By the end of the XIX century. empires of the Middle East were slowly declining. While the European powers competed among themselves in the struggle for colonial possessions, the Persian Shah did not even have a regular army. In the event of an attack, a temporary army gathered, the soldier for whom was delivered by tribal leaders. Such an army was poorly trained and could not provide serious resistance.
In the neighboring Ottoman Empire, the sultan called German and French instructors to reorganize the army, while England and the Russian Empire argued for influence in Persia. English historians con. XIX - beg. Twentieth century, such as Lord Curzon or Edward Brown, deny the colonialist policy of England in Persia. They argue that Persia was much more important to Russia, and the formation of the Persian Cossack brigade was the main evidence of Russian influence.
The formation of the Persian Cossack brigade
The military power of Persia was significantly weakened by wars with Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. Attempts by the Fatah Ali Shah Abbas Mirza’s heir to reform the army along the European lines with the help of French and British officers only led to even more confusion. During the reign of Muhammad Shah (1834-1848), along with his prime minister, Sufi Haja Mirza Agasa, the Persian army lost the last remnants of its former power. Nasser al-Din Shah (1848-1896) made no attempt to rectify the situation. Widespread corruption and general decline prevented any reforms. The army, which had previously successfully crushed the Babit uprising at the beginning of the Shah’s reign, was completely demoralized. Despite the fact that the Persians managed to occupy Herat in 1857 during the Anglo-Persian war, the British intervention in the south of the country showed the defenselessness of Persia before the West. During the battles in Fars and Khuzestan, the Persian army that exceeded the British 10 times fled in panic. A few years later, the battle with the Turkmens in Khorasan showed that the Persians are weaker than even the semi-wild nomads of Central Asia.
Nasser al-Din Shah was the first Persian ruler to visit western countries. During a trip to Russia, Germany, Austria, France and the United Kingdom, the Shah and the ministers accompanying him were most struck by the military command and the beautiful uniform of various European troops. Returning home, the shah came to the idea of \u200b\u200breforming his own army. During his second trip to Europe in 1878, Nasser al-Din traveled through the Caucasus, crowded with Russian troops after the recent war with the Ottoman Empire. Shah everywhere accompanied the Cossack detachment. The shah liked the elegant form and magnificent dzhigitovka so much that he expressed his intention to create a similar cavalry detachment in Persia to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. Before this, the Shah thought to entrust the Austrian officers with the reorganization of the infantry and artillery, but not the cavalry.
Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich announced the desire of the Shah to Tsar Alexander II, and he allowed several officers to be sent to Iran. The head of the Tiflis military district, General Pavlov, chose Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich, who had just returned after the war with the Turks. The lieutenant colonel was given money, an interpreter, and given freedom of action.
At the end of November 1878, Domontovich entered Persia, and in January 1879 he arrived in Tehran. Upon learning of his arrival, the Shah arranged a show of cavalry. The horsemen gathered on the plain near Eshratabad represented a sad sight. When the shah rode past, the cavalrymen bowed. But as soon as he pulled back ten steps, they began to talk. Some dismounted, bought fruit from the peddlers standing nearby, or sat down on the ground and lit pipes. The troops did not know the training. Many rode horses, employed for one day from the stables of noble Tehran, since even the personal guard of the shah did not have enough horses. Only out of politeness did Domontovich have to admit the condition of the troops was good. After that, the lieutenant colonel left for Russia and returned in April 1879 with three officers and five sergeants.
First Brigade Commander Colonel Domontovich
Quite a lot is known about the Cossack brigade, since many of the officers left memoirs. The most interesting are the memoirs of the commanders of the brigade Domontovich and Kosogovsky, while Kalugin’s memoirs are inaccurate. So, he was mistaken with the date of the creation of the brigade, and he named Kosogovsky the first commander.
From the very beginning, Russian officers encountered a number of difficulties. The Shah promised to give part of the riders from the personal guard to the Cossack brigade, but the head of the guard Ala od-Doule opposed this. He was afraid to lose part of his income and managed to dissuade the shah. Domontovich spent three months without work. Finally, he was allocated 400 people of Muhajirs, the descendants of Transcaucasian Muslims who fled to Persia from Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. They became the basis of the Cossack brigade. Domontovich trained them intensely, and by the end of the summer of 1879 he was able to present a brigade to watch the shah.
The shah was satisfied and ordered to increase the detachment to 600 people. But, despite all the privileges of the Cossacks, the Muhajirs did not want to replenish the ranks of the brigade. Among them, rumors spread that they were going to be taken to Russia and forcibly converted to Christianity. As a result, the shah ordered 200 volunteers to be recruited, including representatives of various religious and ethnic minorities.
The commander of the Cossack brigade was appointed by the Russian government in the Caucasus, and not by the Persian government. The commander and other Russian officers served under the contract for several years, sometimes the terms of the contract changed. At the time of Domontovich, there were 9 Russian officers in the brigade, by 1920 their number had reached 120 people.
The Persians could also move up the career ladder in the brigade, which later became a source of conflict. Muhajirs, possessing official privileges from the very creation of the brigade, were unhappy that any Persian, even of noble origin, could become an officer and command them. Until the mid 1890s the sons of officers could inherit the ranks of their fathers, do not bother ordinary service.
Along with a lack of internal discipline and conflicts between social groups, the Cossack team suffered from poor supply. This was due both to the difficult financial situation of the Persian court, and to the intrigues of certain influential aristocrats at the court.
Another problem for the Cossack brigade was the confrontation between Russian officers, commanders and diplomatic representatives of Russia in Tehran. Although sometimes commanders and ambassadors acted together in the interests of the Cossack brigade and in the broader interests of Russian politics in Persia, more often Russian diplomats deliberately thwarted all attempts by brigade commanders to enlist the support of the Persian government or dignitaries in Russia. The quarrel between the wife of the Russian ambassador and his wife Domontovich ruined the relations of the brigade commander with the Russian embassy. The embassy not only refused to support the colonel, but also engaged in weaving all kinds of intrigues against him. As another brigade commander noted in his memoirs, Kosogovsky, the Russian ambassador disliked Domontovich so much that he even wrote to the Viceroy of the Caucasus, accusing the brigade commander of betraying the interests of Russia.
Brigade in the 1880s
The Domontovich contract ended in 1881, and the shah immediately renewed it. The colonel went on vacation to Russia for four months, and never returned to Persia. Probably, the Viceroy of the Caucasus listened to the opinion of the Russian ambassador, and instead of Domontovich, Colonel Charkovsky went to Tehran. The Russian government tried to convince the shah that Charkovsky was much better than Domontovich, but the latter made such an indelible impression on the shah that, after Charkovsky’s resignation, he again began to beg to send Domontovich to Tehran. The shah was refused the request, so from the very beginning the choice of the commanders of the Persian Cossack brigade depended entirely on the decision of the Russian military department in the Caucasus.
The only merit of Charkovsky as a brigade commander was the acquisition of four guns in 1883. In 1886, he was replaced by Colonel Kuzmin-Karavaev, who forced the brigade in a difficult financial situation. Dissatisfied with Charkovsky, the Persian government reduced funding for the brigade by 6,000 mists. However, Kuzmin-Karavaev found support in the person of the Russian ambassador in Tehran, Adjutant General Prince Dolgoruky. The brigade commander not only managed to return 6,000 mists, but also received more than 4,000 mists for the needs of the brigade per year. During his service in Tehran, he paid all the debts of the brigade, but did not advance at all in military training.
In 1890, Colonel Schneur, who was completely different from his predecessor, was appointed brigade commander. Schneur hoped that the Persians would increase funding, impressed by military marches. However, his hopes did not materialize, and soon the colonel had nothing to pay a salary to the Cossacks. Schneur took advantage of the old Persian custom - in order not to pay the soldiers, he sent them on indefinite vacation. The cholera epidemic of 1891-1892 further demoralized the Cossacks, and many of them fled from Tehran.
Among other troubles, Schneur was informed that the Shah wanted to inspect the brigade. For the colonel, it was a failure - only 450 Cossacks, including officers and mercenaries, were present at the show of 600. The shah immediately cut the brigade’s budget by 30,000 mists — almost a third. With the help of the Russian embassy, \u200b\u200bSchneur managed to return 12,000 mists. Together with the ambassador, the shah decided to reduce the composition of the brigade to 200 people, excluding mercenaries, musicians and a small detachment of infantry.
After the departure of Schneur in May 1893, captain Brigard became the brigade commander. Instead of serious training, most of the time he prepared the Cossacks for parades. The Cossack brigade quickly fell into decay and more and more resembled the old Persian army. The shah was disappointed. His son and Minister of War Kamran Mirza Naib os-Sultane insisted on the dissolution of the brigade, leaving only 150 Cossacks under the command of one Russian officer as the personal guard of the Shah. The Shah could not decide: on the one hand, he had already agreed with the German ambassador on the arrival of German instructors instead of the Russians, and on the other hand, he was afraid to offend the Russian government. However, the Germans requested too high a price for their services, and the decision was made in favor of the Russians.
The heyday of the Cossack brigade under the command of Kosogovsky
At this time, a new brigade commander arrived in Tehran - Colonel Vladimir Andreevich Kosogovsky. The problem in the brigade was represented by the Muhajirs. They considered themselves a military aristocracy and honored inherited privileges. Muhajir Cossacks often hired servants to care for horses, refused to do any manual work in the barracks, were rude and naughty. Muhajir could go on leave without permission and return, as if nothing had happened. The Shah, who saw in the mujajirs as “defenders of religion,” not only did not punish them for such acts, but, on the contrary, demanded rewards for returning. To the complaints of Kosogovsky, the shah usually answered: "You do not respect them enough, so they are fleeing from you."
Kosogovsky’s attempts to strengthen discipline led to the revolt of the Muhajirs. In May 1895, they left the brigade, taking with them 20,000 fogs of salary. The Persian government was awaiting the collapse of the brigade - there was only a year left until the end of the contract. The Minister of War of Persia has already begun negotiations with the British. Having learned about this, the Russian ambassador could not stay away. A little pressure on the shah was enough for him to decide to keep the brigade under the command of Kosogovsky.
In May 1895, Kosogovsky was awarded the audience of the Shah. Together with the Russian ambassador, the commander prepared an agreement in which he put forward the following conditions: Muhajirs will serve in the brigade on equal terms with the rest of the staff; the commander’s powers should be expanded, and he will obey only the shah and his sadrazam (prime minister). Also, sadrazam assumed responsibility for financing the brigade, completely removing the Minister of War from all its affairs. The Shah and Sadrazam immediately signed this agreement. The Minister of War tried to object, but the Shah threatened him with resignation, and he also signed an agreement.
Solving the problem with the Muhajirs immediately led to the strengthening of the Cossack brigade. The practice of hereditary transfer of the rank was canceled, and now, in order to receive the rank of officer, the Cossack had to go all the way up the career ladder, starting from the bottom. Soon Kosogovsky received a well-organized, trained and disciplined detachment.
The killing of Shah Nasser al-Din and the struggle for power
Until the spring of 1896, the brigade demonstrated its capabilities only in parades. The murder of Shah Nasser al-Din on May 1, 1896 led to a crisis that allowed the brigade to show itself. During the 48 years of the reign of Shah Nasser al-Din, the situation in Persia only worsened. He began his reign with the killing of thousands of Baha'i subjects, followers of the Báb. The Shah plunged the country into an unnecessary war that ended in defeat. He transferred the management of internal affairs to foreigners in order to receive money for his own whims. The 48 years of Nasser al-Din’s power led to the decline of public morality, economic stagnation, general impoverishment and hunger.
When Mirza Reza Kermani, a follower of Jamal al-Din Afghanistan, killed the Shah, the country was on the brink of disaster. In Isfahan, the claim to the throne was presented by the eldest son of the Shah Zell os-Sultan with the support of his personal army, in Tehran - Kamran Mirza, the beloved son of the Shah. As Minister of War and Governor of Tehran, Kamran Mirza was in a better position. The heir to the throne, Muzaffar ed-Din Mirza was in Tabriz. However, he was in poor health, which inevitably led to a power struggle between the brothers. The Shah was the sole guarantor of law and order. If the people knew about his death, neither the police nor the weak and unreliable army would be able to cope with popular uprisings.
The killing of the shah took place in the morning in a sanctuary in the vicinity of Tehran. As soon as he fell to the ground, Amin os-Sultan, who was near the Sadraz, sent a courier to Kosogovsky with the news of the attempt on the life of the Shah. Sadrazam ordered the convocation of Sardar Akram, the commander of nine Azerbaijani regiments, Nezam od-Doule, the commander of artillery, and Colonel Kosogovsky to prevent unrest and spread rumors. In a note to Kosogovsky, sadrazam wrote that the wound was not serious, and in the evening the shah would return to Tehran. In fact, the shah was already dead, and Amin os-Sultan was only trying to gain time.
When the body of the shah was brought to Tehran in the evening, Kosogovsky realized the seriousness of the situation. Now he could only obey directly to sadrasam. In a short time, the commander assembled a brigade and began patrolling the streets of Tehran. Rumors about the killing of the shah had already begun to spread throughout the city, but strong unrest was avoided. The danger was represented by Kamran Mirza Naib os-Sultan, about whose desire to take the place of the shah was known to both Russian and British. The rightful heir to Muzaffar al-Din was far away in Tabriz, and Naib os Sultan, as commander of the army, could try to seize power in Tehran. Kosogovsky informed the Minister of War that the Russian and British governments recognized Muzaffar al-Din as the rightful ruler, therefore, Naib os Sultan should immediately obey his brother. Frightened Kamran Mirza swore allegiance to the new Shah.
On June 7, 1896, a new Shah, accompanied by a Cossack brigade, entered Tehran. From this moment began to strengthen its influence, and over the next twenty years, the brigade played an important role in Persian politics, being an instrument of Russian influence. Since 1896, the team took on a number of functions to ensure internal security. Small units were sent to the provinces of Persia under the leadership of local governors. In 1901, the Cossacks helped crush the uprising in Fars. In 1903, Kosogovsky was replaced by the incompetent Colonel Chernozubov, in which the team again began to decline. As a result, the Russian military department recalled him ahead of schedule, and in 1906 Colonel Vladimir Platonovich Lyakhov took over as commander of the Cossack brigade.
The participation of the brigade in the Constitutional Revolution under the command of Colonel Lyakhov
Weak health Muzaffar ed-Din Shah gave most of the country's industry under the control of foreigners. So, in Persia, the English Bank operated, which printed state money, completely disobeying the Persian government. In 1906, the shah signed the long-awaited constitution, and after 40 days died of a heart attack. A constitutional revolution broke out in the country, which lasted from 1906 to 1911. An important role was played by the Cossack brigade.
In 1907, the son of Muzaffar al-Din Shah, Muhammad Ali Shah, ascended the throne. The Majles (parliament), formed under the Constitution, represented the opponents of the Shah. On June 22, 1908, the Shah appointed Colonel Lyakhov as the military governor of Tehran. The next day, Colonel Lyakhov, six more officers and Cossacks with six guns stormed the building where the Majdles sat. During the dispersal of the parliament, several hundred people were killed.
Excerpt from the historical series "Khezar Dastan" with a scene of the defeat of the parliament by the Cossack brigade
In 1909, a detachment of 400 Cossacks participated in the siege of Tabriz, whose inhabitants opposed the Shah. However, the Cossacks failed to stop the progress of constitutional supporters towards Tehran, and on July 13, 1909, the constitutionalists entered the city. Muhammad Ali Shah with an escort of Cossacks fled the summer apartment of the Russian embassy in the north of Tehran. When the restored parliament removed the shah, his younger son and heir Ahmad Shah was brought to Tehran under the protection of Cossacks and British sepoys. The 14-year-old Ahmad Shah did not have real power, but Colonel Lyakhov agreed to serve the new regime.
The collapse of the Russian Empire and the Cossack brigade
The overthrow of the Russian monarchy in March 1917 was reflected in the discipline and morale of the Cossacks, but the brigade did not break up. The officers of the tsarist army were opposed to the communists. In 1918, some returned to Russia and joined the ranks of the White Guard, but many remained in the Cossack brigade. They decided to support the struggle of the Persian government against the revolution and to oppose the Soviet intervention in the north of Persia. In 1920, Great Britain began to finance the Cossack brigade, hoping to use the Cossacks to suppress communist activity and anti-government uprisings in Northern Persia.
During 1919-1920 Cossacks fought with the Red Army on the Caspian coast and in Azerbaijan. After the first victories in Mazendaran, the Cossacks were defeated in Gilan, and were thrown back to Qazvin. In Tehran, rumors began to spread that Russian officers were unreliable and were cooperating with either the British or the Soviet army. However, Ahmad Shah did not believe the rumors, since he considered the Cossack brigade his most powerful weapon. In October 1920, the British concluded (or tried to make it appear) that the brigade commander Colonel Staroselsky won fictitious victories over the Communists. They stepped up the campaign against Russian officers, and soon Colonel Staroselsky and nearly 120 Russian officers resigned. So ended Russian influence in Persia. After their departure, Reza Khan became the brigade commander, who had previously served as the brigadier (Mirpanj), and British officers also became part of the brigade.
With the help of a detachment of 1,500-3,000 Cossacks, Reza Khan captured key positions in Tehran on February 20-21. First, he took the post of commander of the army, and then the Minister of War. Having gained power over the Persian army, Reza Khan began its centralization according to the European model, while the Cossack brigade, renamed the division, formed the basis of the new army. By 1925, the new army numbered 40 thousand people. In the summer of 1925, Reza Khan made a coup, overthrowing Ahmad Shah Kajar and becoming the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.
So the Persian Cossack brigade played an important role in the largest political events in Persia con. XIX - beg. XX centuries Submitting to the Russian military department, Russian officers at critical moments supported the legitimate rulers of Persia, preventing the country from falling apart.
The Persian Cossack brigade (hereinafter - PKB; the official name is Cossack of His Majesty Shah Brigade) is a unique military unit of the Persian army that existed under the leadership of Russian instructors from the formation of the first regiment in 1879 until 1920 (in 1916 it was reorganized into division). Its creation was initiated by the Russian envoy in Tehran I.A. Zinoviev. It was closely connected with the Russian conquest of Akhal-teke and the struggle with Great Britain on this occasion, as well as for influence at the Shah’s court [G. Khidoyatov, 1969, p. 348-423]. Despite the available publications [Gokov O.A., 2003; Gokov O.A., 2008; Krasnyak O.A .; Krasnyak O.A., 2007; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012; Rabi U., Ter-Oganov N., 2009], some fragments of her history require more detailed study. One of them is the period from 1882 to 1885, when Petr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was the commander of the PKB, or the Head of the training of the Persian cavalry (hereinafter - the Head), as his position was officially called. So far, the most holistic of his activities in Iran has been set forth in a study by N.K. Ter-Oganova [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 62–67]. But internal problems and the real state of the PCB are poorly covered by him. In our article, we will try to give a possibly complete analysis of P.V. Charkovsky and the position of the brigade in the period under review.
The first Head was the lieutenant colonel (then colonel) of the General Staff (hereinafter referred to as the General Staff) Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich, who had been in Persia from 1879 to 1882. and liking Shah Nasruddin [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 72–78; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 52–62]. In 1882, at the end of the contract, A.I. Domontovich, despite the requests of the Shah, was not left in his post. The reason for this was the conflict with the envoy [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. By order of the Minister of War, from March 1882, the Caucasian authorities were preoccupied with the search for a new candidate for the position of Head. At the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General of the General Staff P.P. Pavlov, approved by the cavalry general A.M., appointed at the beginning of 1882 by the commander in chief in the Caucasus and commander of the troops of the Caucasian military district Dondukov-Korsakov, instead of A.I. Domontovich, it was decided to send Colonel of the General Staff of the General Staff, who was in the Kuban Cossack Army Charkovsky.
The new Head came from St. Petersburg nobles. He was born on April 15, 1845, graduated from the Pavlovsk Cadet Corps, Mikhailovsky Artillery School and the Nikolaev Academy of General Staff. He entered the service on September 29, 1861. He served in the Life Guards of the equestrian artillery brigade. With the rank of captain, he participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. For the first year of the war he was awarded the orders of Vladimir of the 4th degree with swords and bow, St. Stanislav of the 2nd degree and St. Anna of the 2nd degree with swords. After completing the crash course of the Academy, the General Staff was released at the General Staff. In March 1878 he was renamed Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff, and already in August he was promoted to colonel for honors. In 1879, he was awarded a golden weapon for the campaign. From March 1878 to January 1879 P.V. Charkovsky was the commander of the equestrian artillery brigade division and held the post of chief of staff of the 1st Caucasian Cossack division. From January 1879 to October 1882, he was considered only the chief of staff [Glinoeckii N.P., 1882, p. 174; List to the generals by seniority, 1891, p. 840; List to the generals by seniority, 1896, p. 659]. At the same time, he was an active participant in military intelligence in the Caucasus. Being in the specified position, P.V. Charkovsky was appointed secretary of the Trebizond Consulate [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 19] . In the Ministry of War, neither the chief of the General Staff nor the head of the department raised any objections, as was reported to the envoy in Tehran [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 8–9].
On June 5, 1882, Emperor Alexander III authorized the appointment of Colonel General Staff P.V. Charkovsky to the position of the Head of training for the Persian cavalry [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 19–20]. This was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since the Shah insisted on the speedy arrival of the new Head [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 16], appointed March 28, 1882 as Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girs telegraphed the charge d'affaires in Tehran (I. A. Zinoviev was on vacation in Russia) to urgently begin negotiations on the resumption of “on the previous basis of the contract for our instructor” [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 27]. July 16, Russian Charge d'Affaires in Tehran K.M. Argiropulo signed with the Shah government a new contract for three years [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 52-53].
The terms of the contract basically repeated the text of the agreement of 1879 [Krasnyak O.A. , 2007, p. 79; RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 52, 57-59; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 63–64; Browne E.G., 1910, p. 228–232]. It was written in French and Persian and consisted of eleven articles. The first of them indicated that P.V. Charkovsky, appointed by the Caucasian authorities in place of A.I. Domontovich for three years as a military instructor of the Persian "Cossacks." His duty was charged with training and combat training of the cavalry units defined by the Persian Ministry of War, according to the Russian model. The second article stipulated that 3 officers and 5 officers were appointed to help the colonel by the Caucasian administration. It was pointed out that the names of the members of the military mission, the colonel should inform the envoy in Tehran, and that - to the Iranian government. The third article was devoted to issues of material and financial support. The manager was supposed to receive 2,400 mists (24,000 French francs) per year, paid quarterly, and daily fodder for five horses. Ober-officers were left a salary, as during A.I. Domontovich, i.e., each has about 5,000 mists (12,000 French francs). The content of the officers was 20 fogs per month or 240 fogs per year per person. The fifth article stated that this money should be paid starting from the day of signing this agreement. The sixth article stated that 400 mists (4,006 francs) - an advance in two months - should be issued to the colonel on the day of signing the contract. In the fourth article, instructors should have received 100, 75, and 24 semi-imperials from the Persian government to pay for their trip, respectively. According to article ten, at the end of the contract, the Persian government undertook to pay the officers the same amount of travel expenses for returning to Russia. Moreover, the right to them was retained by members of the military mission if "the agreement is canceled at the request of the Persian government before the end of the specified period." The seventh article stated that on all matters related to the service, the colonel should act in accordance with the instructions of the Persian Ministry of War, to which he is subordinate. The same ministry was obliged to pay him a salary. The eighth paragraph of the Iranian government pledged to compensate P.V. Charkovsky all travel expenses made by the colonel on his orders. The ninth article fixed that the colonel could not cancel or amend the provisions of the contract, he could not leave the service to the Persian government before the end of the three-year term. The exception was the disease, due to which P.V. Charkovsky would not be able to fulfill his duties. The colonel was allowed leave for a period not exceeding three months, "if his health or private affairs need him." But in this case, the general staffer did not have the right to receive any payments (including salaries) from the Tehran government. Similar conditions were recorded for other members of the military mission. According to the last eleventh article, instructors should have arrived in Tehran from the moment they received the amount of travel expenses through the Russian diplomatic mission within two and a half months.
At the same time, the process of enrolling the colonel to a new position was taking place. As noted, since 1879 he was secretary of the Trebizond Consulate, being a secret military agent. According to tradition, before being appointed to this post, P.V. Charkovsky was dismissed from military service while retaining his full-time position, but without maintenance, the right to proceed to the next rank, etc., and was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with renaming as a college adviser. Therefore, when sending him to Persia, the reverse procedure was necessary. This required coordination between the War Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were finished in early July. By the highest order of July 16 P.V. Charkovsky was returned to military service and renamed Colonel of the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 43]. And on July 18, P.P. Pavlov was instructed signed by the Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev cause P.V. Charkowski from Trebizond to Tiflis. Upon arrival, the colonel received an eight-day leave [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 45–46]. His trip to Iran was delayed because one of the new instructors was waiting in Tiflis - sent by the General Staff of the cornet Denisov [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 46–47]. Finally, in August, mission members traveled to Tehran. Along with the change of the Head, a change of Russian instructors took place. Yesaul E.A. Makovkin was left by the Caucasian authorities for a second term. In addition to him, the officers were appointed the Kuban Cossack army esaul Menyaev and coronet Denisov [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 53]. As for the officers, some of them were replaced, and some remained for a second term [RGVIA, f. 446, d.44, l. 27].
The new commander clearly did not have the initiative in political affairs that his predecessor, but he knew his job well and tried to do it the same way. During his command PKB P.V. Charkovsky brought the number of people in the brigade to 900 due to the inclusion of 300 muhajirs in it. Muhajirs were called immigrants from Transcaucasia (Erivan and Baku regions), who left him after the signing of the Turkmanchay peace treaty of 1828 and settled in Persia [Kolyubakin, 1883, p. 61–62; Mamontov N.P., 1909, p. 91]. A.I. Domontovich was allocated 400 people from the irregular cavalry Muhajir, distinguished by extremely weak discipline [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 391]. V.A. Kosogovsky wrote that “under Charkovsky, he managed to convince the remaining 300 Tehran Muhajirs, who, during the initial formation of the brigade, did not want to become Cossacks and got into the best, entered the brigade on the same terms that the first four hundred were accepted, that is, preserving their tribal or hereditary content "[Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. Following V.A. Kosogovsky’s modern scholars also argue that the part of the Muhajirs who did not agree to serve in the brigade was due to the efforts of P.V. Charkovsky was enlisted in the brigade on the same terms as their compatriots [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 79; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 64].
However, it seems to us that this enrollment occurred not only at the insistence of the colonel, but at the request of the Muhajirs and the Shah themselves. Initially, Muhajirs reacted negatively to attempts to enroll them in the PKB during its formation. Their boss openly harmed A.I. Domontovich, not wanting to lose his position. However, over time, the situation has changed. Central to this change was the financial support and status that its first commander achieved for the brigade. In conditions when the money maintenance of muhajirs worsened from year to year, the stable situation of their fellow tribesmen in the PKB could not fail to attract. At the same time, the inclusion of the remaining muhajirs in the ranks of the PKB was temporarily solved by the task set by Colonel GSh A.I. Domontovich. In 1880, he wrote I.A. Zinoviev that the position of the muhajirs who were not included in the brigade has a decaying effect on their fellow tribesmen - “Cossacks” [Krasnyak OA, 2007, p. 132-133]. In particular, the first Head noticed that, without any service, they live in Tehran and use their contents. “Such facts,” he wrote, “have a very unfavorable effect on the“ Cossacks ”, who have a rather difficult service, forcing them to evade it with all their might” [Krasnyak OA, 2007, p. 132-133].
In 1883, P.V. Charkovsky from muhajirs of different sexes and ages formed the third regiment and squadron "Kadam", that is, veterans (in this case, the elderly), and women and children were enlisted as pensioners, who continued to receive hereditary salaries of mujajirs in the form of pensions. In addition, the colonel converted the guards half-squadron into a squadron and formed a chorus of musicians [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. In October of the same year, 4 guns of the 1877 model and 532 charges were delivered to them as a gift from the Russian Emperor Alexander III of the Design Bureau [Kublitsky, 1884]. On the basis of these guns in 1884 P.V. Charkovsky formed a horse battery at the Design Bureau [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. It seems that these changes were also associated with Russia's foreign policy plans in the Middle East. In 1881–1885 the empire conquered the Turkmen lands, to which Persia partially claimed. The advance of Russia provoked a response from the British who sought to create an anti-Russian bloc in the Middle East [Davletov J., Ilyasov A., 1972; The accession of Turkmenistan to Russia, 1960, p. 549–797]. Therefore, maintaining peaceful relations with Iran, attracting the location of the shah to Russia, were one of the most important tasks of Russian diplomacy. A P.V. Charkovsky and the PKB acted as elements of foreign policy influence.
The structure of the brigade began to look as follows. Its head was a colonel of the Russian General Staff - Head of the training of the Persian cavalry; Russian officers and officers were considered his assistants - naibs. The PKB comprised three regiments: two from muhajir, one from volunteers. “During formation, the state in each regiment relied on four squadrons, and in the third - only personnel for four squadrons” [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 5]. The number of regiments of the brigade on the lists was 800 people. “In the 1st and 2nd regiments, 300 people each, in the third about 150 and in the battery about 50,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 146]. In addition to them, there was a guards squadron, a squadron "Kadam" and a music choir. Each regiment was led by an Iranian general with the rank of sarhang (colonel) or sartip (general). However, he was usually subordinate to the youngest in rank Russian instructor officer. These Russian officers were the actual regiment commanders. In each regiment, a Russian officer had one officer at his disposal, with whose help he trained the regiment [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. “They are held in high esteem by the Persian officers,” wrote the author, hiding under the pseudonym Misl-Rustem, “who greet them by the hand and obey them in everything. This stems from the fact that Russian officers are much more educated and more important than themselves to keep up with the lower ranks ”[Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. The regiment or fouj was divided into 4 squadrons (hundreds), commanded by Iranian staff officers. According to the observer of the PKB Misl-Rustem, the latter "try to recruit as many people from their" nukers "into their squadrons as possible. servants, or peasants of their villages and related villages. They are better with such nukers, more profit is obtained, and it’s easier to manage them ”[Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. Each squadron was divided into 4 dest (platoon). Each regiment had a banner with a Persian coat of arms. They were stored either in the colonel’s apartment or in the duty room.
At the disposal of the brigade were barracks, stables, pantries for fodder. There were also small workshops (in which the "Cossacks" themselves carried out repairs of weapons and equipment), arsenal shops, a forge, and an infirmary. All this was located in the central part of Tehran. Officers of the PKB, including the Head, lived in houses located opposite the barracks [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142-146]. As for the “Cossacks,” those who were not on vacation lived partly in the barracks, partly in various parts of Tehran in their apartments [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 515, l. 204]. P.V. Charkovsky sought to equip the units entrusted to him along the lines of the European armies. Through his efforts, the appearance of the premises (especially the infirmary, kitchen and barracks) was kept clean and tidy. In 1883, on the order of the colonel, a duty room was made [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 143].
The appearance of the "Cossacks" was as close as possible to that of the Russians. They wore the uniform of Caucasian Cossacks. The first regiment was dressed in uniforms of the Kuban Cossack army with red beshmet and horseback tops. The second regiment wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack army with blue beshmet and tops of popes. The third was distinguished by green beshmet and tops of popes. On the epaulettes of the “Cossacks” the “initials” of the regiment to which he belonged were embroidered. The uniform of the battery men copied that of the Russian "Kuban". The Guards Squadron was outfitted in the form of the Russian Life Guard of the Cossack Regiment. In solemn occasions, his soldiers and officers wore red uniforms, and in everyday life - blue, sheathed with galloons, and Circassians. The armament consisted of Caucasian daggers and drafts, as well as rifles of the Berdan No. 2 system. The latter, however, were handed out only for the duration of the exercises [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. It should be noted that the Russian instructors watched the appearance of the “Cossacks”, starting from the creation of the unit. This was explained by the psychological impact that the cavalrymen uniformly and effectively had on not only the shah, his entourage, but also the Iranians in general (thus increasing the status of Russia in their eyes), but also on foreign observers [Medvedik I.S. ., 2009, p. 120].
Initially, the composition of the PKB was formed exclusively of cavalry. “Those wishing to enter the brigade brought a horse with a saddle,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. D. N. Curzon reported that “the lower ranks must have their horses, but to maintain them in order and to replace them with new ones in case of loss or damage, each person is given 100 cranes per year more than necessary” [G. Curzon, 1893, p. 134]. In reality, the treasury saved on these “holidays”. Horse composition consisted of stallions. Only in the guard squadron were they of a certain color - gray. In the design bureau there were official horses. They were used for the internal needs of the brigade, a detachment of musicians rode on them, a battery was transported [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 6].
The PKB was taught according to the abbreviated Russian military regulations, which were translated into Persian. Classes were held at the training ground Meydan-e Meshk, located near the barracks of the brigade. First, they trained each "Cossack" individually, then conducted squadron, regimental, and brigade exercises. In addition, practiced riding and horseback riding.
A certain idea of \u200b\u200bthe preparation of the brigade is given by the certificate of the Russian officer A.M. Alikhanov-Avar. He traveled to Persia in mid-1883 and observed the PKB Guards Squadron, which was Nasruddin Shah's personal guard. “A few minutes later a platoon passed us, with the music at the head, excellently dressed in red Circassian, Shah’s escort squadron,” A.M. described Alikhanov-Avar impressions from the viewing of troops accompanying Nasruddin Shah on his trip to Bujnurt. - It was an exact copy to the last detail from our St. Petersburg convoy (we are talking about the Life Guards Cossack Life Guards regiment, the Cossacks of which constituted the convoy of the Russian emperor - OG); even the officers were in Russian epaulettes ”[Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157]. “As far as one passage can be judged,” the Russian observer noted, “the imitation seems to have succeeded this time not only in appearance ... the squadron made an impression on us (the officers who watched the show - OG) that it seemed , he can, without any exaggeration, enter the environment of any European army with dignity ”[Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157-158].
When P.V. Charkovsky PKB received its first baptism of fire. In 1882, 100 "Cossacks" were "among other troops" sent by the Persian government to the Astrabad region "to curb the Turkmens." Then in 1884, 300 were sent, and in 1885 - 100 people [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d.61, L. 20]. Unfortunately, the details of the expeditions only know that among the "Cossacks" 28 rifles were killed and lost [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d.61, L. 20]. The following was reported on the latest expedition against the Turkmen Yomuds in the collection of the Russian Ministry of War: “In 1885, an expeditionary detachment was outfitted on the Atrek River to pacify the Turkmen Yomuds. When speaking, he consisted of 1,600 infantry, 200 Cossacks and 200 irregular cavalry, a total of 2,000 people. 600 people arrived at Atrek, the rest deserted along the way ”[Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p. 804].
However, the outer gloss could not cover the internal decomposition. The PCB increasingly penetrated the system of relations characteristic of the Persian armed forces and society as a whole. The main problem remained financial. P.V. Charkovsky was forced to resort to broad measures of saving, since a large amount of money was spent on the maintenance of pensioners. In addition, the team financing system required the Head to be able to solve economic issues in such a way as to avoid riots in the PKB and at the same time maintain its appearance. The latter for Nasruddin Shah was more important than real combat capability.
Remained relevant A.I. Domontovich about “a sloppy issue of money for the maintenance of the brigade”, which “impedes the proper conduct of business” [Krasnyak OA, 2007, p. 133]. In the Persian army, there was a complex system of issuing sums for the maintenance of individual military units [Vrevsky AB, 1868, p.29; Franchini, 1883, p. 27–28]. Since the PKB was part of the Iranian armed forces, it was also subject to generally accepted standards. The entire financing system was “tied” to the Minister of War, who distributed the country's military budget. And in the case of the PKB, it was he who was the most important obstacle, since he kept part of the funds of the brigade in his favor. It should also be noted that a significant reason for the financial troubles of the PKB was the fact that initially no long-term documents were agreed and signed that determined the budget allocations, their spending and reporting. In fact, everything was carried out on the basis of the agreements of the Russian Mission with the Shah and the Minister of War each time a new Head was appointed. As a result, P.V. Charkovsky was constantly faced with the untimely issue of money to him for the maintenance of the design bureau [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 4]. In addition, the money was paid to the team only beginning a few months after the beginning of the year [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90]. The budget for 1882–1883 \u200b\u200bwas 66,536 mists [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010, p. 77] and did not have an upward trend. Misl-Rustem described the financial side of the life of the brigade. “The colonel is given a certain amount to the brigade according to the budget approved by the shah ... but they will not be given all the money: having kept a lot in favor of the war ministry, and even the“ saraf ”- the collector of taxes - will charge interest, since checks are issued to receive money prematurely. Then the colonels sometimes have to give gifts, like the real Persians, to the Minister of War and even the Shah ... After all, these gifts are also worth a lot, which should cause savings, which means that half of people are on vacation, especially in the summer, meanwhile, ” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150]. In addition, “the salary of the third regiment was issued in addition to the Russian colonel and paid extremely sloppy” [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90].
The result of cost savings was a decrease in the quality of training of people of the brigade. Saving had almost everything. So, the specified author, who had observed the PCB for about 6 years, reported that P.V. Charkovsky “dressed people in shirts for the summer, and hid the Circassians in the Zeichhaus, on the one hand, on the occasion of heat, and on the other, to save Circassians” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151]. There is a gradual departure from the principles of management laid down by A.I. Domontovich. An indicator of this was the case when P.V. Charkovsky decided not to give portion money to his hands, so that they would not be spent for other purposes. “But he did not succeed for long,” Misl-Rustem reported. “There was a murmur, and they stopped cooking food.” “The fact is,” he explained, “that the Persian“ Cossack ”manages to feed his entire family with the portions received, and it is unthinkable to do this from the boiler” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145]. Thus, the idea of \u200b\u200bthe first Head that food allowance should not be given to each rider has receded before the realities of Persian life. The result of financial problems was that by the time the contract expired, the colonel was not able to timely provide "reports on the expenditure of amounts." The Russian envoy described this as a “misunderstanding" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. And it consisted in the fact that the Minister of War Kamran Mirza withheld part of the payments in the amount of 6,000 fogs in his favor [V. Kosogovsky, 1923, p. 393]. Nevertheless, with each new Head of the “misunderstanding” this grew and eventually led to the liquidation of the PCB.
When P.V. Charkovsky is spreading such a common Persian phenomenon as the transfer of a part of the personnel of the brigade “on holidays”. Continuing to be listed in the PKB, the soldiers went home to work. This allowed them to save their salaries (on vacation it was supposed to allocate half the content for a soldier), but also caused complaints about the colonel in an attempt to get rich at the expense of the “Cossacks” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151-152]. However, it seems to us that these complaints were caused by the activities of the next Head. Financial problems led to the fact that P.V. Charkovsky was unable to provide timely reporting on the expenditure of amounts [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. However, the history of the PKB indicates that this fact cannot be used as unconditional evidence of the Head's financial impropriety. Problems with the delivery of a financial report to the envoy occurred for each of the brigade commanders in the 19th century. In the case of P.V. Unfortunately, there are not enough Charkovsky facts and information to clarify all the causes of financial turmoil.
Outwardly, the structure and activities of the PCB looked quite respectable. However, it is difficult to completely agree with the opinion of A. Rzhevusky (made, by the way, at the beginning of the 20th century), which the researchers cite, that “the Persian Cossack brigade ... occupied a special position in the Iranian armed forces and already by that time represented a good organized military unit ”[Krasnyak OA, 2007, p. 80; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Indeed, by Persian standards, the PKB was an elite unit with good organization and funding. At the same time, external indicators should not obscure internal processes. As stated in the “Report on the Issues Relating to the Current Situation of the Persian Cossack Brigade”, compiled in October 1907, at its first stages the PKB was an “ordinary, only better trained” part of the Iranian army [I. Rybachenok, 2012, p. . 452]. So, despite the relatively regular training of the Cossacks (three times a week, each no more than two hours [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]), the main thing that was taught to the PKB was jigitizing and defile, or ceremonial march [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 223]. “All the people who are at the head of the army,” explained one of the officers observing the PKB in 1883, “including here also Minister of War Naib os Soltane, have no idea about military affairs and consider them to be the height of perfection if the unit is approximately ceremonial March ”[Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]. “The team walks ceremonially wonderfully,” said Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. An extremely negative characteristic of the PKB was given by a Russian officer A.M. who was in Khorasan in 1883. Alikhanov-Avarsky. Its number does not always reach even 750 people, he said. “This essentially militia cavalry regiment (So in the text - OG) is absolutely arbitrarily called a brigade, and even more so - a Cossack one, because, in addition to the costume of the Caucasian highlanders, this part has nothing to do with the Cossacks” [Alikhanov-Avarsky M. , 1898, p. 222]. The training of the brigade, from the point of view of the European military, was far from in the best condition. The internal reason for this, most likely, was not the colonel’s reluctance, but the lack of funds. P.V. Charkovsky took care of the PKB, but was forced to adapt to existing conditions. So, “in the 6 years that I spent in Persia,” wrote an anonymous correspondent, “there was not a single drill in the brigade for firing live ammunition” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. “Why waste expensive bullets ?! - quoted the Minister of War, the third son of Nasruddin Shah, Kamran-Mirza Naib Os-Saltane A. M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. “... After all, in wartime you’ll have to shoot not at birds, not even single people, but at the masses, for which our boys will not miss!” [Alikhanov-Avar M., 1898, p. 212–213]. I had to save ammo, since there was nothing to replenish their loss. “I know reliably,” Kublitsky reported, “that at present in the Cossack brigade the entire combat set of cartridges for 600 Berdan rifles is limited to two and a half thousand, that is, only four cartridges per gun” [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 69]. At the same time, they were not always spent rationally, and not through the fault of the Head. So, due to the poor quality of local gunpowder, cartridges from Russian rifles were used for idle firing on the orders of the Minister of War in the shah’s maneuvers of the Tehran garrison [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 68]. The same was true of artillery. “From 1883 to 1898,” the new commander of the PKB V.A. informed the envoy in 1898 Kosogovsky, - The Persian Cossack battery, because of the impossibility of replenishing the manufactured shells, did not produce firing of shells at all, only occasionally releasing several grenades for the fun of the shah. The consequence of this is that, being well trained in combat training and operating with guns, officers and servants in essence do not have a clue about firing live projectiles ”[RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d.61, l. 38].
The privileged position of the PCB was also only partly. It consisted in the fact that Russian instructors trained the “Cossacks”, the brigade was under the patronage of the Russian diplomatic mission and paid salaries in it regularly in comparison with other parts of the Persian army. The rest of the PKB was an integral part of the Iranian armed forces, which covered most of their rules and weaknesses. The brigade was also part of the Tehran garrison. Contrary to popular belief [Kalugin S., 2003, p. 364; Rybachenok I.S., 2012, p. 451; Sergeev E.Yu., 2012, p. 175; Strelyanov (Kalabukhov) P.N., 2007, p. 215; Shishov A.V., 2012, p. 20], the brigade was neither a personal convoy nor a guard of the Shah. Convoy functions were performed only by “Cossacks” from the guards squadron, who accompanied the Shah on trips around the country. Under Nasruddin Shah, the “guard” and the personal units guarding the Persian ruler were ghouls [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 57; Franchini, 1883, p. 20-21].
As already noted, the brigade had at its disposal barracks, stables, pantry for fodder and other household and residential premises. However, Misl-Rustem, observing them from the inside, reported that part of the existing was trimmed for showing to senior officials, while the main buildings were not renovated and gradually fell into decline [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142-146].
Another negative phenomenon that “swept” the PKB was an overabundance of officers. The fact is that in the field of production, the brigade commander was not independent and could not regulate it. As part of the Persian armed forces, the PKB also fell under their practice of forming a command corps. “The quality of officers is also not paid attention to,” wrote M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky. - they are produced not only by the Minister of War for a fee, but also by the brigade commander himself without much analysis ”[Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 233]. In addition, the shah himself made officers for the offerings. There was an unwritten rule in the Persian army, according to which all ranks from Naib (Second Lieutenant) to the Sultan (Captain) complained to the Foj commander, from the Sultan to Sartip (General) - the Minister of War, and became a Sartip only at the command of the Shah [Collection of latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p. 797]. The colonel could carry out the ranks independently to the Sultan, without bringing to the attention of the Persian ruler. All that was needed was the approval of the Minister of War. However, M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky was not quite right in criticizing the brigade commander. In Russia, the heads of individual units had the right to be presented to production as headquarters officers and awarded [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d.61, l. 121]. This was also sought by the first Heads - control over the production process. The PKB commanders were put in such a position that they were forced to put up with appointments from the outside. From the outside, to an ignorant person, especially accustomed to a strict production system in officer ranks in the European armies, it seemed that the Head was illegible in his choice. But, on the other hand, under the rules prevailing in the armed forces and the administration of Persia, official production became a profitable article for the producer. It is difficult to say how much the first two colonels used their position to improve their own financial affairs. Regarding P.V. There is no direct information of this kind from Charkovsky. Perhaps he adopted the practice of his predecessor regarding the production of officers of the subtle “Cossacks”, as he was also forced to struggle with the privileged position of the former residents of the South Caucasus. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the colonel promoted officers and mujajirs to enlist their loyalty. Considering themselves to be the descendants of noble Muhajirs, "they found service in the lower ranks of the brigade for themselves humiliating" [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. The same situation developed if unborn children were appointed commanders over the noble Muhajirs. Therefore, the Head was forced to maneuver in order to avoid intra-team conflicts. As for the sale of ranks, Misl-Rustem extended his ideas about the financial impropriety of brigade commanders to the first three colonels in general [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150], and they were based largely on rumors and misunderstood actions.
From indirect information it is clear that P.V. Charkovsky enjoyed great authority among his subordinates [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145-146]. There is no doubt his competence: he did a lot to equip the Design Bureau, developed the “Guide for the Training of Cossack Horse Artillery”, translated into Farsi and published in Tehran in 1885 [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Foreign observers noted that “the influence of seconded Russian officers continues to be noticeable” [Persian Armed Forces by Löbel Jahresbericht, 1888, p. 129]. From the side the team really impressed. The English physician Wils wrote: “Three years ago (the Russian translation was published in 1887 — OG), the shah had three Cossack regiments, which received the right salary, under which the Europeans were instructors. I did not have to see a more beautiful composition of soldiers and horses ”[Wils, 1887, p. 179]. The activity of Russian instructors had an external effect. The opinion of Wils was shared by many observers, and from their words, by ordinary people in these countries. These fears were clearly manifested in the political circles of Great Britain [Medvedik IS, 2009, p. 117; Rotshtein F.A., 1960, p. 221]. Nevertheless, the Russian government during the period under review was not interested in creating an organized armed force in Persia [The most comprehensive report of Lieutenant General Kuropatkin ..., 1902, p. 60]. In this context, an interesting question that still remains open is the attitude of the colonel to the Mission.
N.K. Ter-Oganov claims that between P.V. Charkovsky and A.A. Melnikov in 1885 there was a conflict. The reason for it, as in the case of A.I. Domontovich, it was the desire of the PKB commander to achieve the status of a military agent and greater independence from the Russian diplomatic representative [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 109]. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any links to documents or details of the conflict. Sources known to us do not allow us to state with confidence that there are sharp contradictions between representatives of the Romanov empire in Tehran. Therefore, if any, they are waiting for their researcher. Nevertheless, this question is important for a better understanding of the history of PCBs and requires a little explanation.
A.I. Domontovich put forward, according to the envoy, the same requirements as P.V. Charkovsky, according to N.K. Ter-Oganova. And it should be noted that from the point of view of the position of the Head and personally of his own, the first commander of the PKB had reason to do this. The fact is that until the beginning of the 1890s. only the responsibilities of the Head, and not his rights, were determined in writing. “Having left Russia by order of the Caucasian authorities with the officers, I found myself in the position of entrepreneur,” wrote A.I. Domontovich. - The officers are dependent on the monetary issue, the officers receive the agreed maintenance from the Persian government, and I don’t even have any indication from the authorities in what respect they should be with me. The power of the regimental commander, with all his valid rights, is hardly sufficient in such circumstances. Here, in the midst of a Muslim, fanatical people who do not value their lives, we are placed with the requirement of various shy and not always understood by them rules. The slightest oversight, the slowing down of officers in the execution of my instructions can bring evil ”[Krasnyak OA, 2007, p. 130]. December 5, 1892 the next Head - Colonel of the General Staff N.Ya. Schneur - received the Shah’s Destihat (his own directive), establishing new rules for managing the brigade. On this occasion, he wrote to his superiors: “this is the first attempt to establish some order in the brigade and to determine in writing the rights of the Head of training for the Persian cavalry, since so far everything has been done according to the established custom” [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 89]. A.I. Domontovich, heading the PKB, was formally listed as the head officer for the assignments of the headquarters of the Caucasian military district, on a business trip. In the case of P.V. Charkovsky apparently took this flaw into account - he was officially appointed commander of the PKB. However, it was a palliative decision. Formally, he remained only one of many commanders of military units, albeit in a somewhat privileged position. In Iran, where the position and status were of great importance, this interfered with, reducing the authority of the Head both among the highest dignitaries and among the muhajirs of the brigade, especially notable ones. The military agent (attache) was the official representative of the Russian Ministry of War abroad. He was included in the diplomatic corps, enjoyed the appropriate privileges and in political matters was subordinate to the envoy [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. “On military agents and persons holding their posts”]. None of this, with the exception of dependence on the head of the diplomatic corps, was neither the first nor the second Heads. The brigade commanders at the same time were secret military agents, that is, they had to deliver intelligence information to the headquarters of the Caucasian military district. The status of military attache would contribute to greater activity of the colonels in this direction. And so the workload of brigade affairs did not allow them to fully perform the functions of military intelligence.
In addition, the colonels were in a delicate position. Formally, according to the contract, they had to obey the Minister of War (and informally - the Shah). As representatives of Russia, they were obliged to coordinate all their actions with the head of the Mission. And, as secret military agents, the PKB commanders depended on the command of the Caucasus Military District (although this dependence was less than the first two). As a result, the Heads turned out to be a triple overlapping submission. The main problem in this situation was how to behave in case of a conflict of interests of the Russian Shah. Failure to comply with the wishes of the Persian ruler or Minister of War entailed a deterioration in their attitude to the head and the PKB. In turn, ignoring or incomplete implementation of the instructions of the Russian Mission could provoke a conflict with it and a recall from Tehran. Based on the foregoing, it is not surprising if P.V. Charkovsky really appealed to the envoy and the Caucasian authorities with requests to strengthen his position. However, the facts proving this are not yet known. Judging by the external signs, P.V. Charkovsky, apparently, did not seek to play an independent role, like A.I. Domontovich, and tried to follow the instructions of the Russian mission.
In June, in connection with the end of the contract, V.P. Charkovsky went to Russia [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. Prior to the arrival of the new Head, his duties were entrusted to Yesaul E.A. Makovkin. Together with the colonel from Persia, 2 officers and 1 officer from the mission departed. The rest decided to continue serving in the PKB.
Thus, during the command P.V. Charkovsky PKB acquired a classic look that did not formally change until the end of the 19th century. . Outwardly, it was a well-organized, uniform and trained military unit. However, the internal problems that have manifested themselves in the team since its inception acquire more pronounced features during the period under review. They remained outside the attention of outside observers, but gradually began to exert an increasing influence on the internal climate of the PKB and its position. After the change A.I. Domontovich and the transition I.A. Zinovieva, to the post of director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prevailed the point of view on the PKB as a political (partly even an advertising) project. His main goals were to prevent British instructors from joining the Iranian army and to satisfy, with Russian hands, the needs of the Shah to have a well-trained military unit. The result of this was the emphasis in training the brigade on external training, when fighting efficiency and internal integrity were sacrificed to the ostentatious effect. In the future, this played a negative role, putting in the first half of the 1890s. PKB to the brink of elimination. "\u003e
">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">">Forty Ural Cossacks from among those who left Fort Aleksandrovsky in April died along the way in clashes with Red and local detachments that did not obey anyone. Those who survived, 160 people led by ataman Tolstov on May 22, 1920 crossed the Persian border.
In Persia, Tolstov’s group was well received. The governor of the border region provided them with an overnight stay and shelter. The Cossacks, finally, were able to relax a bit after a long ordeal, and also heal, after which they were sent under guard to Tehran.
Meanwhile, in the country in which they received asylum, the same chaos reigned as in Russia in 1917 and its own crazy war was brewing. Here were their liberals, and the Cadets, and the Communists. There were Jangelians (people of the forest) led by Kuchuk Khan, who was supported by Soviet Russia. The Persian Shah Sultan Ahmad from the Qajar dynasty did not actually rule the country, Persia was partially occupied by Great Britain. And in Persia there was a Persian Cossack brigade under the command of General Reza Pahlavi. The brigade was formed by Russian military instructors back in the 80s of the 19th century and was the Shah’s life guard. It consisted of Russians and Persians and for a long time served as an instrument of Russian influence in the country. Reza Pahlavi began as an ordinary Persian Cossack brigade and rose to the rank of commander. Relying on the ten thousandth Persian Cossack brigade, Pahlavi sought to restore order in the country and establish tough power. In his aspirations, he was similar to Kornilov. The Russian general liked to surround himself with Asians, and the Asian Pahlavi by Russians. Many officers and soldiers of the defeated white armies sought and took refuge in Pahlavi. A group of Tolstov arrived at Pahlavi. The last campaign of the last chieftain of the Ural Cossack army ended in Tehran.
Chapter 6. Persian motives.
“We know that we are the flotilla you are talking about,” Pahlavi perked up. The week before you came to Persia, this flotilla landed in Anzali, recaptured the ships and went to Russia. But the Bolshevik detachments remained, some Blumkin commanded them. Blumkin sniffed with our Kuchuk Khan, together proclaimed the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic ...
- Here you go! - exclaimed Tolstov, interrupting his interlocutor. And the Councils have reached you?
“We’ve got it,” Pahlavi confirmed. Kuchuk Khan is now the chief people's commissar, and Blumkin, chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, commands the Persian Red Army. They also say that some kind of poet follows him everywhere, either Yasenin, or Isenin ...
- Yesenin. There is such a poet, ”Tolstov confirmed. In short, everything is as you have with us, and the Red Army, and the commissars.
“But we will end this,” said Pahlavi firmly. And very soon. And to you the chieftain, I propose to join us, to beat both your and our commissars. There are a lot of Ural Cossacks in my brigade, yes, and not only the Ural Cossacks, Staroselsky is my deputy, Kondratyev is the chief of staff, I know your names, I trust all these people as I do. And I’ll find you a good position. What do you say?
“No, Reza,” Tolstov shook his head. I am grateful to you from the grave of life for having sheltered me, warmed me, I will not forget my age, but I can no longer fight. He won back, he saw too many deaths, there are no more my strengths, forgive me generously. Let me stay in Persia as a civilian. Of course, if one of the Cossacks expresses a desire to serve you, I will not dissuade, on the contrary, I will call, but I won’t go.
“Well, then,” Pahlavi sighed. Sorry, very sorry, but I understand you. Live in Persia, do what you want, no one will touch you here. And touched, will deal with me.
***
“My dear Cossacks,” Tolstov began his speech. I was your chieftain for almost 2 years, I led you into battle with the Bolsheviks, you and I went the hard way from Guryev to Tehran, and now the last day of my atamanism has come. Our holy Fatherland, great Russia perished under the blows of barbarians. Looks like we greatly angered the Lord God that he had turned his back on us. But, I believe, the time will come, Russia will come to its senses and become as great as before. From now on, I cease to be your ataman and, together with others, I settle in the hospitable Persian land. You have chosen to continue serving in the Persian Cossack Brigade. I approve your choice. And now you have a new chieftain, dear Mr. Reza Pahlavi, - Tolstov made a gesture in the direction of Pahlavi. He is now your dad, serve him and your new Fatherland, as bravely as you served the great Russia. Yes, God bless you !!!
***
In early 1921, General Reza Pahlavi, relying on the Persian Cossack brigade, carried out a coup and actually took power into his own hands. In September 1921, parts of the Red Army were withdrawn from Persian territory, and in November, the Persian Soviet Socialist Republic fell under the blows of Cossacks Pahlavi. The Persian Cossack brigade Reza Pahlavi became the basis of the regular Persian army created by the general. In 1925, the Qajar dynasty was officially deposed, and Reza Pahlavi was proclaimed the new Persian Shah.
In 1979, his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was overthrown as a result of the Islamic revolution, but this is a completely different story.
Tolstov lived in Persia until 1923, then moved to France, and in 1942 to Australia, where he died in 1956 at the age of 72.
At the end of the 80s, a revival of the Cossacks began throughout the country; only the Ural Cossacks did not revive. There was nothing to revive, in their historical homeland the Ural Cossacks are no more. The only country where they have survived as an ethnic group is Uzbekistan, on the territory of the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan. The Ural Cossacks were exiled here in 1875 for a rebellion against the tsarist government. They also rebelled against the Soviet regime, but nevertheless in these places a crazy war affected them not so much. They live compactly, practice the Old Believers, speak a special dialect, they are all written in passports in Russian, but they continue to call themselves: Ural Cossacks.
The composition and strength fluctuated depending on the situation on the fronts and territory of operations (15-25 thousand bayonets and sabers). Experienced a constant and severe lack of weapons and ammunition. Most of the time she was part of the troops under the command (formal) of A.V. Kolchak, at the end of the year - at the beginning she tried to coordinate actions with Denikin.
Army commanders
- major General M.F. Martynov (April-September);
- major General V. I. Akutin (end of September - November 14),
- lieutenant General N. A. Savelyev (November 15, 1918 - April 7),
- major general (later, from November 7, 1919 lieutenant general) V.S. Tolstov (April 8 - beginning).
The Ural Army included: 1st Ural Cossack Corps (1st and 2nd Ural Cossack Divisions), 11th Iletsky Cossack Corps, 3rd Ural Cavalry Division.
The Ural Army was promptly subordinate to the command:
- Siberian Army (commander, Major General A. Grishin-Almazov), 06–08/1918;
- Volga front of the People’s Army (commander, General Chechek S.), 08–09. of the year;
- Western Front (commander, General Syrov Ya.), 09–11.1918;
- Eastern Front (Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kolchak A.V.), 12.1918–07.1919;
- Armed forces of the South of Russia (Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant General A. Denikin), 07/21/1919 -03.1920.
At first it acted against the Red Guard detachments, from June 1918 - against the 4th and 1st armies of the East, and from August 15 - the Turkestan Red Fronts. In April 1919, during the general offensive of Kolchak’s armies, broke through the front of the Reds, besieged Uralsk left in January 1919, and reached the approaches to Saratov and Samara. However, limited funds did not allow to master the Ural. In July of the year, the red troops (the commander of Frunze) launched a counterattack and forced the Ural Army to retreat. 07/05/1919 the Bolsheviks returned Pugachev, a well-equipped and armed 25th Infantry Division under the command of V.I. Chapaev, who was transferred from Ufa, defeated the Ural Army on July 5-11 and broke through the blockade of the city and 07/11/1919. entered the city of Uralsk, and 08/09/1919. entered the city of Lbischensk. It should be noted that it was during this period (07.21.) That the operational control of the Ural Army was transferred to Admiral Kolchak A.V., under the command of the All-Russian Union of Regions, General Denikin A.I. After the transition of the Ural Army to the operational subordination of the command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia (VSYUR) General Denikin, its composition was divided into 3 directions:
- Buzuluk, as part of the 1st Ural Cossack Corps; with its 1st, 2nd and 6th Cossack and 3rd Iletskaya, 1st Ural Infantry Divisions and their 13th Orenburg, 13th, 15th and 18th Cossack, 5th Ural infantry, 12th Consolidated Cossack and several other separate regiments;
- Saratov, as part of the 2nd Iletsk Cossack Corps; and its 5th Cossack division with a number of separate regiments (4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 16th, 17th Ural Cossack 33rd Nikolaev rifle, Guryev pedestrian regiments);
- Astrakhan-Guryevskoye, as part of the Ural-Astrakhan Cossack Corps, partisan detachments of Colonels Kartashev and Chizhinsky and Separate 9th Ural Cossack Regiment.
Footnotes
References
- site "Military literature". Valery Klaving "White armies of the Urals and Volga region"
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.
In the second half of the 19th century, two regional powers of the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire and Persia, sought to seriously modernize their armed forces. It was clear that the traditional system of organization and training of both the Sultan and Shah armies had become obsolete. To train new parts, instructors from various European countries were invited. However, the Persian Cossacks became one of the most interesting examples of using European experience in the East.
In 1848, the seventeen-year-old Nasser al-Din Shah Kajar entered the shah’s throne of Persia. He was a representative of the Kajar dynasty that ruled the country since 1795 - immigrants from the Azerbaijani Khajar tribe, who settled in the Caucasus after the Mongol conquest of the territory of modern Iran. In 1795, the son of one of the leaders of the koyunlu tribe of the kajar tribe, Aga Mohammed Kajar seized power in the country and established a kind of power. By the time of the events described - the creation of the Persian Cossack brigade - Nasser al-Din Qajar was in power for thirty years. In 1878, he took his next trip to European countries, visiting the territory of the Russian Empire. From Europe, the shah returned a staunch supporter of the reorganization of his army on the European model. He brought military instructors from France, and decided to establish a military school in Tehran. During a trip to the Russian Transcaucasus, the shah was greatly impressed by the Cossacks who guarded it. Nasser al-Din Kajar set about trying to create a similar military unit in Persia, for which he turned to Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich Romanov, who was then governor in the Caucasus, with a request to send Russian Cossack officers as instructors to form the Persian Cossack army. Despite the fact that the Russian Empire had repeatedly fought with Persia, and indeed the relations between the two neighboring states were far from ideal, the Russian leadership decided to meet the shah. Moreover, the appearance in Persia of military units led by Russian officers inevitably meant the growth of Russian influence on the politics of the Persian state. Therefore, the "good" to send military advisers to Persia was received. Thus began the history of the Persian Cossacks of the Shahs of Qajars.
Thirty-two-year-old lieutenant colonel Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich was already an experienced officer by the time of the events described. He served in the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District as a head officer for special assignments. Behind the shoulders of a lieutenant colonel, a Kuban Cossack by origin, he studied at the 2nd Moscow Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School and the Mikhailovsky Artillery School and fourteen-year military service. In 1864, Domontovich began to serve as a cornet of the 11th horse-artillery battery of the Kuban Cossack army, in 1872-1875. studied at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, at the end of which he was distributed as a senior adjutant to the headquarters of the 38th Infantry Division and promoted to captain. In 1876, Captain Domontovich took part in the occupation of Bayazet, Surp-Oganez, Bolshoi Karakilisa, Diadin and a number of other battles. For military feats, the officer received the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree with swords and a bow and was promoted to lieutenant colonel - for participating in the battles of Dayar. Therefore, it was not surprising that the choice in discussing the candidacy of a military adviser sent to Persia fell on Lieutenant Colonel Domontovich. On February 7, 1879, Domontovich signed a contract with the Persian leadership on the arrival of a Russian military mission in Persia and the formation of a Persian Cossack brigade. Domontovich himself was appointed first brigade commander, and in 1880 received the rank of colonel. In 1879, the first regiment of the brigade was formed.
The organization of the brigade service was very interesting. Formally, the Persian Cossack brigade was subordinate to the Minister of War of Persia, but in fact the brigade was controlled by the Russian ambassador in Persia. The commander of the Persian Cossack brigade was a Russian officer with the rank of colonel of the General Staff, officially having the post of head of training for the Persian cavalry. He was subordinate to Russian officers and officers, considered his assistants. Each regiment of the brigade was commanded by a Persian general, however, the actual commander of each regiment was again a Russian officer - instructor. In each regiment of the brigade, an officer instructor was subordinate to the officer, who assisted in the training of personnel. The cavalry regiments of the brigade consisted of each of four squadrons, which in turn included four platoons.
The personnel of the Persian Cossack brigade was initially decided to be equipped with Muhajirs, the descendants of migrants from the Caucasus who had gone to Persia after the victory of Russia in the Caucasian War. The highlanders were considered warlike, brave, familiar with military affairs, so they were best suited for the role of Cossacks brigade. Over time, more than half of the Cossacks of the brigade came from mountainous Kurdish tribes of Iranian Kurdistan, and the rest was composed of representatives of the Turkic tribes of Iran, Turkmens and Afghans. Warriors of the brigade wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack army, were armed with rifles of the Berdan system and the cold with sabers and daggers.
In 1882, Colonel Domontovich was recalled to Russia and after some time was appointed chief of staff of the Caucasian Cavalry Division. Subsequently, he rose to the rank of general from the cavalry, commanded the 2nd consolidated Cossack division, and retired in 1906. Colonel of the General Staff Pyotr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was appointed the new brigade commander. He formed a third Cossack regiment and a squadron of Kadama veterans, consisting of representatives of older ages, as part of the brigade. Also included in the Persian Cossack brigade were mounted artillery batteries, a squadron of the Shah's guard and a musical detachment. In 1885, Colonel Charkovsky, who had left to serve as chief of staff of the 21st Infantry Division of the 3rd Caucasian Army Corps, was replaced by Colonel Kuzmin-Karavaev as brigade commander. He headed the brigade until 1891, when he was replaced by Colonel Alexander Konstantinovich Shneur (he commanded the brigade in 1891-1894).
However, already in the second half of the 1880s. The Russian leadership lost interest in the brigade, which immediately affected its financial support. The reduction of the personnel of the brigade began - up to 200-300 people by the mid-1890s. Nasser al-Din Shah Kajar also lost interest in the brigade. The Persian Minister of War, Naib os-Saltane, who was heavily influenced by British agents, generally insisted on the dissolution of the Persian Cossack brigade. According to the minister, it was enough to save only the Cossack convoy to escort the shah. However, Nasser al-Din Qajar still abandoned the idea of \u200b\u200bdisbanding the brigade - largely because he did not want to quarrel with his powerful northern neighbor. But the possibility of replacing Russian officers with German instructors was already beginning to be discussed by the Persian command. 
Clouds were gathering over the brigade, and who knows, maybe during 1894-1896. it would have ceased to exist if in 1894 a new brigade commander — Colonel of the General Staff Vladimir Andreevich Kosogovsky had not been appointed. A graduate of the Nikolaev Cavalry School, Kosogovsky first served in the 12th Hussar Akhtyrsky Regiment, then as a senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 2nd Caucasian Cossack Division, commanded a squadron of the 22nd Dragoon Astrakhan Regiment, served as chief officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District and an officer for special assignments under the commander of the troops of the Semirechensk region. In 1890, Lieutenant Colonel Kosogovsky became the headquarters officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, and in 1894 he was promoted to colonel and sent to Persia to command the Cossack brigade.
Colonel Kosogovsky was far from a simple serving man. He was fluent in Farsi and other Iranian dialects, studied the life and traditions of the peoples of Persia. It was Kosogovsky who proposed to the Shah the idea of \u200b\u200bcreating, on the basis of the Persian Cossack brigade, a new Persian army of a modern type. He resumed recruiting personnel to the brigade, and by September 1894, under the command of the colonel were 500 Cossacks. However, there was a scandal. When Kosogovsky canceled the privileges of the Muhajirs, some of them rebelled. On May 5, 1895, the Muhajirs left the brigade’s location, taking the hereditary pensions. The Minister of War, Naib os-Saltane, known for his hostile attitude towards the brigade, invited some of the Muhajirs who left the area under his command, and on May 9, 1895, announced the creation of the Persian brigade. The British officers were to become her instructors, but the Russian embassy intervened and on May 24, 1895, Shah Nasser al-Din ordered the disbandment of the os-Saltane brigade. Then the shah signed an agreement that only Russian military instructors would serve in the brigade. Intervention in the internal affairs of the brigade was prohibited even for the leaders of the Persian War Ministry.
For nine years of command of the brigade, Kosogovsky managed to turn it into the most combat-ready formation of the Persian army. Accordingly, the influence of Kosogovsky himself on the political life of Persia sharply increased. He turned into one of the chief military advisers to the Shah. In March 1899, Shah Mozafereddin-Shah Kajar, who succeeded Nasser al-Din Kajar, who was killed in 1896, on the throne, ordered the brigade to be increased by one thousand people. So the Persian Cossack brigade turned into a powerful force of 1,600 trained and well-armed Cossacks. Colonel Kosogovsky in 1900, being the commander of the Persian Cossack brigade, was promoted to major general, and continued to command the brigade until 1903, when he was replaced by Colonel Fedor Grigoryevich Chernozubov. In 1906, Colonel Vladimir Platonovich Lyakhov became the brigade commander. It was he who commanded the brigade in 1908, when on June 22, on the orders of the new Shah Muhammad Ali, who replaced the Mozafereddin Shah Kajar, who died in 1907, the Persian Majlis was shot from artillery. For this, the Shah appointed Lyakhov Governor-General of Tehran. Seeing the reliability of the brigade, the Shah thought about a further increase in its strength. In 1913, units of the brigade, previously stationed exclusively in Tehran, were deployed in Tabriz, Rasht and Hamadan.
In 1909, Colonel Lyakhov (pictured) was transferred to Russia - to the post of commander of the 50th Bialystok Infantry Regiment, and in 1912 he became chief of the military headquarters of the Kuban Cossack Army. He rose to the rank of lieutenant general and commanded the 1st Caucasian Army Corps, and after the revolution and the outbreak of the Civil War — the troops of the Tepsko-Dagestan Territory of the Volunteer Army, he was killed in 1919. The new brigade commander was appointed Colonel Prince Nikolai Petrovich Wadbolsky - a participant in the Russo-Japanese War, who served as chief of staff of the Caucasian Cavalry Division. Wadbolsky owes the merit of ridding the brigade of fulfilling its unusual functions of carrying out police service in the northern provinces of Persia.
In the summer of 1916, the Persian Cossack Brigade was reorganized into the Persian Cossack Division. He commanded her in 1916-1917. Major General Baron Vladimir Nikolaevich von Meidel - a participant in the First World War, and in 1917-1918. - Colonel Georgy Iosifovich Klerzhe, in the future Chief of Staff of the Ataman Semenov. After the change of power in Russia, the division was taken into balance by the British, who received great influence in Persia. In the years 1918-1920. The Persian Cossack Division was commanded by the last Russian commander, Colonel Vsevolod Dmitrievich Staroselsky, a former commander of the Guards Cavalry Regiment, who left for Persia after the October Revolution. At the same time, divisions of the division patrolled the coast of the Caspian Sea in order to prevent the landing of Soviet troops. It was they who forced the detachment of the Red Army, commanded by Fedor Raskolnikov, to leave Persia. The famous adventure of “Sovietization” of Persia did not succeed in many respects thanks to the Persian Cossack division. However, in 1920, under pressure from British military advisers, all Russian officers serving in the division were dismissed, and command was transferred to Persian officers.
At the end of 1920, the division was disbanded, and five years later General Reza Khan was proclaimed Shah of Persia (on the left in the photo of 1910), which gave rise to the new Pahlavi dynasty. Ironically, Reza Khan was a native of the Persian Cossack Brigade. It was there that a young man named Reza Savadkuhi, a Mazenderan father and an Azerbaijani mother, began serving as a private, and in 1898, at the age of twenty, he was promoted to officer and served in the Persian Cossack brigade (and then division) for more than twenty years, having risen to 1919 to the rank of general. In 1921, in the midst of turmoil, General Reza Khan with the help of his friends - officers, former colleagues in the Persian Cossack Brigade, captured Tehran. Ahmed Shah Kajar was forced to appoint him the military governor of the capital, then the Minister of War. In 1923, Reza Khan led the Persian government, and in 1925 announced the deposition of Ahmed Shah Kajar and became the new ruler of the country.