in the 12th Hussar Akhtyr Regiment. Boris Panaev died in August 1914, leading a cavalry attack on the Austrians. Two weeks later, in September 1914, Guri Panaev died. The third brother, Lev Panaev, died in January 1915. By the decision of the emperor, their mother was assigned a life pension in the amount of 250 rubles per month.

The widows and children of officers were eligible for pensions if husbands and fathers were killed at the front or died from wounds received in battle. Widows received such pensions for life, and children until they came of age.

At the beginning of the war, the number of military pensioners was very small. If in January 1915, at the end of mobilization, 4 million 700 thousand people served in the army of the Russian Empire, then the number of pensioners of the “cash department of the military-land department” was less than 1% of this figure — a little more than 40 thousand.

Pennies of the "lower ranks"

Now we turn to the story of what money the Russian Empire paid to the millions of peasants whom the general mobilization dressed in soldier's overcoats. Soldiers of military service were theoretically on full state support. And the small salary that he was entitled to was actually pocket money to cover petty personal needs.

In peacetime, an ordinary Russian imperial army received 50 kopecks per month. With the outbreak of war, not only officers, but also ordinary soldiers were given a “reinforced salary,” and a private soldier in the trenches began to receive as many as 75 kopecks per month.

The rank and file, who had served the rank of "non-commissioned officers" (what is called the "sergeant staff" in the modern army of the Russian Federation), received significantly more. The highest paid of the soldiers was sergeant major (a rank equal to the modern "foreman"), who received 9 rubles a month in wartime. But one sergeant-servant fell on the whole company - 235 people of "lower ranks".

In the guard regiments, where there was an increased salary, a private soldier in wartime received 1 ruble, and sergeant major - 9 rubles 75 kopecks per month.

However, despite such cheap pennies, there was a thorough detailing of the soldier’s pennies, depending on the military specialty. For example, an ordinary soldier, who served as regimental miner, received 6 rubles a month in wartime (6 rubles 75 kopecks in the guard), and an ordinary soldier with the qualification “weapons master of the 1st category” received 30 rubles a month. This was already equal to the average city salary, but there were even fewer such masters in the army who were able to service and repair complex weapons than sergeants.

Only a few non-commissioned officers and sergeants who remained in long-term service in peacetime had a noticeably better financial situation. In addition to full state support and penny soldier's salaries, which were based on the rank, they also paid the so-called “additional salary” - from 25 to 35 rubles per month depending on the rank and duration of service. Also, their families were paid money for housing rental in the amount of 5 to 12 rubles per month.

In wartime, soldiers' salaries were paid at the beginning of each month a month in advance. When drafted into the army during the mobilization, the soldiers received a kind of "lift" depending on the rank - a conscript called up from the reserve received one ruble at a time, and feldwebel 5 rubles.

The penny wages of the soldiers were to compensate for the full state support, the state and the army fed the soldiers, dressed them from head to toe and provided everything necessary. In theory, according to the norms established by laws, everything looked good here - the conditions of soldier life in the barracks and even at the front were more satisfying and secure than the standard peasant life of the beginning of the 20th century in Russia. But in practice, at the height of the war, everything turned out differently.

Three months after the outbreak of hostilities in the troops, a shortage of clothing and shoes began to be felt. According to the Ministry of War, in 1915 the Russian army received only 65% \u200b\u200bof the required number of boots. In the future, this deficit only intensified. For example, at the end of 1916, in one of the reports of the command of the rear Kazan military district addressed to the chief of the General Staff, it was indicated that there were “no uniforms” in the district, and therefore 32,240 mobilized were sent to the army in their clothes and urgently purchased by the district’s bast shoes . Problems with the shortage of soldier's shoes were not resolved until the end of the war.

They fed the soldiers three times a day. The cost of daily soldiers rations in peacetime was 19 kopecks. General A.I. Denikin recalled in his memoirs about the soldiers ’diet:“ The number of calories and the taste of the food was quite satisfactory and, in any case, more nutritious than the one that the peasant mass had at home. ”

Indeed, the rank and file of the tsarist army ate better than the average Russian peasantry. Suffice it to say that according to existing standards, a soldier was supposed to have more than 70 kilograms of meat per year - while according to statistics in 1913, the average meat consumption in the Russian Empire per capita was less than 30 kilograms.

However, during the protracted war, the government several times reduced food supply standards and cut back on rations. For example, by April 1916, the rate of meat distribution to soldiers was reduced by 3 times.

Soldier "charity"

Upon discharge from the hospital, wounded soldiers received a lump sum allowance, which, depending on rank (from privates to sergeant major), ranged from 10 to 25 rubles, that is, 10 times less than the same allowance given to officers.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, the law of June 25, 1912 "On the charity of lower military ranks and their families" was the first in Russia to provide pensions for soldiers who were injured and lost their ability to work during army service. In the event of complete disability and if such a soldier needed constant care, he received a pension of 18 rubles per month. This was the maximum possible soldier's pension, while the minimum size (with a slight decrease in working capacity to 40%) was only 2 rubles 50 kopecks per month.

The same law first introduced state support to soldiers' families. If the families of the officers lived on the basis of salaries and “apartment money”, then the soldier’s families received the “feed rate” for the warring fathers and husbands - a small amount based on the value of the place of residence 27 kg of flour, 4 kg of cereal, 1 kg of salt and a liter of vegetable oil per month. This "feed norm" was received by the wives and children of mobilized soldiers under the age of 17 years. Children under 5 years old were entitled to half the benefit. As a result, the soldier’s family received no more than 3-4 rubles per month per person, which, before the start of large-scale inflation, made it possible not to die of hunger.

Characteristically, the Russian bureaucracy perceived the missing officers and officers differently. If the officer had the presumption of innocence in this case, and his family received a “temporary monetary allowance” in the amount of one third of the salary of the missing person, then the situation was different for the soldiers. The families of those who were called up to mobilize, in the event their breadwinners were missing, were deprived of the right to receive money at the “feed rate” - just like the families of deserters and deserters were deprived of this right.

After the February Revolution, due to inflation during the war, by May 1917 the salary of the "lower ranks" in the army was increased. Now soldiers, depending on their rank, began to receive from 7 rubles 50 kopecks to 17 rubles a month. In the Navy, the salaries of sailors were even higher - from 15 to 50 rubles.

However, from the beginning of the war until March 1, 1917, the amount of paper money in the country grew by almost 7 times, and the purchasing power of the ruble decreased by 3 times. Over the summer of 1917, the purchasing power of the ruble will fall by another 4 times - amounting to only 6-7 pre-war kopecks by October. That is, in fact, soldier's salary, despite the sharp increase in numbers, will remain at the same level. However, by October 1917, millions of peasants in soldiers' greatcoats, who had not yet deserted from a decaying army, were not worried about their cheap salaries, but much more global and pressing issues of land and peace.

If we objectively consider the situation of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, then a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the imperial army. This is somewhat surprising, but it was created, in my opinion, primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, the “gentlemen of the officers” were portrayed as rich, groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in general and its command personnel in particular. This was especially pronounced in the film "Chapaev", where instead of Kolchak's sufficiently poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the "Kappelevtsy" in pure black and white uniform, advancing in a "psychic" attack in a beautiful formation. Accordingly, high prosperity was also supposed to be trained, as a result - a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by lovers of “Russia that we lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply amateurs of military history, often praising officers came to the point of absurdity.

In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the last role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best gymnasium students simply did not want to “pull the strap” in the officer’s service, when they opened up much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field. It is no accident that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, the cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov wrote in his memoirs: “ It was, of course, difficult for my associates of the time to understand my decision to go to a military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as already noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With such a score they usually went to higher technical educational institutions. According to the general idea, young people in military schools went to military schools. At the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command structure of the army was quite common."Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army since" My parents lived very sparingly, because my younger sister Julia began to study in Chelyabinsk in a female gymnasium. I had to think about the questions more than once: how would I make life easier for my family? The thought occurred to me more than once: “Wouldn’t I leave for military service?” Secondary education would allow to go directly to a military school. About five years at the expense of parents to study at a higher technical institution, one could not even dream of. Therefore, for now, to myself, I firmly decided to go along the military line.»

Despite the cliche about officers as landlord noblemen, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, came from nobles, but were financially close to members of the same community.

« The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guard was far from a frequent occurrence. Turn to the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guard), data on land ownership are available on 36. Of these, five had such. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps gene. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand acres and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one did not indicate the size of the estate, and each of the three amounted to about one thousand acres. Thus, in the highest command category, which had the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
  Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guard), as well as 17 cavalry (15 army and two guard), that is 87 people, 6 people do not have property data. Of the remaining 81, only five (two guard generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, of whom two had estates, and one had their own house) had it. Consequently, land ownership was in 4 people, or 4.9%.

We turn to the commanders of the regiments. As already mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of their total number. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussar, ulan and dragoon) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered. ” If we compare these figures with those for civil servants of the same classes, we get the following: ““ We turn to the list of civil servants of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 people in the ranks of the second class, of whom 44 people owned land, which amounted to 44.9%; 697 people in the third class, 215 of them owned property, which was 30.8%.

Let us compare the data on the availability of land ownership by military and civil ranks of the corresponding classes. So, we have: the ranks of the second class - military - 13.9%, civilian - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is huge.»

On the financial situation P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobility, consisted of serving nobility and in terms of material situation was no different from raznoshintsev"Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes:" The officer was an outcast of the royal treasury. It is impossible to indicate the class of tsarist Russia, which was worse off than the officers. The officer received beggarly maintenance that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. In particular, if he was a family, eked out a miserable existence, undernourished, confused in debt, denying himself the most necessary.»

As we have already seen, land holdings even among the top commanders did not go to any comparison with those of civil servants. In part, this was a consequence of the fact that the maintenance of officials was significantly higher than that of the generals: “ As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division head was 6,000 rubles, and the content of the governor was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, that is, almost twice as much."On a" wide leg "lived unless the guards. General Ignatiev is colorful, although it may be somewhat biased describes his service in, perhaps, the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalier Guard regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of service in this regiment, which was associated both with the costs of uniforms, two especially expensive horses, etc. However, P. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. As such, he considers the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, in the service in which a month had to spend 500 rubles a month - a salary to the head of the division! In general, the Guard was a kind of completely separate corporation, the existence of which introduced a great confusion in the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, it was necessary to get a “guard point” (more than 10 out of 12). In addition, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average points, the best cadets went to the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was practically impossible for a nobleman to get into the most elite Page Corps. Already the fourth in the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoye always had a minimum of guard vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he managed to finish him the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed schools with a significant number of vacancies greatly limited the admission of unrelated cadets there. However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to the tacit, but firmly executed and noted by many researchers: regiment officers must approve the regiment entry. This closeness, caste could block the way for the service of any "freethinker", since loyal feelings were required for service in the guard. Finally, the “property qualification” has already been mentioned. Thus, first of all, wealthy, well-born officers appeared in the guard. True, they needed to perfectly complete the course of schools, but most of the same, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to go to the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” of the tsarist army general! Moreover, career advancement in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have an advantage of 2 ranks over army officers, there was no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard, moreover, the majority of generals who did not have the formation of the Academy of the General Staff came from there. For example " in 1914 there were 36 army corps in the army and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to education data. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 people had higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, 2 from the Artillery Academy, and 1 from engineering and law. Thus, 90% had higher education. Three who did not have a higher education included the commander of the guards corps gene. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps gene. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps gene. G.E. Berhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (gen. Bezobrazov) in the present served in the guard.»

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was due solely to the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first of all fell into the highest posts without the formation of the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: " According to the "Schedule" of 1914, the Russian army included 70 infantry divisions: 3 guard, 4 grenadier, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian rifle. Their heads were lieutenant generals ... By education: 51 people had higher military education (of which 46 were graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, −41- Military Engineering — 4, and Artillery — 1). Thus, 63.2% had a higher education. Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that out of 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guard officers. Here the guards advantage has already affected."As you can see, the" Guards advantage "affects the level of nachdivy. Where does it go when appointing the same people to a slightly higher post of chief of corps? Moreover, for some reason, the author was mistaken about the lack of higher education at G.E.Berkhman, and the rest of the generals were just people from the guard. Not having a higher education, but a very wealthy Bezobrazov so commanded the Guards Corps in general. Thus, the guard was the "supplier" of uneducated academic officers to the higher army echelons.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of justice in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more generous officers, once in the guard, had a much greater chance of making a career than pulling a strap and sometimes more prepared (at least because of less formal conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of the preparation of the higher command structure or the psychological climate. It is known that the division into "castes" reigned in the army. As already mentioned, the guardsmen who had significant preferences among all officers stood out in a special group. But it cannot be said that there were no friction and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. So the most educated officers have traditionally served in the engineering forces and artillery. This was reflected even in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man in the artillery, a drunkard in the navy, and a fool in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the most prestigious was considered the "aristocratic" cavalry. However, she shared. So the hussars and ulans looked down on the dragoons. The 1st heavy brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalier Guard and the Life Guards of the Horse Regiment, who “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. The so-called. "Peter's Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more generous. In artillery, on the other hand, equestrianism was considered an elite, but the serfdom was traditionally considered to be “outcasts”, which pretty much “aroused” in 1915 during the defense of the fortresses. Of course, one cannot say that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in the division and isolation of the various arms of the armed forces from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was to enter the General Staff Academy in Nikolaev. The selection there was very thorough. For this, it was necessary to pass the preliminary exams, and then the entrance exams. At the same time, the best regiment officers initially handed them over. According to Shaposhnikov, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition in the year of his admission. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general subjects. " 1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Weak overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general indiscipline of the mind. 3) Extremely weak knowledge in the field of history, geography. Inadequate literary education“However, it cannot be said that this applied to all general staffists. By the example of B.M.Shaposhnikov it is easy to see that many of them did not have a shadow above the problems mentioned in the document. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the subsequent problems with the formation of the Red Army radically differed from those in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is pretty idealized.

Training at the Academy of the General Staff lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were taught, while military officers mastered disciplines related to combat operations of units. In the second year, general subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, horseback riding classes were held every day. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russo-Japanese war, when the division dispersed during the battles under the Yantai mines, falling into the high Kholan, when the horse of the chief of staff suffered and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander the division was wounded. Perhaps this was already redundant for the positional slaughter of the First World War, but to the criticism of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse, as a way of transportation compared to the car introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with enough vehicles. Buying it abroad was expensive and rather reckless in terms of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant drawbacks. For example, many authors note a weak attention to the development of initiative and generally practical skills. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. At the exit, instead of high-class staff workers, theorists turned out to be far from always representing how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher generally focused on the will to win.

Another problem was the huge expenditure of time on some very obsolete objects, such as the image of the terrain in strokes. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write about it with unkind words. ,
  Contrary to the well-known myth of the fascination of generals with the French school of Granmeson, élan vitale 6, Shaposhnikov testifies to sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the highest generals were not familiar with the German methods of war.

In general, the strength of cadre officers of the tsarist army was morale, readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness, like talking about top secret things in cafes that Shaposhnikov describes in the “Brain of the Army” as applied to the Austrian army. For military personnel, the notion of honor of an officer cost a lot. After the reforms carried out by Golovin, the young officers of the General Staff received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. It was especially important that the tactics of the German troops was no longer a revelation for them, as for the older commanders. The problem of the latter was in a weak interest in self-development, in innovations in both technology and military art. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the plight of the training of the highest command staff was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “Oh paying great attention to training the troops and improving the junior command staff, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command staff: the appointment of people who had spent their whole lives in the administrative chair after graduating from the academy was immediately not uncommon."Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was particularly prominent. Reached jokes: " in 1905–1906 commander of the Amur military district gene. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, was surprised to ask: what kind of weapon?"The same author notes:" The same Lenevich (rightly Linevich - NB) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what train movement was on schedule. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” further Shavelsky notes, “sometimes complete ignoramuses were encountered in military affairs. Military science did not enjoy the love of our military"Echoed them and Denikin:

"I the Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel needed to learn. The oblivion of this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many chiefs on their headquarters. Before the war, the chief, starting with the post of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he had once brought from a military or cadet school; he could not have followed the progress of military science at all, and no one had the idea to take an interest in his knowledge. Any check would be considered offensive ... The general condition of the unit and partly only its management in maneuvers gave a criterion for the assessment of the chief. The latter, however, is very relative: with the inevitable convention of maneuvering actions and our general complacency, maneuvers could make the most gross mistakes with impunity; the disapproving response in the description of large maneuvers, reaching parts in a few months, was losing its sharpness.»

In addition, the officer corps of the higher echelons was extremely old. By age, corps commanders were distributed as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.7 years. Only slightly younger were the division commanders. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the heads of infantry divisions were older than 55 years. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the heads of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this is after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Rediger, however, who quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by a less solid Sukhomlinov. For their rather short board, the attestation commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of the district troops - 6; their assistants - 7; corps commanders - 34; fortress commandants - 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; chiefs of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of independent brigades - 140; infantry regiment commanders - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also requested the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But the problem was Nicholas II. The monarch, praised with all his might, cared little about the combat readiness of the army, paying much more attention to its form and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every way prevented the removal of the generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who did not at all correspond to the position of chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Tsar. No less blame lies with the prime minister, as the distribution of budget funds depended on him to a large extent, which is why he defended against the dismissal of generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting the diary of Polivanov, P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ "Received from EV Journal of the Higher Attestation Commission for corps commanders; followed by permission to dismiss the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion of the dismissal of the gene. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution is “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 Kronstadt defended”". What blood was worth the appointment of nothing particularly distinguished on the battlefields in Manchuria, but the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution by Rennenkampf commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.

True, one cannot say that they did not try to rectify the situation. As Denikin writes, “T one way or another, after the Japanese war, the senior command staff was forced to study. In the spring of 1906, for the first time, at the highest command, the order of the Minister of War appeared: “By the commander of the troops to establish the appropriate occupations of the highest command, starting from unit commanders to corps commanders inclusive, aimed at developing military knowledge." This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in him a scolding of gray hair and undermining of authorities ... But things went little by little, although at first it was not without friction and even curiosities."It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery:" Probably, military thought has never worked so intensively as in the years following the Japanese war. They spoke, wrote, shouted about the need for reorganizing the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, the interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new organs. It seems to me that, if there had not been a lesson from the Japanese campaign and the ensuing upsurge and feverish work, our army would not have stood the test of a few months of world war ...However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A.Svechin writes: “N e less progress should be noted in regard to tactical training of troops and in the advanced training of middle and lower command personnel».

But this was not enough. It is difficult to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short, but also very capacious description of the Russian army before the First World War: “ In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not of personal qualities.»

The Achilles heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political training. The officers were ready to go to death themselves, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin in his book “The Art of Regiment Driving” indicates the inability of staff officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. It must be understood that the times of the Friedrich principle of "a soldier should be more afraid of a stick of a non-commissioned officer than bullets of the enemy" have long passed and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front only by force. Alas, nobody just taught this to Russian officers. And given the completely childish knowledge in the social and political sciences, it is easy to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of the socialist parties. Affected and the separation of officers from the mass of soldiers. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffle in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division was not used solely by virtue of the Guards tradition. The so-called "train", similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered a completely normal phenomenon. , All this was not a noticeable significant part of the war, but the breakdown of discipline, and as a result of the whole army in 1917, showed very well what the inattention to the moral climate inside the army team can lead to.
  The outbreak of World War I completely overturned the officer training system. If before that they were preparing according to a completely harmonious system, getting from the cadet corps to the school, and after its graduation and service the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, now though the schools continued to prepare lieutenants, but only at a greatly reduced accelerated rate. But they could not satisfy the needs of the army. A significant number of warrant officers' schools were opened, graduating officers with extremely weak skills and knowledge.

The most difficult situation was in the infantry. Often you can see such estimates:

« Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command personnel during World War II. As far as I can judge from the data available to me, only in a few regiments the losses of the officers killed and wounded go down to 300%, but usually reach 400-500% or more.

For artillery, I do not have enough complete data. Information on a number of artillery brigades speaks of the loss of officers (over the entire war) in 15-40%. The loss of technical troops is even less. In cavalry losses are very uneven. There are parts that are badly damaged, in others the decrease is completely insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most damaged horse units in comparison with the losses of infantry are negligible. "

The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp “washing out” of the most trained personnel. Those. even those officers who were and commanded the units by the end of the war did not have sufficient education and experience.   “The senior commanding (commanding) staff, taken in only one army, represents a group not so large in size so that the results of its consideration could be applied without substantial reservations to the entire Russian army ...

First of all, when considering the data on the commanding staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders is striking: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments ... According to the previous service, 27 regiment commanders (that is, almost 85% of the total number) belong to the combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regiment commanders there was not a single Officer Genera. The headquarters. Undoubtedly this is an accident, but the accident is very characteristic, indicating a significant decrease among the infantry command personnel of persons with a higher military education ... The majority of command of regiments is very small:

  from 1 to 3 months at 8 regiment regiments,
  from 3 to 6 months at 11 regiment regiments,
  from 6 to 12 months at 8 regiment regiments,
  from 1 to 2 years. 3 regiment regiments,
  more than 2 years. 2 regiment regiments,
... The entire officers under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply distinct groups - personnel officers and wartime officers.
  The first group includes all headquarters officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of headquarters captains (7 out of 38).
  There are 27 full-time officers, that is, not full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers»

So, the infantry personnel officers are knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely insufficient training in both military and general education. The same author gives the corresponding tables:

These tables say a lot. Firstly, it is clear that the rank of "captain" was almost unattainable for a military officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as the future personnel of the Red Army in terms of training. On the other hand, they had already reached high posts under the "old regime" and therefore the stimulus for a career in the new army under the new conditions was not so strong for them and therefore were not as loyal as the junior officers. Secondly, it should be noted the difference in general education. His level of education for staff officers was level, however, it should be noted that incomplete secondary education was not quite what was required of an officer in such a technically intense war as World War I. But already among the staff captains there is a complete disagreement. Officers with higher education appear. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civil path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War. As noted by the famous military writer Golovin, this was the best material for receiving officers, since an intellectual could easily get away from conscription and therefore those who went into the army had not only the best general education, but also the best morale, and in some ways the best moral qualities, rather than, for example, the notorious “Zemgussars”. On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary, but a lower education, or did not have a general education at all. Only a little over a third of the staff captains had completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, that the image of an officer of the "old army" as a native of the "educated classes", which has spread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was a slight advantage. Indeed, this statistics speaks of the class proximity of wartime officers (and, obviously, they were the main contingent among the staff captains who did not receive secondary education) of the new government.

Among lieutenants, second lieutenants, and especially ensigns, the situation with education is getting worse. Among the ensigns, only less than a quarter of the officers had complete secondary education, and military schools, and not the ensigns' schools, completed less than a third of the total.

Thus, two features should be noted. Firstly, the personnel of the infantry was largely knocked out. The companies, and often the battalions, were commanded by wartime officers, in principle, who did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a tolerable education in order to be able to make up for the shortcomings of education in the future.

In general, we have to admit that even before the Great War, officers had significant training flaws. Moreover, while young commanders managed to get education in reformed schools and academies, then the higher, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in their qualities. The thesis of the loss of senior command by the Red Army as a disaster is untenable. Without even mentioning the dubious benefits of the elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, to which France is a brilliant example, one cannot help but see the superiority of the highest command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in training. Much worse was the knocking out of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia did not manage to establish high-quality training of military officers and this was for quite objective reasons: in Russia there simply weren’t enough educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian war, the Berlin school teacher won the war on the Eastern Front.

It is interesting to note that in the Red Army did not hit the cadres of technical troops. But it is precisely these people “with a learned edging and velvet collar” according to Shaposhnikov who had the largest percentage of graduates from the General Staff Academy among those accepted there, which indicates the best preparation. So out of 6 engineers who arrived with Shaposhnikov, they finished all 6. Of the 35 gunners, 20, but of the 67 infantry officers, only 19!

________________________________________________________________________

Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing, 1974. p. 55 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
  In the same place with. 52.
P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications, and memoirs about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. 46. \u200b\u200bQuoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
  In the same place with. 47
  In the same place with. 46
  In the same place with. 50-51
  Ibid. P. 51
  Ignatiev A.A. Fifty years in service .-- M .: Military Publishing House, 1986. p. 58 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
  MINAKOV S.T. SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL FIGHT OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
  In the same place.
  Shaposhnikov B.M. Dec. from. 35
  P.A. Zayonchkovsky Decree Op. from. 41
  In the same place with. 42
  http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id\u003d378
  Minakov S.T. Decree Op. http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
  Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree Op. from. 129.
  Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree Op. from. 27
  Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree Op. from. 127.
  Ignatiev A.A. Decree Op. from. 102
  In the same place with. 99
  Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree Op. from. 135
  Shaposhnikov B.M., Army Brain. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
  Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: LLC Polygon Publishing House, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 col. silt - (Military Historical Library).
  p.14-15. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/h/zayonchkovsky1/index.html
  P.A. Zayonchkovsky Autocracy and the Russian army at the turn of the XIX – XX centuries, Moscow, 1973. p. 174 Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/18/4.htm
  There
  Denikin A.I. The Old Army. Officers / A.I. Denikin; foreword A. S. Kruchinina. - M .: Iris-press, 2005 .-- 512 p .: ill. + pasting 8 s. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html p. 109
  Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree Op. from. 41-42
  In the same place.
  In the same place. S.38-39
  In the same place with. 40.
  Denikin A.I. Decree Op. from. 110–111.
  In the same place with. 221.
  The Great Forgotten War. - M .: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009 .-- 592 p. from. 7.
  Zayonchkovsky A.M. Dec. from. 16.
  Ignatiev A.A. Decree Op. from. 57.
  In the same place. S.44–46.
  Kamenev A.I. The history of officer training in Russia. - M .: VPA them. Lenin, 1990.p. 163 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
  On the issue of officers of the Old Russian Army by the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of a society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Quoted from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
  In the same place.
  In the same place.
Golovin H. H. Russia in the First World War / Nikolai Golovin. - M .: Veche, 2006 .-- 528 p. - (Military secrets of Russia). Circulation 3,000 copies. ISBN 5–9533–1589–9. from. 187 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html
  Shaposhnikov B.M. from. 166–167.

1. On the issue of officers of the Old Russian Army by the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of a society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Taken from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
  2. Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: LLC Polygon Publishing House, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 col. silt - (Military Historical Library).
  3..Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1974. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
  4. P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications, and memoirs about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
  5.Ignatiev A.A. Fifty years in service.- M .: Military Publishing House, 1986. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
  6.S.T. MINAKOV, SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL FIGHT OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm11.htm
  7.http: //www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html? Id \u003d 378
  8. Shaposhnikov BM, The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
  9. Kamenev A.I. The history of officer training in Russia. - M .: VPA them. Lenin, 1990. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
  10. Denikin A. I. The old army. Officers / A.I. Denikin; foreword A. S. Kruchinina. - M .: Iris-press, 2005 .-- 512 p .: ill. + pasting 8 s. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html

I would especially like to place this material on the real situation of Russian officers at the beginning of the 20th century specially for the gentlemen of the “Bulkakrusts”.

The financial situation of officers on the eve of the war, as well as at the beginning of the century, remained extremely constrained. The salary of the maintenance of the chief officers was so modest that the young officers were not able to eat three times a day. “For officer salaries,” B.M. tells in his memoirs. Shaposhnikov (future Marshal of the Soviet Union), had to restrain his appetite. "

Here is the detailed budget of Lieutenant Shaposhnikov, related to the beginning of the century (we note that breakfast costs are not indicated in it). Given constant prices, it meets the financial situation of the junior chief officer until 1909, when the second lieutenant received an increase of 15 rubles a month.

“I received a month,” writes Shaposhnikov, “67 rubles of salary and 9 rubles of apartments. In total, therefore, a month is 76 rubles, not including small money, at 30 kopecks per day per guard. In summer, camps relied on 30 cents per day.

The costs were as follows: apartment - 15 rubles, lunch and dinner - 12 rubles; tea, sugar, tobacco, washing clothes - 10 rubles; for uniforms - 10 rubles; the deduction to the battalions is 10-15 rubles, the salary of the batman is 3 rubles, and only 60-65 rubles. For pocket expenses, i.e. for all entertainment, there remained 11-16 rubles a month, i.e. almost how much, how much did the junker spend on my side needs. If we add summer camp money, then the pocket budget was 20 rubles. ” Here, as already mentioned, there are no expenses for breakfast. The expenses for a hairdressing salon, a bathhouse, for cabbies, for a library, for wine and other small expenses are not taken into account.

The officer budget was more than modest. It should be added that the officer purchased uniforms and equipment at his own expense (with the exception of receiving a lump sum allowance of several hundred rubles for acquiring officer uniforms at the end of a military school and production as officers). Every year, the cost of purchasing uniforms was at least more than one hundred rubles.

So, for example, ceremonial boots cost 20-25 rubles, a ceremonial uniform 70-75 rubles. The cost of other officer things according to the price list was as follows: cap officer-officer - 3 rubles .; Ulanskaya hat - 21 rubles .; hussar headquarters cap - 12 rubles; gilded headquarters epaulettes - 13 rubles; spurs - from 14 rubles .; Dragoon and Cossack drafts - 14-16 rubles; officer sashes and scarves - up to 9-10 rubles .; cloaks and satchels - up to 3 rubles. 75 kopecks

All this, in total, was not cheap.

The cost of uniforms increased significantly due to the frequent change of form, for the most part not caused by any considerations of expediency. An exception is the introduction of protective clothing, the need for which has been convincingly proved by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.

In 1907, hussars and ulans were restored, which led to a change in form in the cavalry. The state of the uniform was carefully monitored by the emperor himself. So, in April 1909, eight orders by the military department were issued at the highest command to change certain form details in individual military units.

And this was no exception. In May-June of the same year, again, by the highest order, seven orders were issued concerning the small details of the officer’s uniform.

Finally, in 1913, a general change in form was introduced for infantry, artillery and engineering troops: a different color lapel and front collar were fastened to the tunic, which in theory should replace the front uniform.

All this cost a lot of money and significantly increased the expenditure side of the budget.

It should be noted that the acquisition of a new form had to be carried out immediately. The officer did not have the right to wear the old uniform, as Nicholas II himself did.

Until 1909, the salary of officers, including all types of allowances, consisted of the following:

second lieutenant - 660 rubles., i.e. 55 rubles per month;

the lieutenant - 720 rubles, i.e. 60 rubles per month;

staff captain - 780 rubles., i.e. 65 rubles per month;

captain (company commander) - 1260 rubles, i.e. 105 rubles per month;

lieutenant colonel (battalion commander) - 1740 rubles, i.e. 145 rubles a month.

Commander-in-chief and lieutenant colonels received from January 1, 1909 an increase in maintenance, the so-called additional money, namely: second lieutenant - 180 rubles, i.e. 15 rubles per month; the lieutenant - 240 rubles, i.e. 20 rubles per month; staff captain - from 300 to 420 rubles; captain (company commander) - from 360 to 480 rubles. in year; lieutenant colonel (battalion commander) - from 480 to 660 rubles., i.e. from 40 to 55 rubles per month. Thus, the new salary of maintenance since 1909 was: for the second lieutenant - 70 rubles. per month; for the lieutenant - 80 rubles. per month; for the head-captain - from 93 to 103 rubles. per month; for the captain - from 135 to 145 rubles. per month; for a lieutenant colonel - from 185 to 200 rubles. per month.

However, even after that, the maintenance of officers remained modest. The well-known military life, the main priest of the army and navy, Protopresbyter Shavelsky wrote in his memoirs: “The officer was an outcast of the royal treasury. It is impossible to indicate the class of tsarist Russia, which was worse off than the officers. The officer received beggarly maintenance that did not cover all his urgent expenses / ... /. In particular, if he was a family, eked out a miserable existence, undernourished, confused in debt, denying himself the most necessary. ”

The salaries of the colonels and generals were very different from the chief officers. So, the regiment commander received 3900 rubles a year, or more than 300 rubles a month; division head - 6,000 rubles, or 500 rubles per month, corps commander - 9,300 rubles, or 775 rubles per month91. However, these salaries were still significantly lower than the salaries received by civil servants of the corresponding ranks. So, the ministers - the ranks of the second or third class, corresponding in rank to the corps commanders, at the beginning of the century received a maintenance of 20 thousand rubles a year, i.e. twice as much. The salary of members of the State Council, equal in rank to the same corps commanders, was 12-18 thousand rubles a year. The same is observed when comparing the salaries of the heads of divisions and governors, who stood on the table one rank lower than the first. As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division head was 6,000 rubles, and the content of the governor from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much.

“/ ... / After the Russo-Japanese War,” remarks Shavelsky, “the Russian army became sober and well-meaning.”

On the issue of the proliferation of drunkenness in the army, we were somewhat alarmed by the order of the military department of May 22, 1914, No. 209. This order contained a detailed list of measures against the distribution of alcoholic beverages in the army (restricting the sale of vodka in officer meetings, creating parts of sobriety societies, lecturing on the fight against alcohol, etc.). However, as it turned out during a comprehensive study of government policies to combat alcoholism in the country as a whole, this order was presented in a different light.

February 8, 1914 in the State Council there was a discussion on the issue of combating alcoholism; March 11 of the same year, Minister of Finance P.L. Bark issued a circular on measures to combat alcoholism. On April 14, again the same year, a circular was issued to the governors on measures to combat drunkenness. In the light of all this, the general task of the order becomes clear as a measure of general preventive nature, and not reflecting the increase in drunkenness in the army.

The construction of the order itself also confirms this assumption. The order does not contain a constitutional part, but simply contains a list of measures against the use of alcoholic beverages.

However, despite the fact that this order was one of the general measures against alcoholism in the country, there were grounds for its publication.

Drunkenness in the army was widespread. This has been repeatedly discussed in the press. So, in the Moscow newspaper Vechernye Izvestiya literally on the eve of the outbreak of war, on June 5, 1914, the article "Alcoholism in the Army" wrote: "Recently, military and private press have repeatedly indicated and cited statistical figures about the growing consumption of alcohol in the army. The huge demoralizing importance of alcohol to the army in the sense of discipline and the state of the military spirit was proved.

Voices about this have recently begun to be heard so often and insistently, linking the issue of alcoholism in the army with alarming rumors about the war - that the Minister of War finally paid attention to it and issued an order against the use of alcohol in the army. "

Touching upon this order, the newspaper criticized him for being unspecific: “Unfortunately, the order does not go beyond the threat of strict punishment for drunkenness and does not indicate any cultural and specific measures to combat this terrible evil of the army.” “But to fight,” the newspaper concludes, “by circulars and threats is useless.”

The Minister of War A.F. also mentions the presence of drunkenness in the army in his notes. Rediger.

Thus, despite the beggarly content received by the officers, drunkenness increased every year. Therefore, the conclusion of Protopresbyter G. Shavelsky that after the Russo-Japanese War the army became more sober should be taken with great caution.

Actually, the opportunity for all kinds of entertainments such as revelry was very limited, as mentioned above, by financial opportunities. Only guardsmen and some cavalry officers had this opportunity.

Did the officers have any additional income other than salary? This question cannot be answered in the affirmative, at least not all had them, but only some categories.

Marshal Shaposhnikov recalls the following on this occasion. “It’s a sin to hide,” he writes, “there were deals with fodder contractors, there was a squadron of dung that was willingly bought at a high price by the locals.”

Secretary of War Rediger talks more about these revenues in his notes. “In the cavalry units, especially in the Western districts (where the bulk of the cavalry was located - P.Z.), the feed contractor paid a monthly salary to the regiment commander, and his assistants, and squadron commanders, and then the wahmisters, and so on. / ... /. Colonel Yukhin, he continues, appointed by the commander of one of the regiments of a separate cavalry brigade, resigned because he did not want to take bribes and at the same time did not want to convict other members of the brigade that they were taking them. It turned out that such an order had existed non-selectively in the brigade since its inception, and that the brigade chiefs also received bribes. The case took place in the Vilna Military District. The case was hushed up, ”concludes Rediger.

This fodder income system took place not only in the cavalry. “In artillery,” says Rediger, “the situation was almost the same. The infantry did not have systematic thefts, but many small ones. ”

Mention should also be made of the illegal "income" of officers and military officials of the quartermaster's office. True, V.A. spoke in his memoirs Sukhomlinov "in peace and wartime, the Russian commissariat stole relatively no more than in foreign armies."

We do not have data on how the matter was in the commissaries of other European armies, but in the Russian army the abuse in the commissariat was great. So, A.A. Polivanov in his diary in an entry dated August 25, 1908 writes:

“Senator Garin, who audits the police in Moscow, / ... / read to me excerpts from the inquiry, where the manufacturer Til claims that for 25 years they have been given bribes to the quartermaster of up to 20 mil. rub. Surnames are indicated. ”

In conclusion of the question of various thefts and bribery, it should be noted that the Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov is perhaps the only Russian minister of war to take bribes.

The order of the military department of 1910 provided for the creation, “as a temporary measure, in the quartermaster’s department of the court, a society of officers and class officials / ... / noticed in disapproving behavior or actions, although not subject to criminal laws, but incompatible with concepts of official dignity or incriminating in the above ranks the absence of the rules of morality or nobility. ”

These individuals were subjected to the said court, which could take the following measures: suggestion, removal from the department or acquittal. The creation of this court indisputably testified to a certain disadvantage in this department.

Summarizing the issue of the state of drunkenness in the army, I believe that there are no grounds for asserting its increase.

However, drunkenness certainly took place among the officers, there were also facts of various outrages. This is confirmed by the order of the military department dated January 21, 1914 No. 42. “Recently,” the order said, “there have been cases with undesirable consequences, which showed a lack of endurance on the part of the officers, and at the same time found a lack of proper moral influence and caring / ... / on the part of bosses / ... / obliged by their authority to give appropriate direction to young officers. "

It was further indicated that “the Emperor was pleased to pay especially serious attention to this phenomenon / ... / and take the most decisive measures to prevent a possible repetition of the future.” "G. the officers, ”the conclusion said,“ I suggest that you become aware that the high honor of wearing an officer’s uniform entrusts everyone who wears this uniform with special care to protect him from any complaints. ”

This order speaks for itself.

In accordance with this, courts of officer honor are created. “To safeguard the dignity of military service and maintain the valor of an officer rank,” said Order No. 167 for the same year. These courts were charged with the discussion of the following issues: “Consideration of acts incompatible with concepts of military honor, official dignity, morality and nobility; analysis of quarrels occurring among the officers. ”

In 1914, the corresponding courts were created for a separate branch of the army: “Court of Officer Honor of the Main Artillery Directorate” (order No. 98), “Court of Honor of officers of the corps of military topographers” (order No. 136), “Court of honor of officers of the Cossack troops” (order No. 167). Even a “Court of Honor for Officers of a Separate Gendarme Corps” was created (Order No. 58).

I must say that all kinds of cases of misconduct of officers fell into the press and were exaggerated, and sometimes inflated, on the pages of liberal newspapers. This was written in one of the most comprehensive reports by the Commander of the Troops of the Moscow Military District, General P.A. Pleve, pointing to the need to "increase the punishment for unjust and malicious tricks in the press on the corps of officers."

Sometimes it’s interesting to know how people used to live. What did they eat, what did they read, what did they do? It is interesting to compare the life of our ancestors with modern life. Now everyone knows what salary is small, and what is quite decent, buying a product can be completely reliably decided for yourself whether it is expensive or not, and many have a fairly fair curiosity - how much did people earn before and what were the prices?

  Salary of employees.
   Most low paying   part of the workers in Russia, the late 19th and early 20th centuries, was a servant who received a month: from 3 to 5 rubles - female, and from 5 to 10 rubles - male. But, the employer, in addition to cash allowance, provided the servants with free accommodation, food, and even clothing.
   Next, go the workers of provincial factories, village manufactories, laborers and movers. Their salary ranged from 8 to 15 rubles per month. And it was not uncommon when one tenth of the salary was issued with cards, which could be bought only in the factory store and of course at inflated prices. Workers in the metallurgical plants of Moscow and St. Petersburg received more than their provincial colleagues, their salaries ranged from 25 to 35 rubles, and skilled workers turners, locksmiths, craftsmen, foremen or workers of rare specializations - for example, electricians received from 50 to 80 rubles per month.
  Salary of employees in pre-revolutionary Russia.
   The smallest salaries were among junior civil servants, as well as among zemstvo teachers of the lower grades, assistant pharmacists, orderlies, librarians of postal workers, etc. they were paid 20 rubles a month. Doctors received much more, their monthly salary was 80 rubles, and the head of the hospital received 125 rubles a month. The salary of medical assistants was 35 rubles, and where only one medical assistant worked at the state, 55 rubles. High school teachers in male and female gymnasiums received from 80 to 100 rubles per month. The heads of postal, railway, shipping stations in large cities had monthly salaries of 150 to 300 rubles. Deputies of the State Duma received a salary of 350 rubles, governors had salaries of about one thousand rubles, and ministers and senior officials, members of the State Council - 1,500 rubles a month.
  Salary of officers of the Russian Empire.
The second lieutenant had a salary of 70 rubles per month, plus 30 kopecks per day for guards and 7 rubles surcharge for rent, all together 80 rubles. The lieutenant received a salary of 80 rubles, plus the same apartment and guard, in the amount of approximately 90 rubles . The headquarters captain received a salary from 93 to 123 rubles, the captain from 135 to 145 rubles, and the lieutenant colonel from 185 to 200 rubles per month. The Tsar’s army colonel received a salary of 320 rubles per month, the general as a division commander had a salary of 500 rubles, and the general as a corps commander - 725 rubles a month.
The cost of various public and private services.
   For a trip at the beginning of the 20th century inside the city, cabmen took 15-20 kopecks. But the price was mostly negotiable and in remote areas could request 30 - 40 cents. Railway station drivers were then the most expensive, they could, without a twinge of conscience, demand 50 kopecks for a not very long trip from the station to the nearest hotel. I must say that the profession of a cab driver was not very profitable, for a day a horse could eat 3 rubles of oats. Traveling by tram cost 5 kopecks to the end of the route; if necessary, a transfer ticket was issued free of charge. Travel around the Garden Ring cost 7 kopecks. Students had free travel tickets with photos so that they could not transfer them to other people.
   For those long distances, they traveled mainly by rail. A first-class ticket to Petersburg from Moscow cost 16 rubles, and in a seated car it was possible to get 40 kopecks for 6 rubles. To Tver from Moscow, the first class could be reached for 7 rubles 25 kopecks, and the third - to get for 3 rubles 10 kopecks. The service of the porter at the station cost 5 kopecks, and if the luggage was large, it was transported on a trolley, and the cost was 10 kopecks.
   Traveling people needed to stop somewhere. Luxurious room with all amenities - telephone, restaurant, etc. in hotels it cost 5-8 rubles a day. A decent room without frills cost from 70 cents to 2 rubles per day. Furnished rooms cost 15-60 cents per day. But many came for a long time and they had to rent a house for a long time. In the center of Moscow, a chic multi-room apartment cost 100-150 rubles per month. A small apartment on the outskirts cost 5-7 rubles. A bed in a working dormitory - 2 rubles.
For owners of their own real estate, of course, there were utilities. A home telephone set cost 71 rubles a year, electricity - 25 kopecks per 1 kWh. Water supply - at home 12 kopecks per bucket, and a water carrier 13 kopecks. In hand utensils on a column - for free.
   Treatment, as now, was a very noticeable expense item. An ordinary home doctor took 3 rubles per visit, a professor at the academy had to pay 20 rubles, and the most famous and fashionable doctors provided services for no less than a hundred.
  In addition to everyday worries, people had to somehow relax. The easiest way to relax was to go to a tavern or restaurant. In a cheap tavern, or as it was called then, “pirka”, on the outskirts of a provincial town, for 5 cents, one could drink half a stack, that is, 50 grams of vodka. For appetizer, the most popular vodka appetizer of all time was offered - pickled cucumber for just 1 penny. And you could eat their fill in such cheap taverns for 10 kopecks. In addition to cheap restaurants there were restaurants and more expensive, respectively, and the class of service in them was better and prices higher. In such taverns, it cost 30-50 kopecks to dine, a beer or a glass of vodka cost 10 kopecks, but this vodka was of good quality and definitely not diluted. For 3 kopecks one could eat a plate of cabbage soup, for 5 - noodles in hemp oil or fried potatoes. Drinking tea with 2 pieces of sugar cost 5 cents, pancakes with fresh granular caviar and vodka cost 1 ruble. In good and well-known restaurants it was possible to pay for lunch in the range of 1.5 - 3 rubles, but in principle everything depended on the possibility and desire of the client. In addition to restaurants and taverns, it was possible to have fun and culturally, for example, go to the theater. Tickets to the Bolshoi Theater for opera in privileged lodges cost up to 30 rubles, for seats in the front ranks of the porter they paid from 3 to 5 rubles, and watching the performance on the gallery was worth only 30-60 cents. A subscription to the Small Hall of the Conservatory for 3 musical evenings with a good performer sold from 2 rubles 40 kopecks to 7 rubles 30 kopecks.
  Average all-Russian prices for various goods at the beginning of the 20th century.
  Products:
  - A loaf of black stale bread weighing 400 grams - 3 kopecks,
  - A loaf of fresh rye bread weighing 400 grams - 4 kopecks,
  - A loaf of white butter bread weighing 300 grams - 7 kopecks,
  - Alcohol raw bucket - 75 kopecks,
  - Potato fresh crop of 1 kilogram - 15 kopecks,
  - Potato old crop 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
  -Rye flour 1 kilogram - 6 kopecks,
-Oatmeal flour 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
  - Wheat flour of the highest grade 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
  - Potato flour 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
  - Macaroni simple 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
  - Vermicelli from premium flour 1 kilogram - 32 kopecks,
  Syrup sweet bottle - 25 kopecks,
  -Sugar sand of the second grade 1 kilogram - 25 kopecks,
  -Lump sugar refined selective 1 kilogram - 60 kopecks,
  - Tula gingerbread with jam 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
  - Chocolate candies 1 kilogram - 3 rubles,
  - Coffee beans 1 kilogram - 2 rubles,
  - Leaf tea 1 kilogram - 3 rubles,
  -Water fruit bucket - 2 rubles, a bottle of 10 cents,
  - Salt 1 kg - 3 kopecks,
  -Milk fresh 1 liter - 14 kopecks,
  Fat cream 1 liter - 60 kopecks,
  Sour cream 1 liter - 80 kopecks,
  -Torog 1 kilogram - 25 kopecks,
  - Cheese "Russian" 1 kilogram - 70 kopecks,
  - Cheese based on foreign technology "Swiss" 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 40 kopecks,
  - Butter 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
  - Sunflower oil 1 liter - 40 kopecks,
  -Heat steamed 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
  - An egg of choice ten - 25 kopecks,
  -Meat veal paired tenderloin 1 kilogram - 70 kopecks,
  - Meat beef shoulder blade 1 kilogram - 45 kopecks,
  - Meat pork neck 1 kilogram - 30 kopecks,
  - Fresh fish perch, river 1 kilogram - 28 kopecks,
  - Fresh fish pike perch of the river 1 kilogram - 50 kopecks,
  - Fresh catfish, 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
  - Fresh bream fish 1 kilogram - 24 kopecks,
  -Frozen frozen pink salmon 1 kilogram - 60 kopecks,
  - Frozen salmon fish 1 kg - 80 kopecks,
  - Frozen fish sturgeon 1 kilogram - 90 kopecks,
  - Fish salted salmon 1 kilogram from 50 cents to 1 ruble
  - Black granular caviar 1 kilogram - 3 rubles 20 kopecks,
  -Pai black caviar, 1 grade, 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 80 kopecks,
  - Black caviar, 2 pieces, 1 grade, 1 kilogram - 1 ruble 20 kopecks,
  -Pai black caviar 3 grades 1 kilogram - 80 kopecks,
  - Salty red caviar 1 kilogram - 2 rubles 50 kopecks,
  - Vegetables cabbage fresh 1 kilogram - 10 kopecks,
  - Vegetables sauerkraut 1 kilogram - 20 kopecks,
  - Vegetables onions 1 kilogram - 5 kopecks,
  -Vegetables carrots 1 kilogram - 8 cents,
  - Vegetables selected tomatoes 1 kilogram - 45 kopecks.
  Civilian clothes:
  -Shirt weekend - 3 rubles,
  - Short fur coat and sheepskin coat - 10 rubles,
  - Business suit for clerks - 8 rubles,
  - The coat is long - 15 rubles,
  -Sleevets of steam - 40 kopecks,
  - steam gloves - 50 kopecks,
  - Boots of soap - 5 rubles,
  - Summer boots - 2 rubles,
-Women's boots of black leather - from 3 rubles 50 kopecks, colored leather - more expensive by 1 ruble
  -Stock stocks - 40 kopecks.
  Military uniform and uniform:
  -Grand officers boots - 20 rubles,
  - The uniform of the ceremonial officer - 70 rubles,
  -Ober-officer cap - 3 rubles,
  - Ulanskaya hat - 20 rubles,
  Hatsar headquarters cap - 12 rubles,
  - Epaulettes gilded officer officers - 13 rubles,
  - Spurs - 14 rubles,
  -Dragoon and Cossack sabers - 15 rubles,
  -Official satchel - 4 rubles.
  Animals:
  - Horse for a cart -100 rubles,
  -Draft horse, working - 70 rubles,
  - An old nag on sausage - 20 rubles,
  -Good riding horse - from 150 rubles,
  -Good cash cow - from 60 rubles.
  Miscellaneous:
  -Harmony- 7 rubles 50 kopecks,
  -Samovar - 10 rubles 50 kopecks,
  - Gramophone - 40 rubles,
  - Telephone set - 50 rubles,
  Serp - 20 kopecks
  -Piano of a famous brand - 200 rubles,
  - Blanket - 6 rubles 75 kopecks,
  -A car without additional equipment - 2.000 rubles,
  -Portfolio - 4 rubles 80 kopecks,
  -Radio receiver - 75 rubles,
  - Hive - 5 rubles,
  - A camera - 10 rubles,
  -electric bulb - 40 kopecks,
  - Leather suitcase - 12 rubles,
  -Ink 35 cents.
  Prices, of course, are average, in different regions of the country they could differ, but not significantly.