Literary and historical notes of a young technician. Literary and historical notes of the young technician General Pokrovsky the story of the forgotten leader of the white movement

FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT JUNE 1941

As Kozma Prutkov said, it is impossible to grasp the immensity. Especially in the sea of \u200b\u200binformation. Therefore, assistance "from the outside" in this matter will never be superfluous. So in November 2010 Oleg Kozinkin from the site of the Great Obligated War informed me that in 1989 the answers of the generals who had met the war near the western border of the USSR in June 1941 were published. There were five questions. They were asked by the chief of the military scientific department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky.

From his biography:

Alexander Petrovich Pokrovsky (1898 - 1979), born October 21, 1898 in Tambov. At the age of 17 he was drafted into the Russian army, graduated from the school of ensigns, served in spare parts and in the Novokiev infantry regiment on the Western Front. In 1918 he joined the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a company, a battalion, and a regiment. In 1926 he graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, in 1932 - the operational department of this academy, and in 1939 - the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. In between studies he served in the headquarters of divisions and military districts. In 1935 he headed the headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps, in 1938 he became deputy chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, from October 1940 he was adjutant, then adjutant general of the USSR people's commissar of defense, Marshal Budyonny.

In the Great Patriotic War: chief of staff of the main command of the South-West direction (during Budyonny: July 10 - September 1941)). After the removal of Budyonny and the arrival there, Tymoshenko was appointed to the North-Western Front as the chief of staff of the 60th (from December 1941 - 3rd shock) army (October-December 1941), commanded by Purkayev. And from there he was transferred to the headquarters of the Western Front, on which (subsequently - on the Third Belorussian), he worked throughout the war. First, in the role of chief of operational management, then for some time as chief of staff of the 33rd army, and then again in operational management and deputy chief of staff of the front at Sokolovsky. And then (after the removal of Konev, when Sokolovsky became the front commander), he became the chief of staff of the front and remained in this position from the winter of the 43rd year until the end of the war.

After the war, the chief of staff of the military district, since 1946 the chief of the Main Military Scientific Directorate - assistant chief of the General Staff, in 1946 - 1961 deputy chief of the General Staff.

At the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front.
  From left to right: Chief of Staff Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky,
  front commander General of the Army I. D. Chernyakhovsky,
  Member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov
website: "The Great Patriotic War. Photos."

Moreover, General Pokrovsky asked his questions long before 1989, for 40 years. And he received answers at the same time. However, they decided to publish them only at the end of the USSR. And then, they suspect, not all. But it took another 20 years, until they began to be actively discussed on the Internet. In particular, on the site "Great slandered war." Questions and answers were posted on it (http://liewar.ru/content/view/186/2/), as well as a comment written by Oleg Kozinkin (http://liewar.ru/content/view/182/3) - so to speak, an attempt at comprehension and generalization. But an attempt with a clear bias in a certain direction is to find evidence that the highest Soviet leadership on the eve of the war acted correctly. And the defeat of the summer of 1941 was due to the betrayal of some senior generals in the headquarters of the western districts. Although, not without the "help" of Marshal Generals from the General Staff. Moreover, some lovers of history are actively trying to spread this hypothesis as widely as possible. Note: not professional historians, but amateurs. Professionals are silent. This is understandable - serious science must rely on serious documents. But the "defense plan" or "attack", signed personally by Stalin, has not yet been found. And some published fragments allow different interpretations. Here is one of the options that arose ("treason"). With an attempt to justify it with the very same “answers” \u200b\u200bto “5 questions”.

Indeed, could not local performers of some teams understand "wrong"? Could. And something prevented them from conspiring in a certain direction? Look, how are accountants acting now, faced with an incomprehensible situation? Including call another accountant for advice. And it is enough for the first to indicate the wrong path, as "the work is done" (not there).

That's the topic of the "rout of the summer of 1941" the very fact of the existence of “Pokrovsky questions” from the General Staff seems to show that the General Staff issued the correct orders, but doubts arose as to how timely they reached the performers and whether they were correctly executed. On the one hand, the topic seems to make sense. But on the other hand, the situation looks strange.

To find out what and when the orders were issued by the General Staff, it is enough to go to the archive once and make copies of them. And do not send letters and wait for answers (and, for several years). And how much time was received and whether those orders were executed correctly, it was necessary to find out during their execution. If the order is received on time and executed correctly, the contractor deserves thanks and the order for a tunic. And if the order is not received; or received but not completed; or received, but performed incorrectly (or not completely), which led to losses of a certain degree of severity, then it makes no sense to search for the guilty after 10 years. If the guilty party was not found and not punished in hot pursuit, then what's the difference?

Therefore, the meaning is possible not only in the answers, but also in the very fact that the "5 questions" arose, which had the following form:

1. Whether the plan of defense of the state border was communicated to the troops in the part concerning them; when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan?

2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the cover troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?

3. When was the order received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack of Nazi Germany in the morning of June 22 ...?

4. Why were most of the artillery in training centers?

5. How prepared were the staffs for command and control and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations during the first days of the war?

And you can immediately say that the questions are strange.

Say the first one. First, a “defense plan” cannot exist in one document. There should be a lot of them. And only a few people in the country's top military-political leadership and among the top leadership of the military districts should know that they belong to the "defense plan". All other generals and officers receive specific orders. And whether they belong to the "defense plan" or not - the performers are not required to know. That's why there is a "military secret." They will order the commander of the N-th regiment or division to prepare the defense on such-and-such a station — let them prepare it in accordance with all the requirements of military science, which he managed to study and learn before. And whether this order arose in connection with the situation or according to some old plan - let them understand the General Staff. And is such an order obliged to have a link to a more general "plan"?

Secondly, what does it mean brought to the troops in the part concerning them"? To which" troops "? We must assume - to the headquarters? Which? Regiments, divisions, corps, armies, military districts? Or to the commanders of battalions, companies and platoons? Serious military plans of a strategic level have a signature stamp. Moreover, not just" secret ", and most likely:" top secret. "Yes, and of" special importance. "But any secret document is sent not just like that (by regular mail), but according to certain rules of a specific" instruction. "With careful consideration of each paper copy and where and when it was sent. vuchivat names of secret documents.

Under these conditions, a serious answer can be obtained only to a specific question. For example, this: "- Have you received such and such a secret document (name) number such and such from such and such a number?".But really, any performer on him only shrugs his shoulders: they say, and who are you to ask such questions? (Do you have permission?) Secondly, if the document is secret, then go to the secret part of the office where this document was composed, and see the accompanying sheet, which indicates how many copies were published and to whom each was sent. What do I have to do with it?

Therefore, calling a set of little-known secret documents with some kind of generalized name is fraught with the fact that different people will understand its composition differently. Or there should already be a uniform description of this common name so that everyone understands it the same way. But this is possible only if the constituent documents are already declassified and known to the respondents. Moreover, they should be known now - after 40 years. But when you consider that the concept of "1941 defense plan" (and as part of the "state border defense plan") is still not fully known, it is unlikely that the respondents understood it uniformly.

And anyway, what does it mean " border defense plan"? Do you mean the now declassified" plans for covering the border during the mobilization ... "(for each of the western military districts)? Or were there any other" defense plans "? Then why could not the first question be drawn up more specifically? ( With the mention of "cover plans")? And from this there may arise the assumption that General Pokrovsky did not know anything about them (which is strange - couldn’t go to the archive of his General Staff?) Or he knew, but for some reason did not want them mention. For what?

By the way, it is now being discovered that those plans for "cover" up to June 22, 1941 were under development. The military units were moving for some reason, for some reason they were deployed. But whether it is completely in accordance with a certain not yet approved "cover plan" or that plan was "adapted" to a real deployment according to some other plans is not known. As it now turns out, "cover plans" to 06/22/1941 were not approved and there was no specific order to begin their implementation.

If we are talking about “cover” plans, then intelligible answers could be obtained from the former chiefs of the former district headquarters. In the rest of the headquarters of the “troops” they could only know about individual orders. But were they part of the defense plan - and who knows? Maybe they were. But whether they turned out to be correct in connection with an enemy attack is another topic.

Therefore, you can immediately notice that the answers to the incorrectly posed question should turn out to be somewhat “vague” (“- But what was the defense plan?”, ““ What is the defense plan? ”,“ - Yes, we received some orders ” , "- According to the cover plan? Something was being done," etc.).

The second question also looks strange. Since the term "cover troops" is used in it, there may be a suspicion that General Pokrovsky heard something about "cover plans." But why didn't he mention them in the first question? But if there were such plans (under which those "troops" were formed), then, probably, it was necessary to voice quotes from the plans, where it was a question of access to the border. In addition, the "deployment" is actually associated with the announcement of mobilization either in the country or in certain localities. And this is the prerogative of the "center", and not of the "troops on the ground."

The third question is strange no less than the first two. If the "defense plan" really existed and began to be implemented in time, then by 1950 this would have been known for a long time and it would have been studied in all educational institutions, starting from school. And if it is set, this means that for some reason they did not have time to bring the troops on alert. And then another assumption arises that the “defense plan” was somehow wrong.

The fourth question is strange even more. If the "defense plan" existed and began to be implemented in time, then why the deployment issues that are the competence of the "center"? Where else should artillery be located?

The fifth question, to some extent, makes sense, but we can immediately assume that if before the attack of June 22, 1941 the “defense plan” was carried out incorrectly, then what difference does it make, how completely were the headquarters ready for command and control?

* * *

If you start to read the answers of the generals, you can see that to the first question  they all answer in the same way - that there was no serious "Defense Plan". Accordingly, in this case, there was nothing to “enforce”. Some orders were received, but whether it is really unknown within the framework of the ongoing "defense plan" or for some other reasons. For example, Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, former commander of the 8th army of PribOVO, (VIZH No. 3, 1989):

“I was appointed commander in March 1941. The position obliged me first of all to familiarize myself with the state border defense plan in order to clarify the place and role of the army in general terms. But unfortunately, neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga at the headquarters of PribOV I was not informed of the existence of such a plan.In the documents of the army headquarters, which was located in the city of Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue.

I get the impression that it was unlikely at that time (March 1941) that such a plan existed. It was only on May 28, 1941, that I was called up with the Chief of Staff, Major General G.A. Larionov and a member of the military council divisional commissar S.I. Shabalov to the district headquarters, where Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov hastily acquainted us with the defense plan. Here on this day I met the commanders of the 11th and 27th armies, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov and Major General N.E. Berzarin, as well as chiefs of staff and members of the military councils of these armies.

The commander of the district troops received us separately and, apparently, gave similar instructions - urgently to get acquainted with the defense plan, to make and report to him a decision.

All this happened in a great hurry and a somewhat nervous atmosphere. The plan was obtained for review and study by the chief of staff. It was a rather voluminous, thick typewriter.

About 1.5-2 hours after receiving the plan, before I could even get to know it, I was called to Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, who received me in a darkened room and dictated my decision face to face ....

The commander of the 11th Army, which was first accepted by Colonel-General Kuznetsov, was in a similar position to me.

My records, as well as the chief of staff, were selected. We received an order to depart to the duty station. At the same time, they promised us that instructions for the preparation of a defense plan and our workbooks would be immediately sent to the army headquarters. Unfortunately, we did not receive any orders or even our workbooks.

Thus, the defense plan was not communicated to the troops. However, the formations located on the border (10th, 125th, and from the spring of 1941 and the 90th rifle divisions) were engaged in the preparation of field fortifications on the border in the areas of fortified areas under construction (Telšai and Šiauliai), were practically oriented about their tasks and areas of defense. Possible options for action were played during field trips (April-May 1941), as well as in classes with the troops.

(There is no drafting date.) "

Interesting recognition!

General P.P. Sobennikov plainly reports that there was no defense plan. But there was some other plan that was kept in great secret. And it is quite logical that he was dedicated to some small part of that plan at the end of May 1941. It is known that on May 24, Stalin held a meeting in the Kremlin with the commanders of the western districts. And it is quite logical that military plans for the near future should have been discussed on it. While the commanders returned to their districts, while they compiled the relevant documents, while they called their commanders, it was May 28th.

Another example answer:

"Lieutenant-General I.P. Shlemin (former chief of staff of the 11th Army). I did not see such a document where the tasks of the 11th army were laid out. In the spring of 1941 there was an operational game in the district headquarters, where each of the participants performed responsibilities according to the position. It is thought that in this lesson the main issues of the state border defense plan were studied. After that, the defense lines were studied with the division commanders and their headquarters (5, 33. 28 sd) on the ground. The basic requirements and their preparation were brought to the attention of the troops. With the headquarters of divisions and regiments was held to reconnoitre the area for the purpose of selecting lines of defense and their equipment. We believe that these decisions are communicated to subordinate commanders and staffs. They prepared their forces and means of defense.

The former headquarters of the 11th put it more diplomatically - “I think the questions were studied,” “I think that these decisions were brought up ...”. And if you clarify his hints, the conclusion is as follows: there was no normal defense plan! No one has seen him! Only “something was discussed” and some “frontiers” were studied. It is possible that defense. And perhaps as a starting area for the offensive.

Another example answer:

"Lieutenant General MS Shumilov (former commander of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army). The state border defense plan was not brought to the headquarters and I was not planned. The corps was planned to carry out certain tasks of field filling in a new fortified area under construction and in These works were not completely completed by the beginning of the war, therefore, apparently, the corps decided to take up defense on the eastern bank of the Jura River, i.e., on the line of the fortified area under construction, and it was ordered to leave only about the company from the regiment.

(No compilation date). "

And the former commander of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army of the Zapovo General Popov answered shortly:

"The plan for the defense of the state border was not brought to me as the commander of the 28th Rifle Corps.

Etc. (similarly).

So, before June 22, 1941, the troops didn’t know anything about the “defense plan”, or managed to get some hints (even then, at the level of the command of the armies). Accordingly, they could not do anything concrete to ensure its implementation. If you don’t know what to do, how can it be ensured?

But some orders were received and some events were held, according to which the generals in the troops suspected that hostilities could begin soon. Example:

"Colonel A.S. Kislitsyn (former chief of staff of the 22nd Panzer Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps). Around March – April 1941, the division commander, I, the head of the operational division and communications were called up to the headquarters of the 4th Army ( Kobrin).

Within 2-3 days, we developed a plan for raising the division for combat alert, which also included documents such as an order for a march to the concentration area, radio and telephone communication schemes, and instructions for the division duty officer in case of combat alert. The reinforcement of the division was not planned.

It was strictly forbidden to familiarize with the contents of the developed documents even the commanders of regiments and divisional units. In addition, the equipment of observation and command posts in the area where the compound was concentrated was not allowed, although this issue was raised by signalmen.

Or the response of the former chief of staff of the 10th army of the Western Command, Lieutenant General P.I. Lyapina:

“The defense plan of the state border of 1941 was repeatedly redone from January until the very beginning of the war, but we didn’t finish it. The last change in the district’s operational directive was received by me on May 14 in Minsk. It ordered me to complete the development of the plan by May 20 and submit it to the headquarters ZAPOVO: On May 20, I reported: “The plan is ready, approval by the commander of the district’s troops is required in order to proceed with the development of executive documents.” But the call did not wait until the outbreak of war. In addition, the last report of May (shows that) in the army and many training events were held, such as field trips, methodological training for the command staff, etc. Therefore, no one could undertake the development of executive documents for the state border defense plan.In addition, my deputy for rear brought a new material support directive in early June that required significant processing of the entire plan. ... "

"... The presence of these documents fully ensured the fulfillment of the tasks assigned by the units. However, all orders of the ZapOVO headquarters were aimed at creating a favorable atmosphere in the minds of subordinates." Bagpipe "with the approval of the state border defense plan we developed, on the one hand, the enemy’s explicit preparation to decisive actions, which we were thoroughly aware of through intelligence agencies, on the other hand, completely disoriented us and set us up to not give serious significance to the current situation.

(No date for drafting) "

Here is one more confirmation that the Soviet general staff was not engaged in the preparation of defense. And the People’s Commissar of Defense too. Together with the political Supreme Commanders. They were not interested in this task. "Not at point blank range."

Although, there are testimonies of two generals who seemingly clearly confirmed that the "defense plan" allegedly existed and was "brought to the troops" - the former chief of staff of the Kiev PSB General Purkaev and his former subordinate Marshal Baghramyan wrote about this.

“Army General M.A. Purkaev (former chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District). The state border defense plan was brought to the attention of the army. It was developed in April by the chief of staff of the district, the operations department and the commanders of the armies and operational groups of their headquarters. In the first ten days The army plans were approved by the military council of the district and transferred to the army headquarters in May, and army plans for administrative documents were developed before the formations.

Their commanders and chiefs of staff were acquainted with the documents of the formations at the headquarters of the armies, after which they were transferred until June 1 to storage in sealed bags to the chiefs of staffs.

In all units and headquarters of the compounds there were plans to raise the alarm. The state border defense plan was to be put into action by telegram of the district military council (with three signatures) to the commanders of the armies and the commander of the cavalry corps (commander of the 5th cavalry corps, Major General F.M. Kamkov V.K.). in the formations and units the action plan was to be carried out on conditional telegrams of the military councils of the armies and the commander of the cavalry corps with the announcement of an alarm.

Sorry, but what should the official responsible for developing the plans have to answer?

What did he not do with them?

To write a "report" on yourself?

So he wrote that some plans (“border defense”) were “naturally” developed for units located there on orders from the General Staff. But before the start of the war, they never began to be implemented. In addition, plans to raise the alarm were developed (a duty for ANY part, regardless of further plans). But whether the pre-war deployment of those units was specific to the task of defense against a specific attack by the German Wehrmacht - General Purkaev wrote nothing about this.

And here is the result of such planning:

"Major General G.I.Sherstyuk (former commander of the 45th Infantry Division of the 15th Infantry Corps). The state border defense plan from the headquarters of the 15th Infantry Corps and the 5th Army to me, as the commander of the 45th Infantry Division , was never brought by anyone, and the operations of the division (I) were deployed according to the indicative plan developed by me and the chief of staff, Colonel Chumakov, and communicated to the commanders of units, battalions and divisions.

There was no defense plan! Did not have! - Again and again! If there was something, then something on some other topic.

"Major General S.F. Gorokhov (former chief of staff of the 99th Infantry Division of the 8th Infantry Corps of the 26th Army). The state border defense plan was received in February-March 1941 at the headquarters of the 26th Army in a sealed envelope and it wasn’t worked with us, but even before it was handed over, the army commander, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, personally told me and the division commander, Colonel N.I. Dementyev, the demarcation lines of the defense section of the compound and regiments, the place of command and observation posts, firing positions artillery. azom divisions were instructed to prepare assumption Przemysl fortified area and dig trenches in its lane.

The headquarters of the division and the border detachment developed a plan for covering the state border in two ways - in case of sabotage and a possible war.

Here is another confirmation that the defense plan was not specifically discussed. But some plans about something existed "in sealed form."

Marshal Rokossovsky in his response wrote that while he was serving in the early 1930s in Transbaikalia, there "There was a clearly developed plan for covering and deploying the main forces" and "it changed in accordance with changes in the general situation in this theater." And further he tactfully writes that just "In the Kiev Special Military District, this, in my opinion, was lacking." And in the “restored” parts of his memoirs this is already said more openly: “In any case, if there was any plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation prevailing at the beginning of the war, which entailed a heavy defeat of our troops in the initial period of war. "

There was no defense plan! Did not have! Did not have!  - The generals and colonels who served in the Western Military Military District by June 22, 1941 explain in chorus.

And if something happened, but it did not actively and seriously concern the preparation of defense specifically.

* * *

Pokrovsky's second question:

So, there were no "defense plans". There were some "state border defense plans." And then, basically under development. In addition, some activities were carried out as part of combat training. And there were some orders for the deployment of troops closer to the western border. In accordance with what plan - it’s really unknown. It is possible that on the "frontiers of defense." But, for example, the IIM theory requires the creation of defensive strongholds in the depths of its territory in the directions of possible enemy attacks. At ranges under 100 km in order to manage to maneuver reserves. And for this, the General Staff must predict them in advance on the basis of intelligence information. As part of a more general “defense plan”. And it is important not only to compile it “just in case”, but in the face of a threat (as it was in the spring of 1941 and the beginning of the summer of 1941), actually begin to execute it. But for this we need the order of the people's commissar (at least).

However (as it turned out above), it has not yet been found. Although there were some plans, they apparently began to be implemented. Including some military units advanced to the border on special orders from Moscow. But it is not known how much their “defense lines” were adequate to the situation of the German attack. Therefore, another question is for what purpose they began to advance to the border under the guise of "exercises." But first, it’s useful to get acquainted with the answers of the generals.

Answers of generals from the former PribOVO:

“Colonel General P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the district’s armored forces). On June 16 at 23 hours the command of the 12th mechanized corps received a directive to put the compound on alert. Major Corps commander Major General N.M. Shestopalov was informed about this at 23:00 on June 17, upon his arrival, from the 202nd motorized division, where he carried out a mobilization readiness check, on June 18, the corps commander raised the formations and units on alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. .

On June 16, by order of the district’s headquarters, the 3rd Mechanized Corps (commander of the Major General of the Tank Forces A.V. Kurkin) was also put on alert, which concentrated at the same time in the indicated area.

1953 year. "

"Lieutenant-General I.P. Shlemin (former chief of staff of the 11th Army). I don’t remember any order to withdraw troops to the state border. Apparently, he wasn’t, since the 28th and 33rd rifle the divisions were in close proximity to it, and the 5th was in the camp (30-35 km from the border).

In the second half of June, under the pretext of going to a field camp in the Kovno area, the 23rd Infantry Division from Dvinsk concentrated.

In June, the numbers of the 18-20th, the commanders of the border units appealed to the army headquarters with a request to assist them in the fight against saboteurs penetrating the territory of Lithuania. In this connection, a decision was made, under the guise of tactical exercises to divisions, to take up defense on their plots and to give ammunition to the soldiers? which, however, the commander of the district troops ordered to select and deliver to the division warehouses.

Thus, by June 20, three rifle divisions took up defense with the task of firmly holding the occupied lines in the event of an enemy attack.

"Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army). In the morning of June 18, 1941, I went to the border strip with the chief of staff of the army to check the progress of the defensive work in the Šiauliai fortified area. A passenger car passed me near Šiauliai, which soon stopped. Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov (commander of PribOVO) stepped out. I also got out of the car and approached him. F.I. Kuznetsov pulled me aside and said excitedly that some German were concentrated in Suwalki mechanized parts.He ordered me to withdraw formations immediately to the border, and place the army headquarters by the morning of June 19 at the command post 12 km southwest of Siauliai.

The commander of the district troops decided to go to Taurage (about 25 km from the border) and put on alert the 11th Rifle Corps of Major General M.S. Shumilova, but he ordered me to go down to the right flank of the army. Major General G.A., Chief of Staff of the Army Larionov we sent back to Jelgava. He received the task of bringing the headquarters to the command post.

By the end of the day, oral orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order. Parts of the 10th, 90th, and 125th rifle divisions were occupied by trenches and wood-earthen firing points (bunkers), although many structures were not yet completely ready. Parts of the 12th mechanized corps on the night of June 19 were withdrawn to the Šiauliai region, while the army headquarters arrived at the command post.

It should be noted that no one received any written instructions on the deployment of connections. Everything was carried out on the basis of an oral order of the commander of the district troops. In the future, conflicting instructions began to be received by telephone and telegraph about the device of notches, mining and other things. It was hard to understand them. They were canceled, confirmed again and canceled. On the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the chief of staff of the district, Lieutenant General P.S. Klenov to withdraw troops from the border. In general, everywhere there was great nervousness, a fear of provoking a war, and, as a result, inconsistency in actions arose.

1953 year "

Answers from generals from the former KOVO.

"Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army). Two rifle regiments (187 and 14 joint ventures) divisions were located near the state border since August 1940.

On June 20, 1941, I received the following encryption of the General Staff: “All units and units of your unit located on the border itself should be taken back several kilometers, that is, to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from the German units, so far will not violate the state border. All parts of the division must be put on alert. Report to 24 hours on June 21, 1941. "

Just at the indicated time, I reported by telegraph about the execution of the order. The report was attended by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, who was entrusted with the verification of execution. It is difficult to say for what reasons it was not allowed to take defensive positions, but the enemy took advantage of this at the beginning of hostilities.

The remaining units and special units of the compound began to enter the state border cover with a signal to open the package with a mobilization plan.

Response of the commander of the 135th SD General Smehotvorov:

"Colonel General Comrade Pokrovsky A.P.

I report:

... Before the outbreak of hostilities, part 135 of the division of the state. no border was drawn and no such order was received. On June 18, 1941, the 135th division came out of the area of \u200b\u200bconstant cantonment - Ostrog, Dubno, Kremets, and by the end of June 22, 1941 arrived in Kivertsy (10-12 kilometers of the city of Lutsk) for the purpose of passing the camp gathering, according to order of the commander of the 5th army, Major General Potapov. ... "

Reply of the former chief of staff of the 62nd SD 15th CK 5th Army Colonel P.A. Novichkova (the one in whose place the 135th SD Smekhotvorov was nominated):

"Parts of the division, on the basis of an order from the army headquarters, left the Kivertsi camp on the night of June 16-17. Having made two night crossings, they went into the defense zone by the morning of June 18. However, they did not occupy defensive lines, but concentrated in the forests and towns near it These actions were undertaken under the guise of moving to the place of a new deployment, and here they began to deploy combat training.

The numbers on June 19 carried out reconnaissance of defense plots with the commanders of the units, but all this was done uncertainly, it was not thought that a war would soon begin. We did not believe that we were going to fight, and took everything unnecessary for the battle. As a result, they overloaded their automobile and horse-drawn vehicles with excess property. "

(The date of preparation of the document is missing)

So, from the answers of the generals to Pokrovsky’s second question, we can conclude that after June 15, various orders began to arise in the western districts to redeploy a number of units and formations towards the border. But the task of preparing the defense was not specifically set; serious defensive measures were not taken. The task of conducting exercises was more often mentioned. This is from the answers to the first part of the question. Specific answers to the second could hardly have been received. What does it mean "how many ... were deployed before the start of hostilities?" The amount of what? Divisions? Those. how many regiments? Army? Those. how many divisions out of it? Or cases? How important is it? In reality, without a map, in comparison with the enemy’s deployment, it’s impossible to understand anything. And without reference to the "defense plan" (which was never found). What happened.

* * *

Pokrovsky's third question:

There are few answers to it.

For example, the response of the commander of the 135th SD KOVO General Smehotvorov:

"Colonel General Comrade Pokrovsky A.P.
  To your number 679030 dated January 14, 1953
  I report:

... There was no order to put the 135th SD units on alert before the start of hostilities, and when the division was machine-gunned by German aircraft on the march on the morning of June 22, the order “Do not give in to provocation, do not shoot at planes” was received from 5A headquarters.

"The order to put into combat readiness and to enforce the mobilization plan was received only on the morning of June 23, 1941, when the division’s units were in Kivertsy, 100-150 kilometers from the permanent cantonments."

(TsAMO, f. 15, op. 1786, d. 50, cor. 22099, ll. 79-86).

Reply from Lieutenant General G.V. Revunenko, chief of staff of the 37th SD of the 3rd Army of ZapOVO:

“On June 17, 1941, I, and the commander of the 1st Infantry Corps, Major General FD Rubtsov and the division commander, Colonel AE Chekharia, were called up to the district headquarters. We were informed that the 37th unit should go to a field camp near Lida although it was clear that the redeployment was carried out in terms of deployment of troops on the state border, he was ordered to have everything with him for life in the camp.

Two regiments marched from Lepel in a marching order, and parts of the Vitebsk garrison were sent by rail. Echelons were drawn up for ease of transportation, so the division headquarters followed without a communications battalion, and the ammunition was in the final echelon.

We learned about the beginning of the war at 12 o’clock on June 22 at Bogdanow Station from a speech by V.M. Molotov. At that time, units of the division still continued their journey, there was no connection with them, neither the commander nor the headquarters knew the situation.

"Major General SF Gorokhov (former chief of staff of the 99th regiment of the 26th army). Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, there was no order to send units to defense plots. Only artillery regiments were ordered by the commander of the 8th rifle corps of the general Major MG Snegov was put into the woods near the planned firing positions, and at the time of the outbreak of hostilities he gave conflicting orders: to the rifle regiments to occupy defensive lines, and to the artillery regiments not to open fire until further notice. Despite our persistent demands, until 10 o’clock On June 22, there was no permission to use artillery.

"Major General NP Ivanov (former chief of staff of the 6th Army). At the time of the enemy’s sudden attack, gatherings of artillerymen, machine gunners, sappers were carried out. Because of this, the formations were organizationally fragmented. Some of the troops were located in camps with permanent deployment of stocks of weapons and materiel.

Parts of the cover were prohibited by the order of the commander of the KOVO troops to the border.

"From the journal of military operations of the troops of the Western Front for June 1941 on the grouping and position of front forces by the beginning of the war1

June 22, 1941 At about one in the morning, an encryption was received from Moscow with an order to immediately put the troops on alert in case of a German attack expected in the morning

At about 2 hours - 2 hours 30 minutes a similar order was made in the code of the armies, parts of the fortified areas were ordered to immediately occupy the fortified areas. At the signal of the Thunderstorm, the Red Pack action was introduced, containing a plan for covering the state border.

The encryption of the district headquarters by the army headquarters was received, as it turned out, too late, the 3rd and 4th armies managed to decipher the orders and make some orders, and the 10th army deciphered the warning after the outbreak of hostilities.

The troops were drawn to the border in accordance with the instructions of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Written orders and instructions to the corps and divisions were not given.

Division commanders received instructions orally from the chief of staff of the district, Major General Klimovsky. The personnel were told that they were going to great exercises. The troops took with them all the training property (instruments, targets, etc.)
.....

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Western Front
  Lieutenant General Malandin
....."

(F. 208, op. 355802s, d.1, pp. 4-10.)

Reply of Major General B.A. Fomin, former deputy. Chief of Operations, ZAPOVO Headquarters:

"The divisions began redeploying to the border areas in a marching order in April-May 1941. Artillery on mechtyag and warehouses of NZ were transported by rail. The following connections moved: 85th SD - to areas west of Grodno, 21th SK - from Vitebsk north- to the west and north of Lida, the 49th and 113th SDs are to the west of Belovezhskaya Pushcha, the 75th from Mozyr to the Malorita region, the 42nd from Birch-Kartuzskaya to Brest and to the north.

In mid-June, the 47th SC administration was ordered to advance by rail to the Obuz-Lesny region by June 21-23. At the same time, the 55th (Slutsk), 121st (Bobruisk), 143rd (Gomel) followed the combined march there, and the 50th SD from Vitebsk went to the Gaynovka district.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, troops were prohibited from defending in their lanes along the state border. By the time of the air strike (at 3 hours and 50 minutes on June 22) and artillery preparation (at 4 hours and June 22), the enemy managed to turn around and take up the defense of the state border: in the 3rd Army — control of 4 sk, 27 and 56 battalions; in the 10th - control of 1 and 5 sk, 2, 8, 13 and 86 sd; in the 4th - 6 and 75 sd. In the process of nomination they were attacked: in the 3rd army - 85 sd, in the 4th - 42 sd.

"What is the question - that is the answer." So far, only one document of the General Staff is known that explicitly mentions the threat of a German attack - "Directive No. 1", which was sent to district headquarters on the night of June 21-22, 1941. In this regard, if they had time to send them to the "troops" an order to rise to combat alert, then already at the very moment the war began. Or after it. The conclusion is logical from here: the German attack was not expected until the morning of June 22, 1941. As a logical conclusion to the entire pre-war policy: there were no "defense plans". Timely orders to carry out defensive measures too. Nobody believed in the German attack. Which the generals have confirmed with their answers.

This also confirms Pokrovsky’s fourth question:

* * *

But the answers to it of the generals in the VIZH are not given.
  Why, why? Moscow ordered through district headquarters!
  It is a logical event in the planned preparation of military operations.
  But not defense against a surprise attack.

* * *

Pokrovsky’s fifth question was not discussed on the site of “slander”:

If the rest was not ready, then what kind of successful work was the staffs talking about?

* * *

The question may arise: in the framework of which theory of action of the Red Army before 06/22/1941 can be correct and logical? As the study of Soviet sources of the 30s shows, this can only be the preparation of a “maneuver” according to the theory of the MMW (motor-mechanized war). Moreover, the offensive maneuver.

There is even a specific article in the journal Military Thought No. 3 of 1941, OPERATIVE SUDDENESS (author - Colonel A. I. STARUNIN) (), in which the only reason for precisely these actions is explained simply (p. 33):

"Providing sudden maneuver in modern conditions

The main obstacle to a sudden operational maneuver is aviation. Naturally, with the decisive superiority of aviation, as was, for example, on the side of Germany during the German-Polish war, operational surprise can be relatively easily achieved on any sector of the front. With equal forces in aviation and motorcycle-mechanized forces, achieving surprise is much more difficult.

Without dwelling on the actions of aviation, we will consider ensuring the surprise maneuver of the ground forces. Given the possible actions of enemy air reconnaissance, each commander of a large combined arms formation, especially the army, must prepare in advance for counteraction and find all methods and means to "hide" the maneuver he conceived from enemy aircraft at least for a certain time. The success of this will largely depend on the training of troops in peacetime. Concentration invisible to the enemy of large military formations (and especially armies) in the desired area must be carried out dispersed. The rifle division will be forced to move to the area of \u200b\u200bconcentration by small columns in depth on a wide front and, as a rule, in nighttime. Naturally, such a maneuver will require considerable effort and appropriate training of forces in peacetime. "

At night, it is necessary to move the divisions to the place of concentration in order to perform maneuvers in the mechanized mechanized war! And what is he like ("maneuver")? I specify: the transition of troops on the offensive. There can be no other understandings. For defense, you do not have to move at night. If there is time - enough during the day. And when inviting correspondents from all accredited newspapers to these paths. Under the orchestras and slogans: "We are going to defend our country!" And with the various demarches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an appeal to the entire world community. Nekhai preparing adversary will think about how much blood he will have to spend if he decides to attack!

But at night, secretly pushing troops to the border makes sense in preparing the offensive.
  The main thing is to have time to concentrate. For if it does not succeed and the enemy strikes earlier, then a great confusion and disruption of the whole plan may happen (which most likely happened in the summer of 1941).

As for Oleg Kozinkin’s comment on the site of “slanders,” in order to agree with him, one has to agree with the fact that by June 1941 there were THREE separate couples of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in the USSR.

1. Firstly, there had to be a “correct” General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense, who saw the threat of the German attack and in time prepared the troops to repel it. In particular, on June 13-18, the right orders were sent to the western districts about urgent bringing the troops into combat readiness. Here are some thoughts that Oleg Kozinkin confirms this hypothesis:

".... So maybe there was no" initiative "in PribOVO at all (especially in Odessa)? And Kuznetsov just carried out orders of the General Staffbut didn’t bring these orders to subordinates? Yes, and he did these orders of NGOs and the General Staff from June 13-18  so with his chief of staff, Klenov, that they made a complete turmoil in the troops of the district. That is, in case of verification from Moscow - like the order of the General Staff from June 18 to bring in B.G.  performed. But in fact, the troops operate in the regime "Come here - stand there." And in about the same way they also led troops from the depths of the districts to the border on the same days, under the guise of "exercises." Not bringing to the command of the armies that moscow order (Directive of NGOs and General Staff of June 13) is clear  - “withdraw to the areas stipulated by the cover plan” and this means that no “targets” should be taken.

.....

And the border division of Abramidze began to reach its defense lines precisely after she received the "special order of the people's commissar", after Abramidze received this order on June 20. And most likely, Abramidze’s answer is about order of the General Staff of June 18, whose existence is strongly denied by skeptics and "official" historians ... "

2. But at the same time there should have been a couple of "wrong" General Staff and People's Commissariat of Defense, who, if they saw the threat of the German attack, but in every possible way sabotaged the task of preparing the Red Army for its reflection. According to Oleg Kozinkin, this is especially evident in the sabotage of sending Directives No. 1 to the okrug:

"... After the evening of June 21 in Stalin’s office a decision was made to bring all troops of the western districts into full combat readiness, a direct order to put them on combat alert was signed at 10.20 p.m." Directive No. 1 "was signed. After that, the districts should It’s already open to raise troops on combat alert, and after that another the stage of deliberate sabotage by the generals in bringing this directive to the troops of the western districts. And this is already directly involved in the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, as well as possibly the chief of the operational management of the General Staff G.K. Malandin (in the districts, the command of the districts was already engaged in the failure to bring the "Directive No. 1" to the troops).

These three did everything possible to “immediately” send Directive No. 1 to the western districts and did it so “quickly” that they sent her out of the General Staff only around and after 1.00 a.m. Those. almost 2.5 hours after its signing in Stalin’s office !!! "

3. In addition, there should have been a third pair of “wrong” General Staff and People’s Commissariat of Defense, who did not see the need to prepare defense on their territory. And instead, they were engaged in some kind of nonsense: they tried to prepare some kind of “counterattack”, apparently guided by the consideration: that the best defense is an offensive!

"3) Now, when analyzing the events that have taken place, it became clear that some employees of the General Staff, knowing that in the first period of the war superiority in real forces would be on the side of Germany, for some reason they conducted and developed mainly offensive operations and only recently (in the end of May 1941) they held a game to cover the border, while it was necessary to develop defensive operations for the first period of the war, taking into account the surprise of the attack. "

....

And this is the direct accusation of the General Staff that instead of the active defense provided for in "Considerations ..." from Shaposhnikov of October 1940, the General Staff, i.e. Zhukov and the company launched a general immediate counterattack on the entire front of the invading enemy. And maybe in May they “played a game to cover the border,” but in reality Zhukov and Tymoshenko tried to launch a general offensive in the very first days of the war. And the general deployment of troops and depots was just to "contribute" to this. .... "

But even this does not end the number of saboteurs. It turns out (according to Oleg Kozinkin) that the correct teams from the General Staff and NGOs (just need to clarify: from which “pair”) in the “places” were in no hurry to fulfill. A special “zeal” in “braking” was shown by generals at district headquarters.

As a result, officers and generals of a lower level could not clearly understand the situation and were already forced to take the initiative at their own “peril and risk” (?). Or not to show.

And as a result, a "rout" arose.

Perhaps such a “logic” makes some sense. (If you agree that in the USSR before June 22, 1941 there were THREE pairs of "NCO-General Staff").

But Oleg Kozinkin does not insist on his interpretation. He ends his "research" by clarifying:

".... Documents are shown, memoirs are dismantled," testimonies "are presented. And the reader only needs to draw his own conclusion - were the troops of the western districts put on alert several days before June 22 or not? And if they were, then why and weren’t brought into reality? And after that there will be only one question - who is to blame for the fact that the putting the troops on the border into combat alert did not take place before June 22, or rather, it was disrupted, and by whom?

In no case, claiming to be “the ultimate truth”, however, I would like possible opponents to draw their conclusions on precisely documents, memoirs and testimonies ... Take these documents memoirs and testimonies, find new ones and draw the opposite conclusion - I will be glad if this works out. But do not forget that the "verdict" in the dispute of "conclusions" will be made by the reader .... This work is not a “version” or “hypothesis that explains everything.” This is a analysis and analysis of existing, published and quite accessible materials. So read, analyze and draw your own conclusions .... And choose whose truth is true.

08/17/2010 "

So read, analyze and draw your own conclusions (how many pairs of NCO-General Staff were there, huh? Maybe not even three, but more?) ....

Pokrovsky Victor Leonidovich

Pokrovsky, Victor Leonidovich  - (1889 1922) lieutenant general. He graduated from the Pavlovsk Military School and the Sevastopol Aviation School. Member of the First World War, military pilot. St. George Knight. In 1917, the staff captain and commander of the 12th Army Aviation Squad in ... ... Big biographical encyclopedia

Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky  - Pokrovsky Victor Leonidovich (1889 November 8, 1922, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) Lieutenant General. Member of the Great and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919, commander of the Caucasian Army, successor to this post of General Baron P.N. Wrangel. Had ... ... Wikipedia

Pokrovsky, Victor  - Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky Victor Pokrovsky Leonidovich (1889 November 8, 1922, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) Lieutenant General. Member of the Great and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919, the commander of the Caucasian Army, the successor to this post of general ... ... Wikipedia

Victor Pokrovsky  - Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky Victor Pokrovsky Leonidovich (1889 November 8, 1922, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) Lieutenant General. Member of the Great and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919, the commander of the Caucasian Army, the successor to this post of general ... ... Wikipedia

Pokrovsky V.  - Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky Victor Pokrovsky Leonidovich (1889 November 8, 1922, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) Lieutenant General. Member of the Great and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919, the commander of the Caucasian Army, the successor to this post of general ... ... Wikipedia

Pokrovsky V.L.  - Victor Leonidovich Pokrovsky Victor Pokrovsky Leonidovich (1889 November 8, 1922, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) Lieutenant General. Member of the Great and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919, the commander of the Caucasian Army, the successor to this post of general ... ... Wikipedia

V.L. Pokrovsky

September 14 (September 26 in a new style) in 1889, Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky was born - an outstanding Russian pilot, lieutenant general, participant in the First World and Civil Wars. The pioneer. In 1919 - commander of the Caucasian Army, successor to this post of General Baron P.N. Wrangel. Subsequently, he was dismissed by Wrangel from the Russian Army, independently prepared a Cossack assault on the Kuban in 1922, and was killed by the Bulgarian political police.

According to emigre and modern Russian historians, General Pokrovsky was an amazing alloy of an adventurer and a warrior who did not know how to fight in white gloves. Being the undisputed hero of the First World War, a talented pilot and a brave military leader, he tarnished himself with many impartial acts, crimes and adventures during the years of the Civil War and during the emigrant period. His cruelty, lack of principle, illegibility in the methods and choice of allies sometimes shocked not only the civilian population, but also comrades in the white struggle. In exile, Pokrovsky did not become "his" for the Wrangel command, but, nevertheless, remained faithful to the White Cause to the end. Unlike prominent white military leaders who were rejected by the Russian Army in exile (General Slashchev and others), Pokrovsky did not make his choice in favor of returning and working with the Bolsheviks. On the contrary, to the best of his ability, he sought to continue the confrontation that had begun in Russia with communism. Only the general’s desperate adventurism, intransigence and ardent desire to always go against the prevailing circumstances led to the tragic collapse and no less tragic death of this outstanding person.

Education

Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky graduated from the Odessa Cadet Corps in 1906, then the Pavlovsk Military School (the first in graduation), was promoted to officer in the Grenadier Little Russian Regiment. The ordinary service in the regiment did not satisfy the young lieutenant: he was a romantic and dreamed of heaven. In 1912, Pokrovsky entered the aviation class of the Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, after which he was enrolled in the Sevastopol Aviation School. After passing the final exam in November 1914, the newly made aviator immediately went as a volunteer to the army and was enrolled in the 21st corps aviation detachment.

World War I

Once in the war, a brave pilot almost every month performs outstanding feats. One after another, military decorations adorn his chest. Here is a small extract from Pokrovsky’s track record in just two months of 1915:

“The military pilot, Lieutenant Viktor Pokrovsky, during the period from May 16 to July 15, 1915 made, except for flights, 40 air reconnaissance missions, performing these tasks each time, giving corps headquarters valuable information about the enemy. These reconnaissance was carried out under strong gun, machine gun and rifle fire of the enemy. For the indicated period of time Pokrovsky, according to the official report, stayed in the air over the enemy for 141 hours; participated in four air battles, firing at enemy vehicles and twice preventing them from reconnaissance; In addition, on May 16, he participated in an aerial battle with a German apparatus and carried out reconnaissance, despite the fact that his apparatus was damaged by an enemy bullet, and more than 35 versts from his positions and all the way to them he was bombarded by a German apparatus flying directly above his head , and crossed the position at an altitude of only 700 meters. On June 7, the German apparatus was fired upon and forced to go down. On June 15, he made a night flight to find the enemy’s batteries and found six enemy batteries. On June 27, the enemy apparatus pursued and made him turn and go down. On July 9, during reconnaissance of the enemy’s rear, which fell into the motor with a bullet, the valve and thrust of the cylinder of Pokrovsky’s apparatus were turned off and, despite the cylinder being completely unusable and the engine turned off at 11 miles in the rear, he managed to get down on his own territory without damaging the device. ”

On July 15, 1915, Pokrovsky accomplished a task so significant in terms of courage and value that soon, on the proposal of the Supreme Commander, he was awarded the St. George arms and officer cross of St. George 4th degree. His name falls on the pages of numerous orders, newspapers and magazines.

July 15, 1915 Pokrovsky with his observer Cornet Plonsky returned from ordinary air reconnaissance to the airfield of the detachment. The army headquarters was located near the airfield. Pokrovsky was the first to notice that an Austrian “albatross” appeared near the airport. The Austrian confidently kept heading for the headquarters, intending to drop bombs there.

Pokrovsky and his observer instantly jumped on the "farm" and took off. At an altitude of about two miles, almost above the headquarters of the army, Pokrovsky joined the battle with the Austrian pilot. The Austrian, turning, began to leave. But Pokrovsky managed to take a position above him and began to press him to the bottom. The enemy came down and then, fearing to sit on the tops of the forest, was forced to go down. Pokrovsky planted his "farm" fathoms 40 from the "albatross". Jumping out of an airplane; he ordered Plonsky to guard him, and alone he rushed to the Austrians, who were in a hurry to set fire to their apparatus. Pokrovsky ran up to the pilot, knocked him down with a blow of the handle of the revolver, and a Mauser directed the observer, an officer of the Austrian General Staff. Having disarmed the officers, he brought the prisoners to the army headquarters. Pokrovsky became the first pilot in the history of the First World War, who managed not only to shoot down an enemy aircraft and capture a pilot, but also to take his apparatus as a trophy: the “albatross” was soon delivered to an aviation detachment with all weapons and in perfect working order.

The name of Pokrovsky in the army became so popular that in September 1915 the Supreme Commander himself summoned him to Headquarters, where the pilot was given an extremely important and secret mission for reconnaissance of the deep rear of the enemy. The information received by Pokrovsky during the brilliant fulfillment of this task was used in preparing the plan of Lutsk (Brusilovsky) breakthrough.

In January 1916, Pokrovsky, with the rank of captain, was appointed commander of the 12th Army Aviation Squad, stationed in Riga. The daily raids by the German Taube made the squad work extremely stressful. Constant night reconnaissance was often accompanied by aerial combat. The composition of the detachment was greatly thinned, Pokrovsky himself, already already wounded, received a concussion, a fracture of two ribs, and froze his hands. His detachment gained the glory of the undaunted and broke the record of being in the air.

Revolution and Civil War

The revolution came, and with it the decomposition of the army. In March 1917, Staff Captain Pokrovsky resigned as commander of an aviation detachment and left for Petersburg, where he worked for some time in the underground organization of Count Palen. The count was engaged in the recruitment of officers for the Alekseyev organization (the future Volunteer Army).

In November 1917, among the implacable opponents of the October coup, Pokrovsky leaves for the Kuban. In the winter of 1917-1918, he supported the uprising of the Kuban Cossacks, as a result of which Yekaterinodar was cleared of the Bolsheviks and an independent Kuban Government was formed (Rada). Pokrovsky was not a Cossack by origin, but, nevertheless, the Kuban Council instructed him, as an experienced commander, to form the 2nd Volunteer Detachment (Kuban Army). The very first small detachment of Pokrovsky (about 300 Cossack soldiers) in battles with the red units on January 21-23, 1918 inflicted a fierce defeat on them near Enem, near the village of Georgiy Afipskaya. The credibility of the former aviator hero among the Kubans becomes unquestioned. Kuban in this period turned out to be the most active center of organized resistance to the Bolsheviks. It was in Ekaterinodar that the leaders of the Kornilov Volunteer Army, rejected by the Don Cossacks, decided to go. If Pokrovsky waited for volunteers in Yekaterinodar, he had every chance of becoming, if not the first, then the second most important figure in the White movement. However, this was not destined to come true.

On March 13 (February 28), 1918, under pressure from the significantly superior red forces of Sorokin, Pokrovsky's detachments left Yekaterinodar. As a result, the city went red without a fight. The Kuban government and Cossack chieftains fled the capital, but on March 14 (1), the Rada appointed Pokrovsky as commander of the Kuban army and promoted him to colonel, and then to major general.

Not surprisingly, the leaders of the Volunteer Army squinted at the “instant” General Pokrovsky. In "Essays on Russian Troubles" A.I. Denikin gave him the following description:

“Pokrovsky was young, of a small rank and military experience, and was unknown to anyone. But he showed intense energy, was brave, cruel, power-hungry and did not really reckon with “moral prejudices”. ... Be that as it may, he did what more respectable and official people could not do: he assembled a detachment, which alone was an actual force capable of fighting and beating the Bolsheviks. ”

The rest of the leadership of the Volunteer Army Pokrovsky made the same impression as Denikin. When the newly-minted general arrived at the army headquarters for negotiations, they treated him restrainedly and dryly. And when Pokrovsky, on the pretext that all sorts of changes could cause fermentation among the Cossacks, began to insist on the autonomy of the troops of the Kuban Territory, General Alekseev flushed:

“Full, Colonel! Sorry, I don’t know how to dignify you. The troops have nothing to do with it - we know well how they relate to this issue. You just don’t want to give up your vanity. ”

General Kornilov, in turn, insisted on the complete and unconditional submission of the Pokrovsky detachment to the command of the Dobarmia. Negotiations are at an impasse.

The next time, representatives of the Kuban government expelled from Yekaterinodar and the Kuban chieftain Filimonov arrived at the headquarters of the volunteers. They agreed to the complete submission of the Kuban to Kornilov.

On March 27, 1918, in the region of the village of Ryazan (Shenjiy aul), the Kuban Army entered an integral part (3,000 soldiers) in the Volunteer Army (2,700 people, of which 700 were wounded). The general command of these forces was assigned to General Kornilov, and the chief of troops of the Kuban Territory V.L. Pokrovsky responded to his government for the further formation of the Kuban army.

This trap shocked Pokrovsky so much that later on he turned into one of the most ardent fighters with Kuban separatism. In the summer of 1918, the commander of the Volunteer Army A.I. Denikin sent a restless subordinate with 4 hundred Cossacks and Circassians to the Labinsky district (county) to organize local rebels. In the battle near the Settlements (August 7), volunteers defeated the Reds, and an anti-Bolshevik uprising swept the entire Kuban. Pokrovsky’s detachment descended from the mountains, began active operations, took possession of Maykop and Armavir. A few days later this partisan army was renamed the 1st Kuban Cossack Division. On January 3, 1919, the division was transformed into the 1st Kuban Corps of the All-Union Socialist League. In July 1919, General Pokrovsky commanded a group of troops of the Caucasian Army near Tsaritsyn. His troops took part in the capture of Kamyshin on the Volga. For the capture of Kamyshin Pokrovsky was promoted to lieutenant general.

In the summer and autumn of 1919, typhus raged in Tsaritsyno. The commander of the Caucasian Army, General Wrangel, and almost all of his headquarters were ill. On September 9, 1919, General Pokrovsky was seriously ill with typhus. He surrendered the 1st Kuban Corps to General Pisarev, and after recovering he was appointed chief of logistics of the Caucasus Army (October - November 1919).

In the fall of 1919, the main forces of the whites were concentrated in the Moscow direction. The flow of human and material reserves from the Kuban, fueling the White movement, was constantly decreasing. Local politicians again spoke of sovereignty, turned a blind eye to Bolshevik agitation and entered into an agreement on mutual recognition with the anti-Denikin "Mejlis of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus." The White Command quite rightly regarded such actions as treason. The duty to suppress them fell on the command of the Caucasian Army, which did not participate in the "Moscow" offensive. However, the "humanist" Wrangel gracefully threw all the "dirty work" to the head of the rear Pokrovsky. With his inherent decisiveness, Pokrovsky set to work. On November 18, he presented the ultimatum to Rada, demanding the extradition of priest Kalabukhov (one of the initiators of the signing of the agreement with the Mejlis) and 12 other separatist leaders. After the deadline, the troops of Pokrovsky surrounded the Rada building, after which the general appointed a new deadline for fulfilling his requirements - 5 minutes. All the leaders of the "independent" surrendered without resistance. Kalabukhov was hanged "for treason against Russia and the Kuban Cossacks", the rest were sent to Constantinople.

November 26, 1919 Pokrovsky replaced General P.N. Wrangel as commander of the Caucasian Army. Wrangel himself, while still a commander, repeatedly tried to stop the drunken outrages, robberies and violence against the civilian population, repaired by the connivance of the young Kuban commanders Pokrovsky and Shkuro. Their devotion to the White Cause did not leave any doubts, but neither their immediate superior nor the Supreme Commander of the All-Union Supreme Court of Justice Denikin succeeded in directing the brutal atrocities of the "hangman" -Pokrovsky and the partisan revelry in the right direction.

Later, in his Notes, Wrangel described V. L. Pokrovsky as follows:

“I knew General Pokrovsky, promoted to this rank by the resolution of the Kuban government, from his work in St. Petersburg in an officer organization led by Count Palen. At that time, he served in the air forces with the rank of captain. An extraordinary mind, outstanding energy, enormous willpower and great ambition, he was at the same time a little choosy about his means, inclined to adventure. ”

Here is a very characteristic “document” addressed to civilians of the city of Maykop and signed by Pokrovsky himself:

Pokrovsky, indeed, was distinguished by exorbitant, sometimes half-insane cruelty. According to contemporaries, where his headquarters stood, there were always many who were executed and hanged without trial, on one suspicion of sympathy for the Bolsheviks. General Pokrovsky himself, either in jest or in earnest, assured that "the appearance of the hanged man improves his appetite" and "the gallows diversifies the surrounding landscape." Such statements more than once led the command to think of the general's mental inferiority.

The modern Russian historian S. V. Karpenko gives the following “portrait” of V. L. Pokrovsky:

“His terrible reputation as a hanger was emphasized by his appearance. A short stooped figure, drawn into an invariable Circassian face, a frowning forehead, a hooked bird's nose and a piercing gaze of dark eyes reminded a merciless steppe predator. The terrible look of the heavily armed officers of his personal convoy - Chechens and Ingushs - deepened the atmosphere of fear around their boss, whom they adored. ”

Perhaps Pokrovsky’s demonstrative antics were partly due to the fact that having received the general rank, Viktor Leonidovich remained an alien to most of the military leaders of the white movement. He did not belong to the category of elect - graduates of the Academy of the General Staff and already by virtue of this circumstance was considered an upstart. As a reverse example, we can recall that P.N. Wrangel, who joined the volunteers with a big delay, (August 1918) immediately received a brigade under his command and automatically equaled Pokrovsky in his own position. However, according to the memoirs of A.I. Denikin, the ambitions of the tsarist general Wrangel at that time did not extend beyond the command of the squadron, and yesterday the headquarters captain Pokrovsky already in the spring of 1918 claimed to lead the entire Kuban army ...

In the period of the tragic defeats of the All-Union Socialist Liberation Union in the late autumn of 1919, the intrigues of the general against Denikin reached their peak. The days of "King Anton" were already numbered. Generals Pokrovsky, Kutepov, Baron Wrangel stood in the same row among applicants for the post of new Commander-in-Chief. However, the allies and the generals, despite the resistance of the Cossacks, supported Wrangel's candidacy: Pokrovsky was suitable for "dirty work", but to entrust him with an army seemed unthinkable.

Wrangel also did not need competition in the person of Pokrovsky. After converting the remnants of the All-Union Union of National Liberation Forces into the Russian Army, the phrase of the new Commander-in-Chief was voiced throughout Crimea that he would not tolerate the presence of such generals as Pokrovsky and Shkuro in his army. The Kuban units were handed over to General Ulagay. Pokrovsky and Shkuro, having not received command posts in the Russian Army, were credited to the reserve and in April 1920 emigrated to Turkey.

Emigration and death

In exile V.L. Pokrovsky lived in Paris, Vienna, then in Berlin. In 1921, after the transfer of the Kuban units from the camps of Chataldzhi and Lemnos to Bulgaria and KSHS, he moved to Varna. During this period, the Cossacks again found themselves in opposition to Wrangel, who came into conflict with the Kuban chieftain Naumenko. Naumenko, with his authority, removed General M.A. Fostikov, the protege of Wrangel, from command of the Kuban Division. Wrangel, disregarding the opinion of the chieftain, supported Fostikov, which pushed most of the Cossacks away from him.

Under these conditions, the name of General Pokrovsky could become a banner capable of collecting the most irreconcilable elements of the Kuban and Highlanders. The name of the little-known General Ulagai, who replaced Pokrovsky in 1920, practically did not say anything to the Kuban, and Wrangel remained for them, first of all, a baron and a guard, who are alien to the aspirations of ordinary Cossacks.

Pokrovsky independently, bypassing Wrangel, planned to organize the landing on the Black Sea coast of the Kuban of armed and politically trained cadres of white officers to organize anti-Bolshevik propaganda, sabotage and terrorist attacks. He received financial assistance from Russian bankers in Serbia (and he believed that assistance from financiers should be "knocked out" by purely Socialist-Revolutionary, revolutionary methods). In Varna, the most convenient point for preparing an amphibious assault, Pokrovsky bought a sailing-motor schooner, at which he planned to transfer the headquarters and command staff of future rebels to Russia. He established relations with the Cossacks in the KSHS, in the Bulgarian factory "Strug" through third parties a batch of hand grenades was ordered. However, information about the creation of a white military organization fell into the hands of the Bulgarian police. Bulgarian Prime Minister then was the left-wing politician Alexander of Istanbul, who had a negative attitude towards the White movement. His government was not shy in dealing with "restless Russian guests." Police intercepted Pokrovsky’s correspondence with his accomplices in Serbia, carried out searches and arrests. The authorities, foiling the landing plans, expelled some of the most active white officers from Bulgaria and threatened Pokrovsky himself with imprisonment. The general was forced to flee from Varna and go to an illegal position.

On November 3, 1922, members of Pokrovsky’s organization killed Alexander Ageev, a Cossack leader, editor of the New Russia newspaper, in Sofia. The newspaper was published in Varna by the Union of Homecoming and funded by both the Bulgarian authorities and the Bolsheviks. Ageev most likely worked for his Soviet “masters,” and published a particularly harsh article about Pokrovsky. In the article, he denounced those who, through their actions, “provoke Soviet power in repression, and then shout about red terror.” Pokrovsky himself did not take part in the murder, but hid with his accomplices in Kyustendil, a small town on the border of Bulgaria and the KSHS. There is a version that Soviet agents helped to find Pokrovsky by the Bulgarian police. They sent an anonymous letter to the police, in which it was reported that one of the members of Pokrovsky’s organization was sent to Kyustendil. As part of the investigation into the murder of Ageev, the police arrived in the city and tracked down the man they needed. The house where Pokrovsky was hiding was taken by storm. When trying to arrest, the general offered armed resistance, was mortally wounded with a bayonet in the side, and soon died in the hospital.

Thus ended the path of a talented Russian pilot, military commander, general, who was put forward by this war, but yesterday’s compatriots cursed and did not understand the previous comrades-in-arms.

Having learned from the newspapers about the death of General Pokrovsky, one of the most famous military leaders of the All-Union Union of Liberal Democratic Forces, Major General A.A. close to Wrangel von Lampe wrote in his diary:

“It's a pity Pokrovsky. He was a man of average morality, but he had a vigorous energy and character, and he did his job better than many ...

Elena Shirokova

Sources and literature:

Wrangel P.N. Notes // White Case. Chronicle of the White struggle. - Berlin: The Bronze Horseman, 1927. Prince. 5.6;

Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles. - M .: "Vagrius", 2002.V. 2;

Saboteurs and terrorists // Russians without the Fatherland: Essays on anti-Bolshevik emigration of the 20-40s. - M.: RGGU, 2000.- P. 450-460;

Leontovich V. General Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky // First battles in the Kuban. Memories. - Munich: Young Russia, 1923;

02/08/2013 at 08:14

For many years of Soviet power, we were taught to think only in the “white - black” plane. Bolshevik mythology created a collective image of an honest, noble “red knight”. Of course, there were those in the ranks of the Red Army. But time passed, and infantile maximalism in assessing historical events and personalities remained, only changing color. What was red turned black, and events and personalities associated with the white movement began to be perceived as the “Lives of the Saints”. There were different people in the White movement. The personality and fate of General Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky, who fought near Tsaritsyn as part of the Caucasian Army P.N. Wrangel, is ambiguous.

Unshakable Fortitude

A brilliant officer, a pilot into the First World War, having accomplished unprecedented exploits, he managed to surprise Generals Denikin, Wrangel and others with great ambition, cruelty, even cruelty and recklessness.

The “Hero of the Kuban”, the liberator of cities and villages, who had turned in the Volunteer Army in a short time from the staff captain to major general, first commanded a division, and then the Kuban corps. According to General A. G. Shkuro, “where Pokrovsky’s headquarters stood, there were always many executed and hanged without any trial, on one suspicion of sympathy for the Bolsheviks.”

The famous Kuban local historian G.V. Klimentyev in his book “With Love About Yeysk” talks about one of the episodes of the Civil War. July 26, 1918 “... Toward evening, from the Gardens side, Pokrovsky himself entered the city with his cavalry, met ... with bread and salt. Church bells rang, people rejoiced ... With the advent of whites, gallows appeared in the city. The first was built in the city garden. Black and mourning, she terrified the townspeople. Outraged women besieged the building of the head of the garrison and demanded to remove the gallows ... Subsequently, executions were carried out in the courtyard of the prison. “Very soon, the general jubilation over the arrival of the whites in the city ceased, as life has shown that the regime of whites in its cruelty was no different from the regime of reds.”

P. N. Wrangel in his “Memoirs” gives Pokrovsky the following characteristic: “His invaluable properties were absolutely exceptional unwavering firmness of mind, rare persistence in achieving his goal and enormous endurance. He was a man of extraordinary intelligence, a very good organizer. ” And from the same book: “The group of General Pokrovsky ... ran into the superior forces of the red cavalry. During the three-day battles of July 22-24, stubborn battles, General Pokrovsky defeated Budenny’s cavalry. ”

For the capture of Kamyshin, General A. I. Denikin promoted to Major General V. L. Pokrovsky as lieutenant general.

The memoirs of General P. S. Makhrov, the former chief of military communications of the Caucasus Army, contain a description of the appearance of V. L. Pokrovsky: “It was a dark brown-haired man of small stature, broad-chested and bent-legged. He walked fast ... From under the dark eyebrows the small sharp eyes of a predator gazed. ”

  From feats to tyranny

In the summer of 1919, Pokrovsky commanded the troops of the Volga Group, defeated three Soviet armies, captured the Kamyshinsky and Volga regions of fortified areas up to the 1st line of the forts of Saratov, captured 52,000 people, 142 guns, 396 machine guns, 2 armored trains. During these battles, Pokrovsky showed exceptional personal courage and was wounded.

When the question arose of transferring General Wrangel to the Volunteer Army, General L. Denikin appointed V. L. Pokrovsky as his successor.

Having taken command of the army, Pokrovsky was in a difficult position. He complained that the army was exhausted to the extreme, on the left bank of the Volga, parts of the Red Army were firmly entrenched. The General rightly believed that the forces remaining at his disposal were not enough to protect Tsaritsyn. Further events confirmed this - the city passed into the hands of the 10th and 11th Red Armies.

General Pokrovsky remained out of work to disband the Caucasian Army. Arriving in Yalta, he, according to P.N. Orlov. The inhabitants were grabbed on the streets, armed with anything. ”

Then a huge number of rear troops and refugees accumulated in Crimea, bringing significant chaos to Crimean life. Various adventurers used this skillfully, including someone who called himself Captain Orlov and gathered a bunch of crooks around him. Under the slogan "improving the rear for a fruitful fight against the Bolsheviks," he advanced through the Crimea.

Wrangel writes: “Orlov approached the city. General Pokrovsky, with several dozen scared, unable to shoot "mobilized", went out to meet him. The "mobilized" fled and Orlov, having arrested General Pokrovsky, took the city without firing a shot ... After spending several days in Yalta, making noise and robbing the cash desk of the local branch of the State Bank, Orlov went to the mountains. "

V.L. Pokrovsky attended a significant meeting of the Military Council of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (FYUR), which elected General Wrangel as successor to the Commander-in-Chief Denikin. Having not received a position in the Russian army, Baron Wrangel, Pokrovsky in the spring of 1920 left Russia and sent to Europe.

At times, relations within the senior officers of the white armies were complicated. What is the reason for the removal of P. N. Wrangel from the post of V. L. Pokrovsky? Probably, the baron considered General Pokrovsky "inclined to adventure", illegible in the means. Perhaps the role played by the memories of the looting of his subordinates - the Cossacks of the Kuban Division against the inhabitants of the Kuban, the licentiousness of its officers.

As P. N. Wrangel writes, “in the military hotel of Yekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) the most reckless revelry happened all the time. At 11-12 p.m. a group of drunken officers appeared, the songwriters of the local guard division were introduced into the general hall, and there was a revel in front of the public. All these outrages were carried out in front of the headquarters of the commander in chief, the whole city knew about them, and at the same time nothing was done to stop this debauchery. "

In wandering around Europe

The fate of Pokrovsky in exile was dramatic. Having lived in Paris and Berlin, Viktor Leonidovich at the end of 1922 moved to Bulgaria.

In the fall of the same year, a Soviet Red Cross mission appeared in the country, consisting almost entirely of Chekists. Many emigrants began to collaborate with her and even organized the Union for Homecoming (Sovnarod).

In response, Pokrovsky created an illegal organization and even tried to send about 60 of his fighters to the banks of the Kuban to organize an uprising. Almost all of them were arrested in the port of Varna. Pokrovsky himself managed to escape.

His people in revenge launched a real terror against Soviet agents and "traitors" from Sovnarod. After the murder of one of the leaders of the “returnees,” 25-year-old Alexander Ageev, the patience of the local authorities snapped.

Pokrovsky took refuge in the town of Kyustendil, about to flee to Yugoslavia. An anonymous letter put in his mailbox in Sofia followed him. It was reported that on November 7 a man who should meet with the murderers of Ageev will travel from Sofia to Kyustendil by day train. The letter contained the signs of this passenger.

Three police agents overtook the train in a car and settled on the station square of Kyustendil. All local police have already been put on their feet. The passenger of the train was identified, detained and a confession was extracted from him, where and to whom he was heading.

Half an hour later, a police company surrounded the house where Pokrovsky was hiding. Together with him in the house were orderly Krichevsky, Lieutenant General S. G. Ulagay and Ageev’s killer Sergey Bocharov. In the operation to arrest them on the next anniversary of the October Revolution, November 7, 1922, security officers from the Red Cross participated along with the Bulgarian gendarmes.

The first to notice the approach of the police was General Ulagai, who was in the yard. Having warned his cries of danger, he managed to hide in the nearby forest. Pokrovsky, shooting back, rushed out into the yard, wounded Kyumidzhev, an employee of the "Public Security" blocking his path, and also rushed towards the forest, but came across an ambush.

During a desperate battle, one of the police officers pierced Pokrovsky’s chest with a bayonet. The wound was fatal, and without regaining consciousness, Viktor Leonidovich died in Kyustendil’s hospital, leaving three young children and his wife without a livelihood ...

Kira Chigirinskaya, Senior Researcher, Panorama Museum "Battle of Stalingrad"

Commander of the Kuban region

Pokrovsky Victor Leonidovich (1889-1922) - Lieutenant General. He graduated from the Pavlovsk Military School and the Sevastopol Aviation School. Participant World War I , war pilot. St. George Knight. In 1917, he was headquarters captain and commander of the 12th Army Aviation Squad in Riga. After the October Revolution, he formed the 2nd Volunteer Detachment in the Kuban. After initial successes, he was forced to leave Yekaterinodar on March 1, 1918. He was appointed Kuban Rada as commander of the troops of the Kuban region and was promoted to colonel and then major general. He commanded the Kuban army, which went on an ice campaign, before it was joined with the Volunteer Army in the Shenjiy aul. In the Volunteer Army - the commander of the cavalry brigade and division. IN VSYUR - Commander of the 1st Kuban Cossack Corps as part of the Caucasian Army, General Wrangel. For the capture of Kamyshin by the general Denikin   was promoted to lieutenant general. From November 1919 to February 1920 - commander of the Caucasian Army (after the general Wrangel ) In the Russian army, General Wrangel did not receive an appointment to a command post and emigrated in April 1920. General V. L. Pokrovsky was killed by terrorists on November 9, 1922 in Kyustendil (Bulgaria).

Used materials of the book: Nikolai Rutych Biographical Directory of the highest ranks of the Volunteer Army and Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Materials for the history of the White movement M., 2002

Troop commander

Pokrovsky Victor Leonidovich (1889-09.11.1922). Headquarters Captain (1917). Colonel (01.24.1918) and Major General (01.03.1918) - both ranks were awarded by decision of the Kuban Rada. Lieutenant General (04/04/1919, produced by General Denikin). He graduated from the Odessa Cadet Corps (1906), the Pavlovsk Military School (1909) and the Sevastopol Aviation School. Member of the First World War: Captain in the 1st Grenadier Regiment; military pilot - squadron commander and commander of the 12th squadron in Riga, 1914-1917. In the White Movement: on behalf of the Kuban Rada, he formed the 2nd volunteer detachment (Kuban Army) of about 3,000 soldiers, 03/01/1918. The first few detachment of Pokrovsky (about 300 Cossack soldiers) in the battles with the red units inflicted a brutal defeat on them near Enem, on the village of Georgy Athena, on January 21-23, 1918. 02/03/1918 returned to Krasnodar, which soon, 03/01/1918, was forced to leave under the pressure of significantly superior red forces. Appointed commander of the Kuban army 01.03-30.03.1918. After a meeting with General Kornilov’s Volunteer Army on 03/27/1918, in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Ryazan (Shenjiy aul), the Kuban Army entered an integral part (3,000 soldiers) in the Volunteer Army (2,700 bayonets and sabers, of which 700 were wounded), and by mutual agreement the general command of these forces were assigned to General Kornilov. Commander of the Kuban Territory, 06/04/1918; commander of the 1st Kuban brigade, 06.08.1918. Commander of the 1st Kuban equestrian division, 08.1918-01-01.1919. On 01/03/1919, the commander of the 1st Kuban Corps, 07/01/1919. The commander of a group of troops of the Caucasian army near Tsaritsyn captured Kamyshin, on the Volga; 09/07/1919. 09.09.1919 fell ill and surrendered the 1st Kuban Corps to General Pisarev. After recovery, he was appointed head of the rear of the Caucasian Army, 10-11.1919. C 13 (26). 11. 1919 commander of the Caucasian Army, replaced General Wrangel; 11/26/1919 - 21/01/1920. He emigrated from the Crimea on 04.1920 to Bulgaria, without having received a command post in the Russian army, General Wrangel. He was killed on November 9, 1922 (by the NKVD agents?) In Kyustendil (Bulgaria) in his office as a newspaper editor.

Used materials of the book: Valery Klaving, Civil war in Russia: White armies. Military historical library. M., 2003.

Baron Wrangel testifies

I knew General Pokrovsky, promoted to this rank by a resolution of the Kuban government, from his work in St. Petersburg in an officer organization led by Count Palen. At that time, he served in the air forces with the rank of captain. An extraordinary mind, outstanding energy, enormous willpower and great ambition, he was at the same time a little choosy in means, inclined to adventure.

Wrangel P.N. Notes. November 1916 - November 1920. Memoirs. Memoirs. - Minsk, 2003.V. 1. p. 109

In addition to General Pokrovsky and Colonel arrived at the meeting of the Regional Council Skin , a number of officers from the army. Despite the presence in Yekaterinodar of the rate, both the arrivals and the officers living in the rear behaved inappropriately disbanded, drank, mugged, and litter money. Colonel Shkuro was especially inappropriate. He brought with him to Yekaterinodar a division of his partisans, bore the name "Wolf." In wolf hats, with wolf tails on the bunches, the partisans of Colonel Shkuro were not a military unit, but a typical free-gunner Stenka Razin. Quite often, at night after the partisans had drunk, Shkuro with his "wolves" was scampering through the city streets with songs, a boom and gunshots. Returning one evening to a hotel, on Red Street I saw a crowd of people. Light poured from the open windows of the mansion, trumpeters played on the sidewalk under the windows and Cossacks danced. At a distance, several “wolves” stood, holding their horses about. To my question, what does this mean, I got an answer that Colonel Shkuro "walks". In the military hotel where we were standing, the reckless revelry happened all the time. At 11-12 p.m., Chesov was a group of tipsy officers, the songwriters of the local guard division were introduced into the common room, and a public was going on before the eyes of the public. General Pokrovsky, Colonel Shkuro, and other officers sat at the head of the table. One of these bouts chaired by General Pokrovsky ended tragically. A convoy officer shot and killed an officer in the Tatar division. All these outrages were carried out in front of the commander in chief, the whole city knew about them, at the same time nothing was done to stop this debauchery.

Wrangel P.N. Notes. November 1916 - November 1920. Memoirs. Memoirs. - Minsk, 2003.V. 1. p. 153

Document

Order No. 2 in the city of Maykop

For the fact that the population of the city of Maykop (Nikolaev, Pokrovskaya and Troitskaya Slobodka) shot at volunteer troops, I impose an indemnity of one million rubles on the above-mentioned outskirts of the city.

Contributions must be paid within three days.

In case of failure to fulfill my requirement, the above-mentioned settlements will be burned to the ground.

I assign the collection of indemnity to the commandant of the city of Esaul Razderishchina.

Head of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division

major General Pokrovsky.

(Quoted from the personal archive of Artyom Veseliy, "Russia Washed With Blood," "New World" No. 5, 1988)